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Brentanian continua and their boundaries
Arthur Heller Britto
This dissertation focuses on how a specific conceptual thread of the history of mathematics
unfolded throughout the centuries from its original account in Ancient Greece to its demise in
the Modern era due to new mathematical developments and, finally, to its revival in the work of
Brentano. In particular, we shall discuss how the notion of continuity and the connected notion
of continua and boundaries developed through the ages until Brentano’s revival of the original
Aristotelian account against the by then established mathematical ortodoxy. Thus, this monograph
hopes to fill in a gap in the present state of Brentanian scholarship as well as to present a thorough
account of this specific historical thread.
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Introduction
Imagine we have a light that shines with a blue colour. At one point, though, say at noon today,
this colour immediately changes and the light starts to shine a red light. Then, one could ask: what
is the last instant in which the light’s colour was blue? And, analogously, one could also ask: what
is the first instant that the light started to shine red? An obvious answer to both questions seems
to be precisely noon. However, if we take a closer look at these answers, we will realize, first that
they cannot be both true together, if we assume that there is only one instant happening at noon;
for if this instant is both the last instant in which the light was blue and the first instant that the
light was red, we will necessarily have to say that the light was both fully blue and fully red at this
instant, which seems to be a contradiction.
Maybe, then, one might reply, we should say that noon is the first instant the light was red and
we can take an instant that is one millisecond before noon and claim that that instant is the last
instant in which the light was blue. A first obvious objection to this, however, would be: but what in
the world allows one to pick the later colour as the one actually present at noon and not the earlier
one? Indeed, this attempted solution is guilty of some apparent inherent air of arbitrariness; one
cannot present a principled reason to choose red instead of blue as the colour of the light at noon.
However, there is a further problem hiding in this simple alleged solution. A natural assumption
about time is that between any two instants there is at least another instant. Now, if this is true,
then, looking back at our example, we must conclude that there is at least another instant between
that last instant in which the light was blue and noon; and, hence, we can ask: what was the colour
of the light in that instant. If we answer “blue”, then we would contradict the claim that the instant
one millisecond before noon was the last instant in which the light was blue; and, if we answer
“red”, then we would contradict the claim that the instant at noon was indeed the first instant in
which the light was red. Thus, we must conclude that in this particular instant between noon and
a millisecond before noon, the light was neither blue not red. But we assumed that the change was
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immediate, that is, that no instant passed between the light being blue and then red. We definitely
seem to have sunk deeply into a murky logical swamp.
Indeed, this kind of problems have a very old history, dating back at least to Ancient Greece,
but they are nonetheless also relevant today, with discussions as to how to solve them coming from
all directions of research. In particular, we can mention the 20th century attempts, pioneered by
Whitehead, de Laguna, Broad and other authors, at constructing a “point-free” version of topology.
However, the main point to keep in mind here is that all these discussions have as common ground
the discussion of the topological notion of continuity.
This notion is, however, not an intrinsically clear one. In fact, different circumstances call for
slightly different ideas regarding how to cash out this notion of continuity. Nowadays, in mathemat-
ics, the most common usage of this notion of continuity is perhaps in connection to functions. In
this sense, a function — more specifically, let us think here of a simple function from real numbers
to real numbers — is said to be continuous if one can draw its graph without taking the pen off the
paper, i.e., if the line that we recognize as its graph does not contain any “jumps”. The usual formal
characterization of this property is the classical ε-δ property, which shall be studied in a little more
depth further on in this dissertation, but which can be intuitively described here as the property
according to which a “small” change of the argument of the function only produces a “small” change
in its value at this argument — or, in other words, a change to a “nearby” argument point moves
the value of the function also to a “nearby” value. We can see in this sense how this notion is also
connected to the notion of “closeness”. Nonetheless, this transition into a rigorous definition does
away with the original intuition of gaplessness in the sense that we are now always considering a
“close” argument point, but one that is indeed some distance away from the original point and that
cannot be considered the “next” point following the original argument in the sense that there is a
whole interval of points strictly between the two points we are considering.
The main goal of this dissertation, thus, is to unravel a specific thread in the history of math-
ematics. More specifically, we shall discuss the particular development of this notion of continuity,
that started in Ancient Greece and eventually evolved into a key notion of the modern mathematical
theory of point-set topology.
However, we shall look at this historical thread from the perspective of Brentano’s ideas con-
cerning these matters as they were presented in his late texts from the first decades of the 20th
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century. In doing so, our goal is to fill out a gap in Brentano’s scholarship, as well as to offer a fairly
self-contained presentation of this particular historical thread — giving special emphasis on details
that share connections with Brentano’s ideas on the matter. It is not only my personal opinion that
problems — and, ultimately, their solutions — are much better understood in historical context, but
also, Brentano himself was a fairly historically oriented thinker and, although he presented many
radically new ideas, he always relied on the historical tradition of every problem he dealt with.
Thus, the first chapter of the dissertation deals with the beginning of the history of this concept
of continuity, as it was presented by Aristotle and further developed both by later Ancient and by
Medieval thinkers. Special attention will be given to a particular interpretation of these topics by
a specific Medieval tradition that became known to contemporary writers as quasi-Aristotelianism.
This is done since this tradition contains ideas that are very much in tune with the later Brentanian
account of the subject, so that the study of this earlier tradition shall provide us not only with the
necessary historical underpinning of Brentano’s position, but also with an early presentation of the
logical structure of the problems of the Aristotelian position, and of the structure of a solution that
will eventually turn out to be analogous to the later Brentanian solution.
In the second chapter, we shall look at how the notion of continua developed from the original
Aristotelian background assumptions — in particular, from the claim that these continua cannot be
composed out of indivisibles — to the modern mathematical, or point-set theoretical, conception
that relies heavily on indivisibles. It is our thesis that this change was carried out in the wake
of new and very powerful integration methods that were developed around the beginning of the
Early Modern period. Accordingly, we shall briefly study these methods and point out their shared
characteristics which contribute to yield a logical defense of the thesis that continua are indeed
composed out of indivisibles.
The third chapter, then, is concerned with Brentano’s own ideas on this topic, from his criticisms
of the mathematical constructions of continua in his time, to his positive ideas regarding their nature
and properties. These ideas compose a fairly detailed account of the nature of continua which, I
believe, amounts to a very interesting and complete description of what one might call, as will
be explained later in this monograph, “the natural topology of the 3-dimensional objects of outer
experience”. This topology will radically differ from the orthodox mathematical topological accounts
in that there will not be open sets, since a basic thesis of this account is that every bounded portion
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of space has its own boundary. This, in turn, will yield a very down to earth theory of contact and
of change that bypasses all the problems that creep into the orthodox set-theoretical approach to
defining these concepts.
It is my view that this Brentanian conception of continua relates to new, extensive and exciting
work — by authors like Gotts, Gooday and Cohn, and Lando and Scott — that is being carried
out today both from a philosophical and from a formal-mathematical perspective. This monograph
aims at providing a different perspective to these questions and paves the way for the introduction
of Brentanian concepts and ideas into this current debate.
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CHAPTER 1
Aristotle and the origins of the notion of continuity
Like many other crucial notions that are nowadays commonplace in science and mathematics,
our first recorded logical assessment of the notion of continuity dates from Ancient Greece. In
particular, we can date the first known inquiries into this notion and the problems inherent to it to
two disciples of Parmenides of Elea: Melissus of Samos and Zeno of Elea. The latter, indeed, became
especially famous for his arguments that relied heavily on the infinite divisibility of space and time
to derive so-called “paradoxes of motion” and, thus, vindicate his teacher’s doctrine that motion
was not real. For instance, we can mention the classical arrow paradox which aims to conclude that
an arrow shot could never reach its intended target. For, say the target is set 10m from where the
arrow was shot; then, in order to get to the target, the arrow would have to travel at least until the
midway point, which is 5m away. The same argument, however, can be used again having now the
midway point as the new location where the arrow begins its motion and we must conclude that in
order to get to the target from this new position the arrow needs to go through the new midway
point that is 2.5m away. Moreover, from every new mid point we can carry out the argument, so
that by applying it an ever increasing number of times we arrive at the result that the arrow would
have to travel an infinite number of distances each being half the size of the former, but all of them
being nonetheless strictly positive. This, Zeno argued, would imply that this traversed distance
must be infinite and, therefore, that a complete motion until the target would be indeed impossible!
Now, Aristotle, surely having as one of his goals the refusal of such paradoxes and the idea that
there must be a way to dispel them by means of a proper understanding of the terms used, was the
first to really present a thorough and strictly speaking logical account of this notion of “continuity”.
1. Aristotle’s theory of continuity
Aristotle’s account of continuity can be separated into two distinct parts. On the one hand,
we have his “offical” abstract account in the Physics and the Categories in which he considers
continuity as a property of some things or quantities in opposition to others. On the other hand,
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however, we have the actual usage that Aristotle makes of the notion of continuity — specifically
with respect to time — in the context of motion and transformations.
In this chapter we shall first concentrate on the former aspect and, once we have a good grasp
of it, we shall discuss the enormously controversial application to motion and its development until
the Medieval period.
1.1. The definition. Aristotle presents us in Book V of the Physics a definition of a notion
of continuity, together with the related more basic notions of “being next-in-succession” and of
“contiguity”. The reason for this, as he recognizes in the beginning of Book III, is that
motion is supposed to belong to the class of things which are continuous; and the
infinite presents itself first in the continuous—that is how it comes about that the
account of the infinite is often used in definitions of the continuous; for what is
infinitely divisible is continuous. (Physics, 200b16-20)
Hence, as far as our main topic is concerned, Aristotle here not only claims that motion has a
particular connection to the notion of a continuum — a fact that shall lead to some tensions, which
shall be discussed later —, thus explaining the connection that will lead him to further discuss this
latter notion, but also already stipulates a fundamental relation between continua and the notion
of infinity, by recognizing a first specific property of continua, viz. the property of being “infinitely
divisible”.1 This notion is to be contrasted with what Aristotle calls “an indivisible”.2 These can be
interpreted either as extended atoms that cannot be divided because of some fundamental impos-
sibility in its own nature, or, as we shall do henceforth in this monograph, as things that fail to be
able to be divided because they lack extension in some spatial way.
This seems to be a fairly minor point, but, in fact, these two notions of an “indivisible” have
extremely different logical implications for one’s conception of them. Indeed, having some true
extension, the first kind of indivisibles — that we might call something like “the thick conception
of atoms” — can easily be though of as composing an extended continuum; something like the
Archimedean axiom would guarantee that, no matter how small the extension of these thick atoms,
if we juxtapose enough of them, we will arrive at a continuum that is as large as we want. Therefore,
although these thick atoms were fairly common place in the mind of Ancient atomists, it seems that
1In fact, this property of continua is mentioned by Aristotle already in book I of the Physics: “the continuous is
divisible ad infinitum” [εὶς ἅπειρον γὰρ διαιρετὸν τὸ σινεχές] (185b10-185b11).
2Aristotle uses the word ἀδιαιρετον, which is exactly the Greek counterpart of “indivisible”.
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Aristotle’s notion of “an indivisible” was indeed the truly unextended version, as we shall justify
more thoroughly further on in order to consider Aristotle’s claim that continua cannot be made up
of indivisibles.
But first, let us consider what one can call “Aristotle’s technical definition of continua”, which
is presented further down the text of the Physics. This passage is important because it lays down
the structure of an account of the notion of continuity that, not only was completely dominant until
at least the Late Middle Ages, but also played a significant role in characterizing Brentano’s views
on the matter, as will become clear in a later chapter of this monograph. Thus, we shall quote the
full passage here and then go on to present our reading of it.
A thing is in succession when it is after the beginning in position or in form or in
some other respect in which it is definitely so regarded, and when further there is
nothing of the same kind as itself between it and that to which it is in succession
[...].
A thing that is in succession and touches is contiguous. The continuous
[σινεχές] is a subdivision of the contiguous: things are called continuous when
the touching limits of each become one and the same and are, as the word im-
plies, contained in each other: continuity is impossible if these extremities are two.
This definition makes it plain that continuity belongs to things that naturally in
virtue of their mutual contact form a unity. And in whatever way that which
holds them together is one, so too will the whole be one, e.g. by a rivet or glue
or contact or organic union.
It is obvious that of these terms ‘in succession’ is primary; for that which
touches is necessarily in succession, but not everything that is in succession
touches: and so succession is a property of things prior in definition, e.g. numbers,
while contact is not. And if there is continuity there is necessarily contact, but if
there is contact, that alone does not imply continuity; for the extremities of things
may be together without necessarily being one; but they cannot be one without
necessarily being together [ἅμα]. So natural union is last in coming to be; for the
extremities must necessarily come into contact if they are to be naturally united;
but things that are in contact are not all naturally united, while where there is no
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contact clearly there is no natural union either. Hence, if as some say points and
units have an independent existence of their own, it is impossible for the two to
be identical; for points can touch while units can only be in succession. Moreover,
there can always be something between points (for all lines are intermediate be-
tween points), whereas it is not necessary that there should be anything between
units; for there is nothing between the numbers one and two. (Physics, Book V,
226b34-227a34)3
At a first glance, we readily see that these definitions hint at something like a distinction we
might make today between discrete and non-discrete entities, for the former are the things that
can be next-in-succession, in the sense that nothing of the same character is between the previous
thing and what is next-in-succession to it. The interesting thing to note, however, is that, although
unfortunately4 Aristotle was still very far from a further subdivision that modern mathematicians
make inside the non-discrete class between the “truly continuous” and the “merely dense”,5 he did
nonetheless provide us with another interesting distinction to be made in this domain of the non-
discrete — viz. the distinction between “the merely contiguous” and the “truly continuous” things.
Now, in order to carry out a proper clarification of this Aristotelian characterization, we need
to understand the corresponding notion of “limit” or “boundary”, which shall be done in the next
section.
3Another interesting passage is the following passage from the Categories:
To quantity let us turn next. This is either discrete or continuous. [...] Of quantities that are discrete
we may here instance number and speech, of quantities that are continuous line, superficies and solid, to
which time and place may be added. [...] Thus is number discrete, not continuous. The same may be
said about speech, if by speech the spoken word is intended. Being measured in long and short syllables,
speech is an evident quantity, whose parts possess no common boundary. No common limit exists, where
those parts—that is, syllables—join. Each, indeed, is distinct from the rest.
A line is, however, continuous. Here we discover that limit of which we have just now been speaking. This
limit or term is a point. So it is with a plane or a solid. Their parts also have such a limit— line in the
case of the former, a line or a plane in the latter. Again, time and space are continuous. Time is a whole
and continuous; the present, past, future are linked. Space is also this kind of a quantity. For seeing the
parts of a solid themselves occupy so much space and these parts have a limit in common, it follows the
parts of space also, which those parts themselves occupy, have exactly the same common limit or term as
the parts of the solid. As is time, so is space, then, continuous: the parts meet at one common boundary.
(Categories, VI, 4b22-5a14)
4And, of course, very much understandably.
5The latter being that which has the property that between any two things of this kind there is always another of
the same kind in between, while the former requires a much more complicated property, which shall be discussed in
a later chapter.
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1.2. Boundaries. We should pay attention to the fact that, in order to carry out the aforemen-
tioned distinction between “being next-in-succession”, “being contiguous” and “being continuous”,
Aristotle introduces the notion of “limit” [ἔσχατον]. In particular, he is assuming that things that
can be contiguous or continuous, i.e., what we would now call the domain of the non-discrete, all
have these limits and that these limits can touch or even fuse into a single limit, or, as Aristotle puts
it, they can “become one and the same”. In order to standardize our terminology, we shall use the
fairly synonymous term “boundary” for ἔσχατον, which is usually translated as “limit” or “extrem-
ity”. I would like to stress here that the translation into “limit” is by no means a bad translation.
Indeed, it is usually the preferred word to carry out this translations in most scholarly contexts.
However, the ancient Greek word ἔσχατον is closely related in meaning to the word ὅρος, which is,
in its turn the root word for both ὅριον, which means literally “boundary”, and for ὅροσμός, which
was the corresponding Ancient Greek word for the latin definitio — which gave rise to the English
“definition”, in the sense of something that limits the meaning of a thing. Our choice of terminology
here, viz. the translation of ἔσχατον as boundary, is simply to unify our discussion with the much
later terminology found in Brentano and used in the later chapters of this dissertation. Moreover,
we should note that Aristotle talks about this notion of “limit” in a way that is parallel to the use
of the term “boundary” in modern mathematics, as we can see in the following passage:
We call a limit the extremity of each thing, i.e. the first thing outside of which
no part [of the thing] is to be found, and the first thing inside of which every part
[of the thing] is to be found. (Metaphysics, ∆, 1022a4–5)
Now, to understand this notion of “boundary”, it is important to go back to the notion of “an
indivisible”. We have mentioned that this latter term in Ancient Greece could mean different things
— viz. extended atoms or unextended spatial figures. Now, because of the path that we shall take
in the further chapters of this monograph, we shall didactically forget about extended atoms6 and
define this concept of “an indivisible” to encompass any geometrical figure that is unextended in
6We shall have the opportunity in the next chapter to discuss an analogous late Medieval or early Modern distinction
between indivisibles and the so-called “infinitesimals”, which are the counterparts of these extended atoms of Antiquity.
9
at least one of the three spatial dimensions.7 Thus, a plane figure, a line, a point, these are all
examples of such indivisibles.
Then, we should note as well that, although there is no clear explicit claim in Aristotle to
identify these boundaries with indivisibles, it seems to be a very natural move to carry out this
identification of the various possible boundaries of geometrical figures with one or another type of
these indivisibles. For instance, it is extremely natural to consider two points as the boundary of
a line segment, a circle as the boundary of a two-dimensional disc, a sphere as the boundary of a
3-dimensional massive ball etc.
Moreover, another example that is particularly important for Aristotle is the “now”, which
is understood by him to be the boundary between past and future in the continuum of time.8,9
However, this characterization of the “now” is by no means restricted to it, but extends to all types
of boundaries. Thus, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle says that
[c]learly it is the same with points, lines and planes, for the same account holds,
since all alike are boundaries or divisions. (Metaphysics, 1002b8-11)
1.3. Boundaries are not substances. An important part of Aristotle’s account of continua
is, for the purposes of this monograph, the claim that boundaries are not substances. This is the
case because this Aristotelian claim is closely related, as we shall see later, with Brentano’s idea
that a continuum cannot be thought of as composed out of indivisibles. But first, let us analyse
how these notions are interconnected in Aristotle’s account.
7Here we should mention a text that has been credited to Aristotle, but whose authorship has been severely contested.
It is the text whose Latin name is De lineis insecabilibus and that contains essentially a discussion of whether lines
(and, more generally even, whether any geometrical figure that is unextended in some dimension but extended in
another) can indeed be though of as indivisibles. Most of the text is, indeed, dedicated to pointing out that lines,
being extended in one direction, can be divided in that direction, so that the ascription of the predicate “indivisible”
to lines constitutes a contradiction. This line of reasoning is extremely interesting in its rigor, since we must recognize
that, from a purely logical standpoint, truly indivisible figures must be indeed points. However, I believe that the
failure to use such a rigorous approach is not an insurmountable problem for Aristotle’s official account, since pretty
much all of the properties necessary for his theory are indeed present in this notion of an indivisible as something
that is unextended, not in general, but in at least one possible direction.
8“the now [...] is indivisible and is inherent in all time. For the now is an extremity of the past (no part of the future
being on this side of it), and again of the future (no part of the past being on that side of it): it is, we maintain, a
limit of both. And if it is proved that it is of this character and one and the same, it will at once be evident also that
it is indivisible.” (Physics, 233b32-234a4)
9Sorabji (1983) says about an instant that it
is not a very short period, but rather the beginning or end (the boundary) of a period. It
therefore has no size, for it is not a very short line, but rather the boundary of a line. (p. 8)
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First, we should note that, in Aristotle’s philosophical framework, everything that exists is
essentially split into two classes of “beings”: the class of substances and the class of things that
belong to those substances. Moreover, the main distinguishing property between these classes is
that, whereas substances can have independent existence, i.e., they do not require the existence of
anything else for their own existence, the things that belong to them can only exist on top of some
specific underlying substance that is to be thought, therefore, as having an ontologically prior being
or existence. This has consequences regarding how each of these different metaphysical entities
can come into being and cease to be. Indeed, Aristotle says in the beginning of the last passage
mentioned that
besides what has been said, there are also paradoxes about coming into existence
and ceasing to exist. It is thought that in the case of a substance, if it now exists
without having existed previously, or later fails to exist after previously existing,
it must be in process of coming into existence or ceasing to exist. But with
regards to points, lines and surfaces, when they exist at one time without existing
at another, they cannot be in the process of coming into existence or ceasing to
exist. For as soon as bodies have been put together, one boundary does not exist,
but has ceased to exist, and when they have been divided, the boundaries exist
which did not exist before (for the point, being indivisible, was not divided into
two). And if the boundaries are in process of coming into existence or ceasing to
exist, from what are they coming into existence?
It is similar with the now in time; for this too cannot be in the process of
coming into existence or ceasing to exist, and yet it is thought to be ever different,
which shows that it is not a substance. Clearly it is the same with points, lines
and planes, for the same account holds, since all alike are boundaries or divisions.
(Metaphysics, 1002a28-b11)
This passage portrays very clearly how, for Aristotle, boundaries are sui generis objects, that,
for instance, can come to be without ever being in the processes of becoming and, conversely, can
cease to exist without ever being in the process of ceasing to exist. Indeed, in the Physics he
restricts the general metaphysical claim that nothing can exist (not exist) without being previously
in the process of coming into existence (ceasing to exist) explicitly to continuous or divisible things:
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Hence it is apparent that what has come into existence must previously have been
in process of coming into existence [...] in the case of things which are divisible
and continuous. (237b10)
Furthermore, this point is what evolved into the discussion that became known as “the problem
of the ceasing instant”. In particular, Kretzmann says that
[i]n the light of the notion of instantaneous transition, just introduced, such ceas-
ings and beginnings take place at instants — instants that serve as limits of the
temporal interval during which the one or the other of the opposed conditions
obtains. But since instants cannot be immediate to each other, two intervals im-
mediate to each other must be limited relative to each other by one and the same
instant. (Aristotelian instants are mere cuts in the potentially infinitely divisible
temporal continuum, and one cut cannot be immediately adjacent to another.
Thus, any two instants define a temporal interval, no matter how short; and any
interval, no matter how short, can be divided by a middle instant into two inter-
vals each of which is only half as long as the original.) Thus, the ceasing of one
contradictory condition and the beginning of the other must occur at one and the
same instant, the instant of transition. (Kretzmann (1982), p. 273)
Indeed, these elements provide, according to Sorabji (1983), the logical foundation on top of
which
Aristotle would solve the paradox of the ceasing instant. Moreover, I think that
the solution is not only brilliantly ingenious, but also entirely effective. It renders
unnecessary the alternative solutions of the following nine hundred years. (p. 12)
Thus, in order to go more deeply into the details of these logical elements, we shall discuss a little
bit of this paradox and its Aristotelian solution in the next section. But, before that, let us complete
our exposition of the basic Aristotelian position, by analysing another fact that will play a major
role in Brentano’s application of this metaphysical position.
1.4. Boundaries are indivisibles and, thus, cannot compose continua. Note that all
of these boundaries we have been considering are unextended in at least one direction and, thus,
are all indivisibles. Hence, we shall here make our first exegetical assumption and suppose that the
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boundaries that Aristotle talks about are indeed these indivisibles. There is an interesting passage
in book B of the Metaphysics that attests to this interpretation. In it, Aristotle says:
if it is a magnitude, it is corporeal; for the corporeal has being in every dimension,
while the other objects of mathematics, e.g. a plane or a line, added in one way
will increase what they are added to, but in another way will not do so, and a
point or a unit does so in no way. (1001b10-11)
The connection seems to be between having extension in some spatial dimension and being able
to increase something’s size “in one way or another”. More specifically, we claim that these “ways”
in which something might add to something else are precisely what we would recognize now as
spatial dimensions. And right after that, Aristotle claims that adding such indivisibles would surely
increase the “number”, but not the “size”, for how can
a magnitude proceed from one such indivisible or from many? It is like saying
that the line is made out of points. (Ibid., 1001b17-19)
What seems to be claimed here is that, although surely boundaries seem to play a vital role
in the Aristotelian characterization of continua,10 they are not assumed to compose these continua
as their building blocks. That is clear, for instance, in the following passage, that opens the sixth
book of the Physics:
Now if the terms ‘continuous’, ‘in contact’, and ‘in succession’ are understood as
defined above—things being continuous if their extremities are one, in contact if
their extremities are together, and in succession if there is nothing of their own
kind intermediate between them—nothing that is continuous can be composed of
indivisibles: e.g. a line cannot be composed of points, the line being continuous
and the point indivisible. For the extremities of two points can neither be one
(since of an indivisible there can be no extremity as distinct from some other part)
nor together (since that which has no parts can have no extremity, the extremity
and the thing of which it is the extremity being distinct).
10Indeed, we find Aristotle characterizing the notion of a “body” by means of this notion of “boundary”:
If ‘bounded by a surface’ is the definition of body there cannot be an infinite body either
intelligible or sensible. (Physics, 204b5)
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Moreover, if that which is continuous is composed of points, these points must
be either continuous or in contact with one another: and the same reasoning
applies in the case of all indivisibles. Now for the reason given above they cannot
be continuous; and one thing can be in contact with another only if whole is in
contact with whole or part with part or part with whole. But since indivisibles
have no parts, they must be in contact with one another as whole with whole.
And if they are in contact with one another as whole with whole, they will not be
continuous; for that which is continuous has distinct parts, and these parts into
which it is divisible are different in this way, i.e. spatially separate.
Nor, again, can a point be in succession to a point or a now to a now in
such a way that length can be composed of points or time of nows; for things
are in succession if there is nothing of their own kind intermediate between them,
whereas intermediate between points there is always a line and between nows a
period of time.
Again, they could be divided into indivisibles, since each is divisible into the
parts of which it is composed. But, as we saw, no continuous thing is divisible
into things without parts. Nor can there be anything of any other kind between;
for it would be either indivisible or divisible, and if it is divisible, divisible either
into indivisibles or into divisibles that are always divisible, in which case it is
continuous.
Moreover, it is plain that everything continuous is divisible into divisibles
that are always divisible; for if it were divisible into indivisibles, we should have
an indivisible in contact with an indivisible, since the extremities of things that
are continuous with one another are one and are in contact. (Physics, 231a18-
231b17)
This passage has become fairly famous and it essentially deduces contradictions from the as-
sumption that points can be either next-in-succession, in contact or continuous with each other. The
main result from this argument, however, is that continua cannot be mere aggregates of indivisibles
— and this fact is indeed brought back by Aristotle in the last paragraph to lend its weight to the
original characterization of continua as infinitely divisible. However, this position had already been
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explicitly made in the Physics, albeit not in its present fully abstract form. For instance, let us
consider the following passage:
the ‘now’ is not a part: a part is a measure of the whole, which must be made up
of parts. Time, on the other hand, is not held to be made up of ‘nows’. (218a6-8)
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This passage seems to raise the reader’s attention to the “indivisible” character of what Aristotle
calls “the now” [νῦν]. This is done, however, by means of another notion, that of “measurability”.
Usually, in Ancient Greek texts one sees this word used in relation to the mathematical distinction
between rational and irrational magnitudes, i.e., between magnitudes that share a common unit
of measurement and magnitudes that do not.12 Here, however, we have a slightly different, albeit
related meaning being used. Indeed, here the question is not whether two magnitudes share a
common unit and, therefore, are rational; the question here is whether some alleged part of a
magnitude (viz. an instant as a part of a time span) can be superimposed on the magnitude a
natural number of times so that at the end of the superimposition, the whole original magnitude is
covered.13 This seems to be the way the notion of measurement acts in this context and Aristotle
seems to be equating the notion of “a part of a continuous magnitude” to the notion of “being able
to be superimposed on the original magnitude a natural number of times so that at the end of the
superimposition, the whole original magnitude is covered”. In this respect, then, he concludes that
the instant, or the “now”, is not such a part. This conclusion, however, bears a strong indication
that Aristotle is indeed thinking about the “now” essentially as what in our terminology has been
called “an indivisible” or “a boundary”.14
11Another similar passage is:
Necessarily, too, the now—the now so-called not derivatively but in its own right and primarily—is indi-
visible and is inherent in all time. For the now is an extremity of the past (no part of the future being on
this side of it), and again of the future (no part of the past being on that side of it): it is, we maintain,
a limit of both. And if it is proved that it is of this character and one and the same, it will at once be
evident also that it is indivisible. (233b32-234a4)
12E.g., we can think about a pair of lines with 2m and 3m and a pair of lines with 2m and
√
2m. In the first case,
there is another magnitude, say, a line with 1m, that can be superimposed onto the original lines a natural number
of times (2 and 3 times, respectively). However, in the second, there is no such magnitude.
13A more formal property bearing a striking resemblance to this formulation is the Archimedean property, according
to which (as applyied, say, to real numbers), given two real numbers p > q, it is always possible to find a natural
number n, such that nq > p.
14Kretzmann (1976b) calls attention to the fact that many of the portions of a magnitude that would unquestionably
be called “parts” of the magnitude also do not measure the magnitude, as by our reading of this notion. E.g., we can
think about a portion of
√
2m of a line segment 2m long. Indeed, this criticism is reasonable in that it calls attention
to a fault in the formal definition which is not easily corrected, since in our example there is not even a shared part
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Therefore, after all this I believe we can be confident in our interpretation of boundaries as
indivisibles and in our reading of Aristotle’s position as being that boundaries are not parts of
continua and, therefore, that the latter cannot be composed of the former. Indeed, here is Aquinas’
conclusion regarding this topic in his Commentary to Aristotle’s Metaphysics:
And the truth of the matter is that mathematical entities of this kind are not
substances of things [and thus cannot compose things], but are accidents which
accrue to substances. But this mistake about continuous quantities is due to
the fact that no distinction is made between the sort of body which belongs to
the genus of substance and the sort which belongs to the genus of quantity. For
body belongs to the genus of substance according as it is composed of matter and
form; and dimensions are a natural consequence of these in corporeal matter. But
dimensions themselves belong to the genus of quantity, and are not substances but
accidents whose subject is a body composed of matter and form. (pp. 189-190)
And with these things in mind, we can now conclude that, according to Aristotle, the notion
of “a continuous thing” is characterized both by its infinite (potential) divisibility15 and by the fact
that it possesses a fundamental unity that is characterized by the property that any pair of parts
which exhaust the continuum must share at least a boundary. Note, however, how both properties
eventually boil down to the assumption of these indivisible boundaries that are (potentially, per-
haps) everywhere in the continuum, since everywhere in it is a possible place of division and since
everywhere in it can be conceived of as being a place where two parts of the continuum are actually
fused together — a condition that is also determinant for the Aristotelian conception.16
of both segments that can be superimposed in both a (maybe different) natural number of times so as to exhaust
them — i.e., the obvious answer to define a part of a magnitude in terms of the notion of being smaller and rational
with the original magnitude. However, it seems that all this talk about measuring is only the setup that Aristotle
could find in which to discuss the “indivisibleness” of instants, which we explained in terms of it not being extended
in some dimension. Thus, although Kretzmann’s criticisms are not wrong, I believe they fail to hit the overall logical
kernel of Aristotle’s point here, being directed more towards the contingent historical setup that it actually took in
the passage. Furthermore, Aristotle’s setup could be made precise by substituting this notion of “measurement” by
the notion of “covering”, which is what we did here.
15Cf. De generatione et corruptione, I, 2, 317a4-13.
16I’d like to mention here a contemporary interpretation of Aristotle that is less historical and more logico-formal,
but, nonetheless, agrees almost entirely with our characterization here:
To summarize, it seems that, for Aristotle, line segments have actual endpoints — but such
endpoints are decidedly not part of the line segment. They are just its boundaries. Each
endpoint is metaphysically tied to the segment it bounds, and cannot be considered in isolation
from the segment, in the same sense as the smile of the Cheshire cat cannot be considered apart
from the cat. The interior points on a line segment exist only potentially. There is a potential
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Thus, we see how these two properties of continua are, for Aristotle, merely flip-sides of the same
theoretical coin, which is the assumption of this close relation between continua and boundaries.17
However, what is also interesting for our purposes in this monograph is to note a sort of converse of
this claim that any two parts of a continuum must share a common boundary — viz. the fact that
a pair of things that merely touch at their boundaries and, thus, are not fused together into a single
continuum, must each have its own boundary which is somehow collocated with the boundary of
its corresponding contiguous counterpart. Indeed, this independently follows from the fact that a
“thing” or a “body”, as we saw, must have a boundary, together with the fact that two things, if
they are to fail to merge into a single continuous entity, their touching boundaries cannot become
the same. In this respect, we have the following passage from Aristotle:
In the act of dividing the continuous distance into two halves one point is treated
as two, since we make it a beginning and an end; and this same result is produced
by the act of counting halves as well as by the act of dividing into halves. But
if divisions are made in this way, neither the distance nor the motion will be
continuous; for motion if it is to be continuous must relate to what is continuous;
and though what is continuous contains an infinite number of halves, they are
not actual but potential halves. If he makes the halves actual, he will get not a
continuous but an intermittent motion. (Physics, VIII, 263b1-263b6)
1.5. The discussion regarding the scope of book B of Metaphysics. Before we consider
the more specific question of how these Aristotelian ideas regarding substances and their boundaries
have been used in the discussions of motion and the instant of transition, we shall briefly talk about
two points. First, we shall study in this section how much Aristotle was indeed concerned with the
problems we are trying to find answers to in his work. Then, in the next section, we shall discuss
the scope and meaning of his concept of “place”.
infinity of such interior points, but not an actual infinity of them. (Hellmann and Shapiro (2018),
p. 4)
17I believe this overall account is in harmony with Sorabji’s view on Aristotle. For instance, cf. Sorabji (1976), pp.
69-70:
It means that time will be infinitely divisible, and there will be no such thing as a time-atom,
that is, an indivisible period with an indivisible duration. An instant will be not a time-atom,
nor any kind of period, but rather the boundary of a period, itself having no duration.
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So, to start, let us note that, in the beginning of Metaphysics book B, Aristotle claims to be
wrestling with two questions:
whether numbers and lines and figures are a kind of substance or not, and if they
are substances whether they are separate from sensible things or present in them
(996a12–15)
Nonetheless, notwithstanding this clear statement of the problem, we find different opinions in the
literature regarding its true scope. More precisely, we have Madigan (1999, p.29) and Mueller (2009,
pp. 190-191, 204, 205) stating that Aristotle is truly only discussing the first of these questions,
perhaps assuming “dialectically”, as something accepted by the thinkers whose views he is discussing,
that the objects in question here — viz. numbers, lines and figures — are undoubtedly locally
present in substances, as the latter’s boundaries or limits.
However, we must disagree with them and, to do so, we shall follow here a different opinion
found in the literature — more specifically in Katz (2018), who believes that Aristotle does indeed
address the second question, understanding the term “separate” not as local separability, which fails
to hold in the case of the boundaries considered, but as what she terms the “ontological status
relative to sensible bodies” (p. 24). In this sense, then, the question regarding separability is not
whether points, lines and figures can exist as locally distinct entities from bodies — which indeed,
as Madigan and Mueller rightly claim, they cannot —, but whether they are ontologically prior to
bodies or not.
And, in this respect, it seems that Aristotle does conclude that they are also not separable. But,
now, this claim is not merely that they never seem to occur in places which are not occupied by
bodies, but that they, indeed, can never do so! In other words, surfaces, lines and points are not
“more substances” than bodies.
Now, if we look into Aristotle’s argument in this part of book B, his first approach is to mention
“more recent thinkers”, who claim that
a body is surely less of a substance than a surface, and a surface less than a line,
and a line less than a unit and a point. For a body is bounded by these; and
they are thought to be capable of existing without body, but a body cannot exist
without these. This is why the more recent and those who were held to be wiser
thought numbers were the first principles. (1002a4-12)
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However, after he does this, he goes on to criticise this position, claiming that
if this is admitted, that lines and points are substance more than bodies, but we do
not see to what sort of bodies these could belong (for they cannot be in perceptible
bodies), there can be no substance. Further, these are all evidently divisions of
body, one in breadth, another in depth, another in length. [...] Therefore, if on
the one hand body is in the highest degree substance, and on the other hand these
things are so more than body, but these are not even instances of substance, it
baffles us to say what being is and what the substance of things is. (1002a15-27)
Thus, it seems that Aristotle is denying the status of “substance” to indivisibles; or, in Katz’s words,
that, for him,
geometrical objects are groups of properties of certain sensible objects. ((2019),
p. 467)
This is, incidentally, exactly the interpretation we found in Aquinas’ Commentary, which is
however couched in a language that is perhaps more Aristotelian than Aristotle’s, in the sense that
Aquinas, in the aforementioned passage, fully identifies indivisibles with accidents. This is, however,
nothing more than what Katz is claiming when she says that these indivisibles — which are surely
a part of the full collection of geometrical objects — are “properties” of objects.
Moreover, I agree that these positive claims are the correct interpretation of Aristotle’s negative
claim to the effect that indivisibles are not more substances than bodies. This is essentially the
most important elements to extract from this discussion if our goal is to understand the much later
ideas of Brentano. However, I highly recommend Katz’s papers for a more in depth discussion.
1.6. The notion of “place”. Before we move into an exposition of how these general ideas
proposed by Aristotle were applied in the case of motion, we shall have a look at a few points
regarding Aristotle’s notion of “place” as it is presented in the Physics. The reason for doing this is
that, as we shall see in chapter 3 when we consider Brentano’s take on these ideas, several authors,
starting from perhaps a more commonsense-based notion of “place”, fail to truly grasp the main
points of Brentano’s very Aristotelian account, and even try to argue against this account, failing
to notice that in doing so they are incurring in a petitio principii, since they are arguing from a
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certain notion of “place” against a view that does not share this notion, but thinks about place in
a wholly different way.
Now, in Physics IV, Aristotle wrestles with the notion of “place”. In his own words,
we must raise the whole problem about place—–not only as to what it is, but even
whether there is such a thing. (209a29-30)
In particular, it is fairly clear that Aristotle wants to make sure that place is not thought of, as
Furley (1982) puts it,
as a sort of ghostly duplicate of the body itself. (p. 22)
In other words, he wants to go against a very easily considered position (even today), according to
which every body has a certain spatial portion which it is said to occupy and which is usually called
“the object’s place”. Indeed,
when we come to a point we cannot make a distinction between it and its place.
Hence if the place of a point is not different from the point, no more will that of
any of the others be different, and place will not be something different from each
of them. (Physics, 209a9-13)
Aristotle seems to be concerned with making sure that one does not fall into the trap of thinking
about the place of an indivisible over and above the indivisible itself.18 However, we find a more
positive account of what it would be to think about this notion of a “place” in his final conclusion,
according to which
the place of a thing is the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it.
(Physics, 212a20-212a21)
The book Morison (2002) is fully devoted to presenting and discussing this Aristotelian notion
of a “place”, and it does so very thoroughly. For instance, chapter 3 presents a detailed discussion of
Aristotle’s treatment of Zeno’s infinite regress: if everything that exists is somewhere, and if places
exist, then it would seem that places must be somewhere as well; and, then, places of places too, ad
infinitum. As an example of Aristotle’s love for terminological distinctions, his solution is to claim
that there are many ways in which things might be somewhere, depending on the ontological nature
18As we mentioned, the main reason for considering this topic here is that, not only it does bear on the more general
topic of this dissertation, but that we shall have the opportunity in a later chapter to criticise a criticism of Brentano
that hinges precisely on this mistake that Aristotle is urging one not to make.
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of the thing in question. For instance, a property is somewhere in virtue of being in a substance
which, in its turn, is somewhere in the sense that it is in some place. Thus, although Aristotle
does not explicitly tell us what it is for a place to be somewhere, one can extract from his overall
approach that places are somewhere in a sense that is related to the part/whole relation: places are
parts of their spatial environment.
Moreover, Morison also contributes to an explanation of the notion of “that which contains
something”, which is required for Aristotle’s definition to make sense. In particular, one may readily
see that this notion might be extremely ambiguous. For instance, consider a fish in a fishbowl and
ask: what is the thing that contains the fish? Is it the water? Or the bowl? Perhaps the air in the
room? Or maybe the room itself? Morison rightly concludes that, when Aristotle is talking about
the thing that surrounds something he is indeed considering the limiting case in this “Russian doll”
situation, so that what he means is something like the whole universe, which is, for Aristotle, finite
and, thus, can be seen as the “common place of all things”.19
Finally, Morison explains that if we were to take this latter quote too seriously and consider
merely the universe as the place of something, then we would have to conclude that everything
would be in the same place. Thus, if we want, as Aristotle did, to consider places of things as
unique to those things and different from other thing’s places, we must consider a more complicated
notion which is the one picked out by Aristotle by the expression “inner boundary of the thing’s
surroundings” and which is, as Morison puts it, the intersection of all of the thing’s surroundings
— a limit in the opposite sense in which we saw the universe to be the limit of these Russian doll
type structure that is composed by the various possible surroundings of something.
Thus, since I do not see anything to correct or complement on his account, I simply refer the
reader to this book by Morison for reference. However, I would like to call one’s attention to how this
Aristotelian account, not only, as we saw, forbids one to think about the place of an indivisible over
and above the indivisible itself, but also it identifies something’s place with a certain boundary, viz.
the so-called “innermost motionless boundary” of the thing that surrounds the object whose place
we are concerned with. This is, indeed, a more general characterization that has as a consequence
the aforementioned identification of points with their places; in particular, it is one that ties the
notions of boundary and place very closely together.
19Cf. Physics, 209a32.
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2. The connection with motion
Much of the discussion regarding continua and their boundaries did not, however, take place in
Antiquity in the abstract framework we have been considering. Much more common were narrower
discussions that had in mind the particular cases of motion or change, which, by their nature,
gave rise to questions regarding the specific continuum of time and its “pointy” indivisibles that are
usually called “instants”. In this respect, we can mention the following passage of Aristotle that sets
the stage for a few of the later inquiries into this topic:
The ‘now’ is the link of time, as has been said (for it connects past and future
time), and it is a limit of time (for it is the beginning of the one and the end of the
other). But this is not obvious as it is with the point, which is fixed. It divides
potentially, and in so far as it is dividing the ‘now’ is always different, but in so
far as it connects it is always the same, as it is with mathematical lines. For the
intellect it is not always one and the same point, since it is other and other when
one divides the line; but in so far as it is one, it is the same in every respect.
So the ‘now’ also is in one way a potential dividing of time, in another the
termination of both parts, and their unity. And the dividing and the uniting are
the same thing and in the same reference, but in essence they are not the same.
(Physics, 222a10-20)
Moreover, coming back to the tight connection between continua and infinite divisibility, Aristotle
says of time that it must be a continuum. Indeed, he says:
By continuous I mean that which is divisible into divisibles that are always divis-
ible: and if we take this as the definition of continuous, it follows necessarily that
time is continuous. (232b23-25)
Now, the important point for our purposes here is that, when we think about change, we must
always think about it against a background time that somehow “measures” this change. Then, under
the assumption that this background time is indeed continuous, we run into problems relating to
instants when something is beginning to be something or ceasing to be something. According to
Kretzmann (1976b),
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[w]e may describe [...] the Aristotlelian problem of beginning and ceasing very
broadly as the problem of assigning temporal limits to a process of change mea-
sured against a continuum. (p. 102)
More precisely, these notions of “beginning” and “ceasing” must be correlated with some of the
particular indivisibles where one can divide this background time continuum; and, more specifically,
with the alleged particular instants where something was somehow for the very first time and where
something was somehow for the very last time.
However, although in the 19th century mathematicians discovered that one must distinguish
between dense sets and truly continuous ones,20 at the time of Aristotle, this was not even close
to being common knowledge and all kinds of thinkers used the notion of density, i.e., the fact that
between any two points there is always another point, to characterize continua in general.21 Thus,
if we ascribe to some given motion or change a first moment in which something was so-and-so, we
must, according to Aristotle, conclude that there was no last instant in which this something was
not so-and-so, for if there were such last instant, since it must be different from the first moment
we specified, it is guaranteed to exist points between them; and, since they will all be prior to the
first moment of something’s being so-and-so, they must be moments in which this something was
not so-and-so, so that the assumed last moment of something’s not being so-and-so was unjustified.
And, conversely, if we ascribe to some given motion or change a last moment in which something
was so-and-so, then we must, according to Aristotle, conclude, by an analogous reasoning, that
there was no first instant in which this something was not so-and-so.
Aristotle’s solution, then, was to — perhaps quite arbitrarily — assume that whereas there
could always be a first moment of something, there can never be a last moment of anything. More
specifically, we have the following passage:
It is also plain that unless we hold that the point of time that divides earlier from
later always belongs only to the later so far as the thing is concerned, we shall
be involved in the consequence that the same thing at the same moment is and
20More on this discussion in later chapters.
21Indeed, this is merely a restatement of Aristotle’s characterization of continua as infinitely divisible. For every
point is a possible division position; and if, say, a line segment between two points is to be divisible, there must exist
(at least potentially) a point between the points that mark the segment’s extremities.
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is not, and that a thing is not at the moment when it has become. (Physics,
263b9-12)
We shall denote this Aristotelian position as the “first but not last” thesis. It is explicitly recognized
by Strobach (1998), as we can see in the following passage:
This already presents us with quite a good reason for regarding the problematic
limiting instant as an instant when the target state has in fact been reached with
the limiting instant assigned to the later state (being black): if instants are densely
ordered and there is a limiting instant (which it is reasonable to assume) and at
every instant something has either to be the case or not, and if there is no last
instant at which something is not the case, then there is a first instant at which
this is the case. (p. 57)
However, just after recognizing this fact, he goes on to say that
Hence Aristotle’s solution does not just consist of the simple instruction: “Any
problematic instant should be assigned to the later state!”. There would be no
motivation for doing this. In 263b10, Aristotle assigns the limiting instant to the
later state because he is in this passage occupied with the end of a process and
not with its beginning. Analogously, at the beginning of a process, the limiting
instant would have to be assigned to the initial state (there is no first intermediate
state reached, and thus no first instant of having left the initial state). The word
ἀεί in 263b12 refers only to ends of processes. There is no difficulty in applying
the solution concerning being white to being at the target place of a motion.
Aristotle’s position may then be summed up as follows:
There are, in such changes no first position a mobile could occupy af-
ter the terminus a quo and no last position it could occupy before the
terminus ad quem. [...T]he actuality of the condition in which an object
rests has intrinsic limits.
Thus, the option Aristotle uses for describing the moment of change when, at the
beginning and at the end of a continuous process, non-comparative properties are
involved, is the either/or option. (Ibid.)
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In this sense, Strobach is holding a position similar to Sorabji’s, according to which there is no
general solution as to whether the moment of transition belongs to the earlier or to the later state.
Indeed, according to Sorabji,
[o]ne of the difficulties about answering [whether the moment of transition belongs
to the earlier or to the later state] was that if we said that one of these instants
existed [i.e., in our terminology, if the moment of transition belonged to one of
these states], but not the other, we seemed to be being arbitrary. It would be a
sufficient solution, if we could show that it would not be arbitrary to prefer one
instant to the other. For this purpose, we need only show that there is a reason
for preferring one to the other; we need not show that it is mandatory to do so.
(Sorabji (1976), p. 71)
However, I do not believe that this type of solution is in fact what Aristotle had in mind. A
reason for that would be, indeed, the following passage:
the primary time that has reference to the end of the change is something really
existent; for a change may be completed, and there is such a thing as an end of
change, which we have in fact shown to be indivisible because it is a limit. But
that which has reference to the beginning is not existent at all; for there is no such
thing as a beginning of change, nor any primary time at which it was changing.
(236a10-13)
In this passage, Aristotle expressly rejects Strobach’s point that we can have a first term if we are
considering “the beginning of a process”. Furthermore, when discussing Sorabji’s account of the
moment of transition in the specific cases of generation (γένεσις) and corruption (φθορά), Strobach
says the following:
It seems to me that according to the terminology of Physics VI γένεσις and φθορά
are exactly analogous to discontinuous changes in objects as described in 2.3.2.1.
The only difference is that they are the discontinuous changes from non-existence
to existence or vice-versa. Let us call this use γένεσις1 and φθορά1. I think that
in the other passages Aristotle uses the key terms as referring to the processes on
which γένεσις1 and φθορά1 depend. So in the terminology of the other passages the
γένεσις of an object is a process which takes place before the object exists. At any
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instant which falls within this process the object does not exist yet. The limiting
instant at the end of the process is the first instant of its existence. Perishing,
φθορά, however, is a process in which the object decays while still existing. Only
the limiting instant at the end of the process is the first instant of its non-existence.
Thus, coming-to-be and perishing in this sense are processes but they are not
processes between existence and nonexistence. Rather, existence is the end-term
of the process of coming-to-be, and non-existence is the end-term of the process of
perishing. We might call this use γένεσις2 and φθορά2. As a result, then, γένεσις1
and φθορά1 are special kinds of discontinuous change (namely between existence
and nonexistence), while γένεσις2 and φθορά2 are the processes on which γένεσις1
and φθορά1 depend. According to this view, what was said about the limiting
instants of κίνησις applies to γένεσις2 and φθορά2, simply because γένεσις2 and
φθορά
2 are kinds of κίνησις. So I suggest that there are two different uses of
γένεσις and φθορά in Aristotle but that both the uses of γένεσις and φθορά have
their definite place in Aristotle’s treatment of the moment of change. Under this
interpretation, objects would usually have a first instant of existence, but no last
instant of existence (while there is a first instant of non-existence). ((1998), p.
59)
Indeed, Strobach believes that this follows from a generalization of the argument presented by
Aristotle in Physics, 235b17-28, which, according to him, has the form:
[i] ... that which has changed must be in that to which it has changed ...
[ii] For,
[a] since it has left that from which it has changed
[b] and must be somewhere
[c] it must be either in that to which it has changed or in something else.
[iii] If, then, that which has changed to B is in something other than B, say
C, it must again be changing from C to B;
[iv] for B was not assumed to be contiguous, and change is continuous.
[v] Thus we have the result that the thing that has changed, at the moment
when it has changed, is changing to that to which it has changed,
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[vi] which is impossible:
[vii] that which has changed, therefore, must be in that to which it has
changed.
[viii] So it is evident likewise that that which has come to be, at the moment
when it has come to be, will be ... (Ibid., p. 60)
This argument, as Strobach correctly concludes, aims at establishing the fact that at the limiting
instant of a change process we have present the state which is to be achieved by the change. Also
correctly, he claims that this argument can be used almost verbatim to conclude the analogous
result for the limiting instant in the beginning of this change process. Indeed, we can find his
overall view in the following quote:
Aristotle offers a precisely motivated description of the moment of change; it is a
mixed description, using different systematic options for different cases. We have
seen that for comparative properties he uses the neither/nor-option, while for non-
comparative properties he uses the either/or option, i.e. a sort of either/or-option
which assigns the limiting instant at the beginning of a process to the initial state
and the limiting instant at the end of a process to the target state.
Aristotle’s classification of the moment of change entails the denial of the
existence of an instantaneous event at the limiting instant. This offers the chance
to avoid a banishment of change from time, even though instants are densely
ordered and exhaustively distributed to the obtaining or not obtaining of a non-
comparative state: since there is no event of changing anyway, no event of changing
needs to be banished from time. If there is no event of changing, then Plato’s
premiss that an event of changing can only take place when of two opposite states
one does not obtain any more and the other does not obtain yet, is of no interest.
Although Aristotle denies an instantaneous event at the limiting instant, the
limiting instant has nevertheless a very special role. Aristotle makes this clear for
the limiting instant at the end of a process, by ascribing to it the complicated
and interesting property of being an ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ μεταβέβληκεν. He does, however,
neglect the limiting instant at the beginning of a process and he does not provide
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a really thorough discussion of why there is no discontinuous change. (Ibid., pp.
80-81)
In this passage, Strobach seems to be claiming that Aristotle’s “first but not last” thesis applies
only to “endings of processes”. In the beginning of a process, on the other hand, something like a
“last but not first” thesis would hold.
I believe that that this interpretation is not quite correct. Indeed, for transformations that
require processes that are extended in time, Aristotle believes that the transformation takes place
part by part, so that three moments have to be acknowledged: the time before the process, in which
the substance was completely A; the time after the process, in which the substance was completely
not-A; and the process itself, in which the substance was neither totally A or not-A, but partially
both. Then, according to Aristotle, we should think about this situation as providing us with no
last moment in which the substance was either completely A or partially A, but with first moments
in which the substance was partially A and completely not-A.
Now, although I believe that Strobach’s interpretation is not quite accurate to Aristotle’s in-
tentions, it shares, nonetheless, much in common with other interpretations of Aristotle and with
further developments that took place in the latter history of the Aristotelian tradition, which shall
be considered in the next sections.
Indeed, the whole reason why we are taking a look at these multiple attempts at a logical
reconstruction of Aristotle’s position by contemporary philosophers is to realize that, although
Aristotle’s account is very interesting and indeed fairly rigorous, there is nonetheless a gap in his
original exposition on this matter. Moreover, it is in the context of filling this gap that we shall
encounter later on a particularly interesting theory that, although couched in historically localized
terminology and conceptual underpinning, is, nonetheless, if not a historical, surely a logico-formal
ancestral of the much later Brentanian approach to this problem.
3. Sorabji’s piecewise solution
Let us, then, have a look at one more modern interpretation of Aristotle’s ideas on the topic
of the instant of transition, in which this mentioned gap will be fairly clear. According to Sorabji
(1976),
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[o]ne of the difficulties about answering was that if we said that one of these
instants existed, but not the other, we seemed to be being arbitrary. It would be
a sufficient solution, if we could show that it would not be arbitrary to prefer one
instant to the other. For this purpose, we need only show that there is a reason
for preferring one to the other; we need not show that it is mandatory to do so.
(Sorabji (1976), p. 71)
In other words, Sorabji realizes that to escape the accusation of being arbitrary as to whether the
moment of transition belongs to the former or later state, he needs only provide, for each of the
main classes of transition, a reason for the moment of transition belonging to either one or the
other state. And, thus, he goes on to list and analyse the various types of transition accepted by
Aristotle, so as to locate in each type the condition to which the moment of transition belongs.
The first case he undertakes is that of a continuous motion. More specifically, he considers the
case of some particle starting at rest, then moving and finally coming back to rest. In this context,
he says that
there is an asymmetry between the series of positions away from the position
of rest and the position of rest itself. There can be no first position away from
the starting point, or last position away from the finishing point in a continuous
motion, or in any other continuous change. Hence there can be no first instant of
being away from the starting point or last instant of being away from the finishing
point. No such considerations apply to being at the position of rest. This already
supplies us with a solution to our paradox, in some of its applications. For if
someone were to ask. "when is the last instant of being at the position of rest,
and when the first of being away from it?", we could safely reply that the latter
instant does not exist. But we can go further. The asymmetry between the
position of rest and the positions away from it can provide us with the excuse we
want for treating rest differently from motion. It would be perfectly reasonable
to mark the asymmetry by saying that just as there is no first or last instant of
being away from the position of rest, so equally there is no first or last instant
of motion. It would be reasonable, but not mandatory. Reasonableness is all we
need in order to escape the charge of arbitrariness. (p. 72)
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However, he also acknowledges the possibility of thinking about this case in a different way, as is
clear from the following passage:
at the instant of reversing direction, a ball’s centre of mass is (as in all cases of
coming to a halt) at a different position from that occupied at preceding instants,
and (differently from ordinary cases of coming to a halt) it is also at a different
position from that occupied at succeeding instants. This difference of position
admittedly favours our regarding the instant of reversing direction as one of mo-
tion. But I think the consideration is outweighed by the absence of a particular
direction and of a positive velocity. (p. 73)
Then, he goes on to analyse cases in which either the initial or the final state are not continuous
transformations. A typical example is the one about visibility, which was introduced by Aristotle
himself. About this case, Sorabji says that
[i]f we are watching a receding aeroplane, or looking for an approaching one, we
cannot normally tell at the time what will prove to be the last instant of visibility
as it recedes, or the last instant of invisibility as it approaches. If we want to
register this instant as it arrives, we shall normally have to wait until the new
state is upon us, before we can do so, and it may then reasonably be held that
we are not registering the end of the old state, but, at best, the beginning of the
new. This means that, in many contexts, we have a good reason for not talking
of the last instant of the old state, but (if it has one) of the first instant of the
new. This solution seems to have appealed to Peter of Spain, for certain kinds
of case [sic]. [...] Aristotle himself may have another consideration relevant to
the particular example of visibility. For he classifies seeing as an energeia, and
on one interpretation, an energeia has no first instant. This is how J. L. Ackrill
interprets Aristotle’s idea (e.g., Sens. 446b2) that "he is seeing" entails "he has
seen". Ackrill treats the perfect tense "he has seen", like "he has been seeing",
as implying an earlier period of seeing ("Aristotle’s distinction between Energeia
and Kinesis", in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough, London
1965, esp. pp. 126-7). This interpretation has been disputed, but if it is correct,
it implies that there will not be a first instant of seeing, and therefore not a first
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instant of seeing the approaching object in the problematic example of De Sensu
449a21-31. (p. 76)
Thus, in the case of visibility, we have more of a classic “first but not last” type of solution.
These examples, however, are enough to show us the gist of Sorabji (1976)’s solution: that the
question as to whether the instant of change belongs to the former or latter state strongly depends
on the particular transition in question, for in each case we shall be able to find a sufficient reason to
assign the moment of transition to one state and not the other. This sufficient reason that presents
itself in each particular case would, then, be enough to deter any criticism that this choice was
arbitrary.
Another interesting thing to note from this way of understanding Aristotle’s ideas on the moment
of transition — and, in particular, as it is presented in the last quote — is that we see mentioned
the name of Peter of Spain as accepting one of the presented solutions. This is interesting because,
indeed, the Medieval philosopher Peter of Spain ended up constructing a intricate and extensive
classification of cases and the corresponding ascription of the moment of change in each one of
them. Thus, although he would not agree perhaps with all the details of Sorabji (1976)’s cases, he
does indeed agree with the overall picture of the moment of transition as belonging to earlier or
later states depending on the particular transition in question. So, let us bridge this gap between
Aristotle’s original exposition and the later Medieval appropriation of his ideas in the following
section.
4. Antiquity after Aristotle
After Aristotle, the discussion around the notion of continua and boundaries continued and
many philosophers did attempt to present new and different solutions to the problems that creep
into Aristotle’s account.
For instance, some philosophers began to seriously entertain the possibility of indivisible time
leaps, which are the temporal counterparts to an atomic conception of matter as composed out
of elementary indivisible building blocks that have nonetheless some finite, albeit very small, size.
These were called atoms, so that their time counterparts are now known as “time atoms”.
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The original Aristotelian set up continued, however, to have a strong foothold on the ongoing
theories that were being developed to make sense of continua. For instance, according to Gould
(1971), there are
four fragments in which something is reported about Chrysippus’ view of the in-
finite. The first (II 482), as Arnin has constituted it, combines two seemingly
incompatible reports. We are told by Stobaeus that, for Chrysippus, bodies sur-
faces, lines, places, the void and time are divisible ad infinitum. Diogenes, how-
ever, reports that Chrysippus did not speak of divisibility ad infinitum but rather
said that a body is infinitely divisible. The reason for Chrysippus preferring the
latter way of talking, as Diogenes says, is because the process of division goes on
without cessation; the expression ad infinitum wrongly suggests that there is an
infinite into which the body is divisible. Though one cannot speak with definite-
ness, Chrysippus seems to be taking Aristotle’s stand with respect to the infinite
divisibility of spatial magnitudes: namely, that to say that a body is infinitely
divisible is to say that it is potentially infinite; that is, one can go on dividing
without end. (p. 116)
Another Philosopher that undertook to expand and correct Aristotle’s position regarding con-
tinua was Alexander of Aphrodisias, who attempted to further clarify Aristotle’s original definition
of contiguous and continuous by means of redefining the meaning of “in” from the original Aris-
totelian characterization. In his own words,
[t]hings are said to be in the same, if there is nothing between them. [...] Things
that fit on to each other [ἐφαρμόζοντα] and make no volume [ὄνκος] and have
nothing between them are “in the same”. For the limit of both becomes one in
the case of things that touch, since they coincide, on account of there being no
interval in that region. Whereas in the case of things that are continuous, even the
one is destroyed; for things are continuous when in actuality there is no boundary
[πέρας] in between. (Alexander, apud Simplicium, Commentary on the Physics,
570.1-7)
It seems that Alexander, although expressly contradicting — or at the very least, diverging
from — Aristotle’s original definition of contiguous and continuous, is nonetheless true to Aristotle’s
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intention. For Aristotle himself claims that inner points of a continuum are only potentially, so that
in a sense, when two objects fuse into a single continuous unity, their common boundary ceases to
be, in the sense of having no actuality. This seems to be what Alexander is calling our attention to;
and, thus, he seems to be merely clarifying, and not truly modifying, Aristotle’s original definition.
4.1. Neo-Platonism. Aristotle’s main characterization of continua kept on dominating the
Ancient philosophical framework well into the late Ancient period, especially through the neo-
Platonic school. Here we shall take a look into an interesting case study in this respect, which is
Simplicius commentary on book VI of the Physics.
After presenting a layout of the book, he presents what Furley (1982) calls “a famous contrast”
between the early atomic theory of Leucippus and Democritus and the later theory of Epicurus.22
The contentious issue would be the partlessness of atoms. According to the original atomic theory,
atoms are both impassive (ἀπαθε͂) and partless (ἀμερε͂); however, the later atomist Epicurus claims
that, while they are impassive, they are not partless. According to Furley (1982), this change in the
characterization of atoms springs from Aristotle’s critical arguments towards the claim that partless
bodies can compose larger objects. In Furley’s words,
[p]artless units can make up neither a magnitude composed of parts that are con-
tinuous with each other nor one composed of parts in contact. Thus a continuous
line cannot be composed of points, since the parts of a continuous magnitude, ac-
cording to Aristotle’s definition, have extremities that are one, and points, being
partless, have no extremity different themselves. Similarly, they cannot have ex-
tremities that are together and so cannot compose a larger magnitude by contact.
(p. 27)
This is an interesting point of view; and, although Furley himself recognizes that “most historians”
reject this interpretation, I believe he is indeed correct in his assessment.
This, however, shows us indeed how overwhelming Aristotle’s account of continua was in Antiq-
uity, to the point that rival accounts had to conform themselves to the very compelling arguments
presented by Aristotle in the time between these atomist theories.
Another position in late Antiquity that reproduces Aristotle’s ideas is Damascius’ conviction
that it was a mistake, which eventually led philosophers into the paradoxes of time, to assume that
22Cf. Simplicius (1997), 925.13-22.
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instants (which are an example of the more abstract notion of points) have actuality. According to
him, they are simply boundaries wihtout reality (Phys. 799,30-5) (SP 86 2-8) — a position that is
very much in tune with Aristotle’s ideas on continua and their boundaries.
A further example of the foothold of Aristotle’s ideas in the neo-Platonic school is Simplicius’
claim that Aristotle’s argument
called for the indivisibility of now and its not existing in actuality, which is demon-
strated in the sixth book of the work in his discussion of motion.
This was the last known Greek contribution on this topic in Antiquity, since in 529 Justinian put
an end to the teachings in the school in Athens. However, it shows us that by this time Aristotle’s
account of continua was indeed the mainstream account, even though it had by them its terminology
slightly rephrased.
Notwithstanding this late hegemony, however, the Aristotelian account faded a little out of the
mainstream as Late Antiquity turned into the Early Medieval period. Indeed, according to Sorabji
(1983),
[i]t was not only infinitely divisible leaps, but also the Aristotlelian paradoxes,
which continued to live after the end of antiquity. But solutions did not improve
in medieval Europe, if we may take as typical de treatment of Peter of Spain (died
c. A.D. 1277) to the ceasing instant. According to a recent report [Kretzmann
(1976), p. 105], he held that an instant exists, begins to exist and ceases to exist
simultaneously. (p. 63)
5. The Middle Ages
The beginning of the Middle Ages was marked by an intellectual appropriation of neo-Platonic
ideas into a Christian theological worldview. This much is certain. However, this was also accompa-
nied by a lack of interest in Aristotelian ideas regarding continua. As we saw in Sorabji’s last quote,
what survived the end of Antiquity was more a discussion regarding the possibility of leaps and
regarding the paradoxes of motion than a thorough appropriation of Aristotle’s abstract account of
continua and their boundaries.
However, as Aristotle’s works found their way into the newly established universities of Europe,
his ideas on this topic quickly became again fairly canonical. More precisely, much like most other
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topics touched by the Stagirite philosopher, the discussion regarding continua and indivisibles in the
Late Middle Ages was heavily constrained by the account we have been analysing in this chapter.
Of course, as in other areas of inquiry, Late Medieval thinkers expanded upon Aristotle’s original
account, but most of those thinkers carried out all kinds of logical and semantic manoeuvres to
position their accounts as close to the original Aristotelian account as possible.
Thus, for example, we have as a prime example Ockham’s discussion in his De corpore Christi
(1930, pp. 36.22-38.5 and 40.18-42.11). According to Stump (1982),
There is something at least misleading [...] in characterizing Ockham’s discussion
of points here as a discussion about the existence of points. Ockham himself does
not put the issue in those terms here. As he explains it, what is at stake in his
treatment of points is not so much whether there is such things as points as what
the nature of points is. [...]
Ockham understands a point primarily as a limit of or a cut in a continuum.
There are such cuts or limits, just as there are absences from loved ones; but a cut
or a limit, like an absence, must not be thought of as an independently existing
thing. This continues to be Ockham’s general strategy also with lines and surfaces
— he takes each to be a kind of limit which is not an entity in its own right —
until he reaches his general conclusion about quantity, namely, that a substance
or quality is not quantified by the addition to it of a separate, independently
existing entity which is quantity but instead is quantified simply by itself, by a
certain condition and arrangements of its parts. (p. 217)
Indeed, given this characterization — which I believe is correct — what we find in Ockham’s
discussion is nothing more than a thorough logical evolution of the ideas present in Aristotle’s
characterization of these limits, whose existence already depended, for him, on the continua they
bounded.
Another example of this general trend that also has to do with the theme of this dissertation is
the extremely complex aforementioned taxonomy introduced by Peter of Spain to specify the correct
location of the moment of transition in the myriad of types of transition that can occur in nature.
As we saw above, Aristotle’s account of continua and boundaries presents us with a decision as to
which of the two states of a transition should hold at the very moment of transition. And Peter of
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Spain took it one step further in that he worked out an incredibly complex taxonomy of transitions
and studied in each case where the moment of transition should belong to.
There was, however, a specially interesting (minor) trend in late Medieval thought that is
especially relevant the topic of this dissertation and that relates closely with Brentano’s ideas on
this issue. It is, hence, to this trend that we shall turn our attention in the next section.
5.1. The instant of transition and quasi-Aristotelianism. Imagine we have a plane that
is divided by lines into successive strips such that the first strip has size 12 the size of the plane,
the second 14 the size of the plane and so on, so that the n-th strip has size
1
2n the size of the
plane. Then, we make a distinction between the odd and even numbered strips and imagine a point
starting at the extremity of the plane that is farthest from the first strip. Then, as this points moves
clearly it will eventually enter an odd numbered strip. But, we might ask, what is the first moment
in which such an event happens?
As the point starts moving into the plane, it will immediately enter either an odd numbered
strip or an even numbered one, there is no other choice. If the first option is the case, then we can
conclude that the answer to our question is: immediately! If, on the other hand, we have the second
case, we must also conclude the same answer. The reason is that, given an even numbered strip in
our plane, there is always an odd numbered strip that closer to the starting position of the point
than the given even number strip. Hence, the point must pass before through that odd numbered
strip before reaching the even numbered one.
Now, what we have with such an argument is that the point will reach an odd numbered strip
immediately as it starts moving. Nonetheless, there is nothing preventing us from switching odd for
even and vice-versa in the above argument, thus also showing that the point will reach immediately
an even numbered strip. But no odd numbered strip is an even numbered one — we seemed to have
reached a contradiction!
This paradox is a version of the paradox considered by Richard Kilvington in his Sophisma
16.23 It is a prime example of the kind of questions that were being discussed in the Late Middle
Ages in connection with the Aristotelian ideas concerning continua and, in particular the temporal
continuum.
23A translation of which can be found in Kretzmann (1982), Appendix F.
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This is not the place for a complete discussion of the myriad of paradoxes and their multiple
solutions by Scholastic philosophers, but what is of interest for us here is a particular general
account on the moment of transition that provided the Aristotelian account with tools to attack
these paradoxes in a way that is surely a logical ancestor of Brentano’s approach in the 20th century,
in the sense that it hinges on a particular approach to the metaphysics of boundaries that is, from a
logico-formal perspective wholly analogous to Brentano’s. However, a different question is whether
these ideas were indeed a truly historical ancestor to Brentano’s. This is much harder to say, since
we cannot be sure what exactly in the Aristotelian tradition Breentano actually had access to.
However, there is such a logical agreement between this tradition and Bretano’s ideas that one must
surely wonder whether this is where Brentano got his ideas about boundaries from.
We are referring to the tradition that arose in the 14th century with the work of some philoso-
phers — such as Henry of Ghent, Hugh of Newcastle, John Baconthorpe and Landulf Caraccioli24
— who began to take seriously a certain possible attack on what was by then the “orthodox” Aris-
totelian notion of continua. The problem they raised attention to has to do specifically with the
application of Aristotle’s general theory of continua to the particular case of change, or, more specif-
ically, motion — which is indeed a particular case of the former broad notion of change in general,
as it is, according to Aristotle, simply a change in location. In Kretzmann’s words, the problem
was the following:
If the ceasing of condition not-φ and the beginning of condition φ occur at the
same instant, then it seems right to say that that ceasing and that beginning
are precisely simultaneous. And since condition not-φ obtains precisely until it
ceases and condition φ obtains precisely as soon as it begins, that instant of
transition may appear to present a violation of the non simul principle. In short,
the elements of Aristotle’s analysis of change may appear to entail this absurdity:
at the instant of transition x is both not-φ and φ in the same respect.
That is, a certain change of some substance is a process in which it either has at some time t0 some
condition25 which it fails to have at some later time t1 or vice-versa. Now, if both the moment in
24On this topic, the papers Knuuttila and Lehtinen (1979), Kretzmann (1982) and Spade (1982) are particularly
interesting and thorough. Also, cf. the discussion between Sorabji (1976) and Kretzmann (1976b).
25Now a days, perhaps the word “property” might be more appropriate here, but we shall stick to the historical
vocabulary.
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which the substance stops having the condition and the one in which it starts not having it coincide
and, since something has some condition up to, and including, the last moment of the condition’s
presence and does not have it from the moment it stops having it onwards, then it seems that we
must conclude that this moment of transition is a moment in which the substance both has and
does not have the condition in question — something that would blatantly contradict Aristotle’s
principle of contradictories.26
The problem, however, is a real problem, according to Kretzmann, only for the class of conditions
that he calls “successive conditions” and characterize as those conditions that can be realized only
over a temporal interval. Indeed, he tells us that
[t]he most important of them [i.e. genuine problems for the Aristotelian position]
may be the difficulty (perhaps the impossibility) of providing a satisfactory Aris-
totelian account of the instant of transition between such conditions as rest and
motion, conditions that can be realized only over a temporal interval. Medieval
philosophers, building on Aristotle, called such conditions “successive”, distin-
guishing them from “permanent” conditions, those that are fully realized at an
instant. (Kretzmann (1982), pp. 274-275)
It must be noted, however, that this restriction of the problem to successive conditions does not
make the slightest sense to me. In particular, it seems that the problem would relate essentially
to the permanent conditions, since these are the ones that can be realized on singular instants
and, therefore, the question whether one or the other holds at the moment of transition will yield
either a contradiction — i.e., the answer that both contradictory conditions hold at the instant —
26Indeed, these are Baconthorpe’s words with which he presents the problem:
contradictory termini that are the termini of a single change occur at the same instant — I
mean the ultimum of the not-being of the form to be generated and the primum of its being.
(Commentary on the “Sentences”, L. III, d. 3, q. 2, art. 3)
Another characterization of the problem can be found in Spade (1982):
In the fourteenth century, a certain group of authors thought they saw a problem with the
Aristotelian analysis of the instant of transition; it appeared to them that at the instant when a
thing changes from being φ to being not-φ (or vice-versa), it must be both φ and not-φ. In order
to preserve the Law of Contradictories, therefore, these authors interpreted the word “together”
(simul) in the common formulation of that law as referring not to temporal simultaneity, but
to simultaneity by nature. Hence, contradictories may be true at the same instant of time, as
in the case of instataneous transition, but they cannot be true at the same “instant of nature”.
(p. 298)
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or something that goes against the excluded middle principle27 — i.e., the answer that neither
contradictory conditions holds at the instant. For successive conditions, one could much more
easily accept something much closer to Aristotle’s “first but not last” solution, taking the terminus
ad quo to be the earlier open interval and the terminus ad quem to be the later closed interval that
contains the boundary. On the other hand, a condition that requires some temporal interval to exist
can obviously not be present at a single instant and this fact would be enough to conclude that
these conditions would not yield problems; for how can two contradictory conditions be present
at a single instant if neither of them can be realized at a single instant? Also, this would also
not go against something like the excluded middle principle. Indeed, the fact that neither of the
contradictory conditions are realized at the single instant in question might arguably not be a denial
of the excluded middle principle, since it could arguably apply only to such conditions that could
actually obtain at a single instant. Otherwise, every instant, which by definition must lack both
a successive condition and its contradictory would indeed be a counter example for the excluded
middle principle.
Now, independently of whether the problem is related to successive or permanent conditions,28
the so-called quasi-Aristotelian Medieval philosophers introduced in connection to it what Kretz-
mann (1982) calls “the divided instant” (p. 276), which was originally characterized in the following
passage of Baconhtorpe:
The termini of a change are separated from each other only as much as the duration
of the change that mediates between the termini, but an instantaneous change does
not endure except for an instant alone; therefore its termini are separated not in
accordance with with the parts of a duration, but solely in accordance with the
order of nature. (Commentary on the “Sentences”, L. III, d. 3, q. 2, art. 3)
According to him, the usual interpretation of his contemporaries makes it so that
[...] something false is imposed on the Philosopher. For the Philosopher there
does not save the contradiction between being and not-being in that way [...];
instead, the Philosopher saves the contradiction in this way, that the instant is
divided into a beginning and an end in such a way that the instant’s first sign,
27Which is not considered by Aristotle, but that from our vantage point cannot be omitted
28Kretzmann (1982) recognizes that his quasi-Aristotelian Medieval thinkers did relate the problem of the instant of
transition with permanent conditions (p. 275).
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which corresponds to the terminus a quo of an instantaneous change, measures
the ultimum of the not-being, and its last sign measures the primum of the being
[...] (Commentary on the sentences, L. III, d. 3, q. 2, art. 3)
The gist of the idea here is that, if one can think about the instant of transition as being
composed of two distinct instants, then one is free to locate each contradictory condition in one of
the composing instants and thus to reject the conclusion that these contradictory conditions must
be both present in the same instant, which is the conclusion that seems to be the main problem for
the quasi-Aristotelian thinkers in the original Aristotelian framework.29 The whole talk of “instants
of nature” seems to be an artifice found by these philosophers to introduce such a division in the
instant of change, which is what does the main logical labor in this discussion. It is not the fact that
these new instants are “of nature” that allows the quasi-Aristotelians to do away with the original
problem, but the simple fact that the assumption of these moments of nature allows one to think
about the original instant of change as somehow being divided. In this sense, then, Kretzmann’s
characterization is fairly on target, for it calls one’s attention exactly for this divided nature of the
instant of transition in the quasi-Aristotelian tradition.
That this idea is to be found originally in Aristotle was surely claimed by the so-called pseudo-
Aristotelian proponents. However, it is not so far-fetched to believe that the Stagirite did have,
perhaps not such a fully detailed account, but an idea that the point of transition did somehow
pertain both to the former and later condition. Indeed, he says that
[i]t is also plain that unless we hold that the point of time that divides earlier
from later always belongs only to the later so far as the thing is concerned, we
shall be involved in the consequence that the same thing at the same moment is
and is not, and that a thing is not at the moment when it has become. It is true
that the point is common to both times, the earlier as well as the later, and that,
while numerically one and the same, it is not so in definition, being the end of the
29Here, we have a passage that sums up these ideas:
For present purposes, then, Quasi-Aistotelianism may be described as a theory of change that
developed in response to the standard medieval Aristotelian account of the instant of transition,
an account that struck the Quasi-Aristotelians as entailing the simultaneous occurrence of con-
tradictory conditions. They sought to avoid that outcome by accepting the contradiction in the
temporal order and separating the contradictories in the order of nature, accordingly dividing
the instant of transition into two instants or “signs” of nature, basing their solution primarily on
Physics VIII 8. (Kretzmann (1982), pp. 280-281)
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one and the beginning of the other; but so far as the thing is concerned it always
belongs to the later affection. (263b9-263b12)30
Moreover, the interesting point to be made here, in the context of the broader discussion of
the monograph, is that this divided nature of the moment of transition, as it is conceived in the
quasi-Aristotelian tradition, is perhaps what will allow the Aristotelian-inspired Brentano in the
20th century to talk about a multiplicity of indivisible boundaries being collocated in order to
elucidate cases in which different continua meet. In particular, we must note the protagonism that
the problem regarding the moment of transition plays in both contexts and, although this moment
of transition is, for Brentano, a much more abstract notion — not being necessarily restricted
to any kind of physical motion or change —, which encompasses boundary points in which, e.g.,
differently coloured continua touch, we must attest to the fact that the recognition of a multiplicity
of collocated boundary points plays the same logical role in the Brentanian discussion and eventual
solution to the problem as the divided instant in the quasi-Aristotelian solution to the paradoxes
of change. Thus, this Brentanian solution too, notwithstanding its being more abstract and less
couched in obscure scholastic terms such as “instants of nature”, will have, in very broad terms,31
the distinction between different indivisibles that are present at the same “point” or “instant” as its
essential logical structure.
5.2. Criticisms of the pseudo-Aristotelian position. Now, although there seems to be at
least a logical connection — if not a truly historical one, since it is very likely that the Aristotelian
Brentano was indeed familiar with the writings of the Medeival philosophers mentioned in this
discussion —, Kretzmann (1982) is, nonetheless, in favor of
dismissing both the problem regarding the instant of transition and the Quasi-
Aristotelian solution [...]. (p. 274)
For him, it is clear that
from an Aristotelian point of view the [quasi-Aristotelian] attempt is misguided
and the result unacceptable. (ibid.)
30Knuuttila and Lehtinen (1979) interpret this passage as meaning that
Aristotle’s ‘solution’ to the difficulty is to say that the change is instantaneous and the instant belongs to
the posterior time with respect to the changing object
31More details in a later chapter.
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This is because he believes that Aristotle has indeed long before already presented a solution to this
conundrum. In particular, he believes that this solution is precisely the one we have called “first but
not last position” and the one which Baconthorpe recognized as “something false” being imposed on
Aristotle.
As we saw, this doctrine is extracted from a passage in Physics, VIII. Also, we saw how the
latter part of the passage introduces what we have called the “first but not last” solution, which
is far from being a clear and decisive solution and, thus, any reference to it for a solution of the
problem of the instant of transition will be as undecisive and problematic as Aristotle’s position
itself. However, Kretzmann (1982) not only believes the problem has been successfully dealt with
by Aristotle himself in this passage, but also that there are further more fundamental criticisms to
be made to the quasi-Aristotelian unquestioned acceptance of the Scotist doctrine of the so-called
“moments of nature”. For this, he cites a fairly complicated passage of Ockham that seems to
derive the impossibility of moments of nature. This passage, indeed, involves further systematic
assumptions that could — and should — be called into question in a thorough evaluation of the
true strength of the criticism. However, as was hinted at when talking about the relationship of
this so-called “quasi-Aristotelian” doctrine with the later Brentanian account of continua, I believe
that the main point here is not to think about the quasi-Aristotelian view regarding the problem
of the instant of transition in terms of the moments of nature as some kind of “true and complete”
solution to the problem, but merely as a first — perhaps the first in many centuries — recognition
of the problem and an early attempt of solving it by means of this logical approach of “dividing”
the problematic instant.
This position, however, as we mentioned above, should be held in higher regard since it seems
to be the intellectual precursor to Brentano’s much more abstract account that does away with
Scot’s notion of an “instant of nature” and retains, as we shall see in a later chapter, just what is




The manifold-theoretic conception of continua
In this chapter, we shall be concerned with the history of how, in the course of the centuries
following the Middle Ages, Aristotle’s conception of continua as infinitely divisible and, therefore,
as being unable to be composed out of ultimately simple or indivisible parts was transformed,
from an undeniable canon of philosophical thought, into a theory that is completely foreign to
the mathematical notions that took root and grew into the backbone of modern mathematical
orthodoxy. We will see how this history unfolded in many bursts, with a few back-and-forths, but
at the end of the day one must say that it ultimately culminated in the birth of set theory as
the underlying theory behind all of modern mathematics and, particularly of a new mathematical
discipline that became known as general or point-set topology.
Nowadays, it thoroughly accepted that any mathematical theory, from abstract algebraic group
theory to differential geometry or functional analysis, can be and, indeed, is perhaps supposed to
be — if one is to consider it as being actually thoroughly formalized so as to achieve the modern
level of logical rigor — recast inside formal set theory, say, as a collection of sentences that follow
logically from the ZFC axioms. Even category theory, which is often thought to be a new — and
better, since more in line with many mathematical customs and intuitions — logical foundation
for modern mathematics, is hardly ever introduced without recourse to set theoretical notions.1
However, this omnipresence of set theoretical concepts and methods is a late 19th century creation,
whose consolidation occurred well into the first half of the 20th century with the introduction of
the formal axiomatic systems we know today as ZFC or BGvN and with its use in the development
of many areas of mathematics, but mainly of point-set topology.
Now, this moment of consolidation of these new mathematical methods is precisely when
Brentano is writing about his ideas on continua. Hence, it is only reasonable to assume — and,
1I believe that it is very symptomatic of this the fact that all the category theoretical formulation I know start by
postulating that a category is a set of objects together with a set of “arrows” or “mappings” between these objects.
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indeed, fairly clear from the few mathematicians and mathematical notions he mentions in his es-
says — that, in doing so, he is replying to the ideas that have been around in the mathematical
discussions regarding continua and that his thoughts must be understood in the context of the
different mathematical methods for defining the continuum of real numbers which were just 30 or
40 years old at the time he was struggling with his own ideas on the subject. Philosophical ideas
are, as any human creations, not born ex nihilo, but have precursor ideas, gestation periods, fertile
environments in which to sprout and grow, and enemy ideas to combat and overthrow. Brentano’s
ideas on continua are not different, and so are what we would like to call the “manifold-theoretic
conceptions”2 against which these ideas stood. The former are surely related to Aristotelian and
Medieval conceptions, but the latter are not as well — merely — the outcome of individual genial-
ity and vision. Even if one forgets all the other mathematical developments in course in the 19th
century that surely — as we shall see — have had a role to play in the full development of this
manifold-theoretic conception, and think only about the single man who might be credited with
the creation of modern set-theory, viz. Cantor, it is already clear that his ideas did not come from
nothingness itself, but were inserted in a debate that during his life already spanned at least two
millennia, as we can clearly ascertain from the following passage of his (1883b):
The concept of the ‘continuum’ has not only played an important role everywhere
in the development of the sciences but has also evoked the greatest differences of
opinion and even vehement quarrels. This lies perhaps in the fact that, because
the exact and complete definition of the concept has not been bequeathed to the
dissentients, the underlying idea has taken on different meanings; but it must also
be (and this seems to me the most probable) that the idea of the continuum had
not been thought out by the Greeks (who may have been the first to conceive
it) with the clarity and completeness which would have been required to exclude
the possibility of different opinions among their posterity. Thus we see that Leu-
cippus, Democritus, and Aristotle consider the continuum as a composite which
2We use the word “manifold” (in GermanMannigfaltigkeit) to make clear a the slight distinction that exists between
set-theory as a mathematical theory that surely overgrew its origins and that has many features independent of the
historical situation we are considering and the background ideas that were behind the historical developments of this
mathematical theory at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. Indeed, Cantor himself first used this word to refer
to the objects whose formal theory he would eventually become known for creating, only later calling them “sets”
(Menge), and the nowadays ubiquity of the word “set” seems to have come from (besides the obvious simplicity of the
English word, which is surely appealing to mathematicians) from the important developments of the French analysts,
who referred to Cantor’s manifolds, following the latter’s own lead, as “ensembles”.
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consists ex partibus sine fine divisilibus, but Epicurus and Lucretius construct it
out of their atoms considered as finite things. Out of this a great quarrel arose
among the philosophers, of whom some followed Aristotle, others Epicurus; still
others, in order to remain aloof from this quarrel, declared with Thomas Aquinas
that the continuum consisted neither of infinitely many nor of a finite number of
parts, but of absolutely no parts. This last opinion seems to me to contain less
an explanation of the facts than a tacit confession that one has not got to the
bottom of the matter and prefers to get genteely out of its way. Here we see the
medieval-scholastic origin of a point of view which we still find represented today,
in which the continuum is thought to be an unanalysable concept, or, as others
express themselves, a pure a priori intuition which is scarcely susceptible to a
determination through concepts. Every arithmetical attempt at determination of
this mysterium is looked on as a forbidden encroachment and repulsed with due
vigour. Timid natures thereby get the impression that with the ‘continuum’ it
is not a matter of a mathematically logical concept but rather of religious dogma.
((1932), pp. 190-191, translation from Ewald (1996), p. 903)3
1. Medieval dissidents and the new mathematical methods of the 17th century
Just as with so many other notions originally investigated by Aristotle, the notion of a con-
tinuum posited by the Greek philosopher remained canonical for at least a dozen centuries, during
which the vast majority of scholars took his teachings as essentially true, albeit sometimes cryptic
and incomplete. They struggled to understand the Aristotelian theses concerning this notion of
continua, as they did for most of Aristotle’s philosophical ideas, by proposing new — sometimes
insightful and sometimes merely pedantic — distinctions to understand cases for which Aristotle’s
own considerations did not apply; and also by presenting corrections to Aristotle’s arguments or
even wholly new arguments to justify his original doctrines. As we saw in the last chapter, very few
scholastic philosophers went against the Philosopher’s teachings and, even when they did, it was
3Bell (2006) rightly finds strange the mention of the famous atomists Leucippus and Democritus along with Aristotle
at the divisionist side of the quarrel and explains this by introducing a distinction between ‘material’ and ‘theoretical’
divibilism — a distinction that will appear below as we consider Medieval ideas on continua — and understanding
Cantor’s claim to be that these Greek philosophers, albeit great champions of material atomism or indivibilism, were
nonetheless prone to accept that mathematical continua were indeed infinitely divisible — a view that is supported
by Heath (1981).
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done with a high degree of — perhaps not always truly sincere — caution and reluctance, not to
mention the logical manoeuvres undertook to consolidate their affiliation to the great Philosopher.
Thus, it is no great surprise that throughout these centuries very few philosophers, most notably
Henry of Barclay and Nicholas of Autrecourt, took the path of going against the Aristotelian orto-
doxy of regarding continua as not composed of indivisibles. Others, as Nicole Oresme and Nicolaus
of Cusa, claim that any real continuum, albeit infinitely divisible with respect to some ideal men-
tal operation, is in practice only finitely divisible, reaching eventually a moment in which further
division would necessarily imply substantial destruction. Thus, we have:
Divisible is used in two ways: one way it means the real separation of the parts
of anything, and the other way it means division conceptually in the mind. It
is not to be thought that every magnitude or continuum is divisible in the first
sense, for it is naturally impossible to divide the heavens as one divides a wooden
log, separating one part from another. In dividing a log or a stone or another
material or destructible object, one can reach a part so small that further division
would destroy its substance. But any continuum or magnitude is continually
divisible conceptually in the human mind, just as astrologers divide the heavens
into degrees, the degrees into minutes, the minutes into seconds, the seconds
into thirds, fourths, and then fifths. The imagination can proceed thus endlessly.
(Oresme (1968), pp. 45)
Under mental consideration that which is continuous becomes divided into the ever
divisible, and the multitude of parts progresses to infinity. But by actual division
we arrive at an actually indivisible part which I call an atom. For an atom is a
quantity, which on account of its smallness is actually indivisible. (Nicolaus of
Cusa, apud Stones (1928), p. 447)
However, these independent thinkers of the late scholastic period could hardly scratch the surface
of the well established Aristotelian doctrine of the infinite divisibility of continua. It is mainly with
the mathematical developments of the 17th century that the existence of indivisibles would acquire
more respectability, so that philosophically oriented mathematicians and mathematically oriented
philosophers could begin to think of extended continua as being composed of an actual infinity of
indivisibles.
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Thus, we shall begin our reconstruction of the path through which the idea of indivisibles
ultimately composing continua came to the forefront of the mathematical culture in the 17th century
with the method introduced by Kepler in his Nova stereometria for the analysis of the volume of
revolution solids. Kepler is widely regarded as the first mathematician to use freely the notion
of both infinitesimals and indivisibles in carrying out calculations of areas and volumes. Indeed,
somewhat like the connection between atoms and indivisibles in the last chapter, these two notions
often go hand in hand in the history of the developments that led to the eventual discovery of the
calculus at the end of the 17th century. However, it is important for our reconstructions to keep
these two notions apart. In particular, it is important to understand that, while indivisibles were
though of as heterogenea or actual lower-dimensional portions of some mathematical continuum —
viz. lines in a figure or surfaces in a solid —, infinitesimals were thought as homogenea or as parts
of a continuum that, although had the same number of dimensions as the original continuum, had
nevertheless a very small extension in at least one of these dimensions — as in the case of thinking
about a circle as a collection of very thin triangles or, for a more modern example used for the
construction of the Riemann integral, as in the case of thinking about the area below a curve as the
collection of all very thin rectangles bounded above by the curve.
The example we gave above of the circle as the collection of all very thin triangles is indeed
Kepler’s. In fact, to compute the area of the given circle, he though of this circle as being com-
posed of many infinitesimally small isosceles triangles whose bases were infinitesimal sections of the
circumference and whose heights were the radius of the circle. Thus, the area of the circle could be
estimated as being half the circumference of the circle, i.e., 122πr = πr, times its radius r — which
is in fact the right result.
It is, however, his method for calculating the volumes of solids of revolution that is most im-
portant for our theme here because this is the method that actually introduced into the modern
mathematical scene the notion of indivisibles. These solids of revolution, which are essentially the
ones obtained by rotating some conic section about an axis — as, e.g., when one considers a sphere
as arising from the rotation of a semi-circle about its diameter or, to use some of Kepler examples,
when one considers “apples” or “lemons”, which are obtained by the rotation about the same diame-
ter of arcs that are, respectively, longer and shorter than the semi-circle —, were fairly well studied
in antiquity, in particular with the work of Pappus. Notwithstanding, Kepler introduces a very
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fruitful technique for the calculation of their volumes by adding the areas of all cylindrical surfaces
generated by rotating all the possible chords one could draw uniting two points of the original conic
section. Thus, the image one gets from this method is one in which these revolution solids are
thought of as being somehow ultimately composed of all these cylindrical surfaces.4
Another interesting example of how such intuitions came to bear on mathematical methods of
integration is Galileo’s proof of the mean speed theorem in his Two new sciences (pp. 173-174).5 In
this theorem, Galileo shows that the time it takes a uniformly accelerated body starting from rest
to traverse some distance d is the same as the time taken by some other body traversing the same
distance d with a velocity which is the mean between the starting and ending velocities of the first
body. The actual proof involves turning things around a bit and showing that if the two motions
happen in the same time interval, then the distances covered by the two motions are equal, which
amounts to the same result. Indeed, let AB be the time it takes for the first body to traverse d
and let EB be proportional to the highest speed the body has during the movement — viz., its
final velocity. Then, by drawing the line EA, we have that all the lines parallel to EB represent
the instantaneous speed which the object has at some instant t, which is the distance between each
parallel line and the line GA. Now, if we let F be the midpoint between E and B, we have that the
area of the rectangle ABFG is the same as the area of the triangle ABE, since GF bisects AE at I.
What is happening is that the area of the smaller triangle AIG is the same as that of the triangle
IFE, as can be seen by understanding that for each point T between A and B, the length of the
section of the line parallel to GAmeeting AB at a point T that lies in the triangle AIG is identical to
the length of the corresponding line segment inside IFE of the line that meets AB at T . But since
the lengths of the parallel lines — in the case of the uniformly accelerated motion, the length of the
sections inside the triangle ABE, and in the case of the constant velocity, the length of the sections
inside the rectangle ABFG— are proportional to each instantaneous speed of the body, the areas in
question are proportional to the distance d, so that this distance is indeed the same for both motions.
4Cf. Kepler, Opera omnia IV, pp. 584-5.








For us, the interesting part of this proof is the one in which the areas of the two smaller triangles
AIG and IFE are compared, for, to carry out this comparison, Galileo thinks of these respective
areas as being somehow composed out of the lengths of the infinite number of line sections parallel
to EB that lie inside the respective triangle. Thus, by showing that for each such length in AIG
there is a corresponding length in IFE and vice-versa, the equality of areas is established.
This proof bears some similarities with Oresme’s proof of the same proposition. However,
although we have seen that Orestes does indeed take a step towards the recognition of continua as
being composed of an actual infinity of indivisibles, by distinguishing between real and mental or
conceptual division, Baron notes that
[t]here seems no reason to suppose that Oresme regarded a line as the sum of its
points or a surface as the sum of its lines. This is a static idea and the whole
emphasis with Oresme is on the description of lines, surfaces and solids by motion.
It was not necessary for him to postulate an infinity of lines drawn upon a surface;
he argues, in fact, that if an ordinate be erected at any point on the base line
proportional to the intensity of the quality then the total area under the summit
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line (or line of intensity) will correspond with the quantity of the quality. (Baron
(1969), p. 86)
What is important to note here, though, is that even if Oresme’s philosophical positions make him
merely an intermediate figure in the history of acceptance of a manifold-theoretic view of continua,
he undeniably did play a key sociological role in this history, in that his mathematical ideas were the
bedrock on top of which this ontological conception of continua could be justified. Indeed, Baron
concludes by saying that
[i]f Oresme himself did not find it necessary to draw lines of intensity everywhere
on the base line others who followed him may well have done so; for most of
the sixteenth-century editions of his work and that of the Merton Calculators are
illustrated with innumerable diagrams exhibiting an endless variety of geometric
forms covered with arrays of parallel ordinates. (Ibid., p. 87)
By “parallel ordinates” she has in mind the type of construction we used, following Galileo, for
the proof of the mean speed theorem. These, according to her, were commonly accepted in the
16th century as constituting the areas of polygons, as the addition of diagrams containing them to
the works of Oresme and the Medieval calculators would show. Undoubtedly, though, by the 17th
century this idea of higher-dimensional geometric figures as being composed out of an infinity of
lower-dimensional ones is elevated by the work of Galileo’s student Cavalieri into a very efficient
method for integrating areas of plane figures and of solids, which eventually became known as “the
method of indivisibles”. As we shall see below, this turned out to be a very famous method and
its rigorousness was very much a discussion theme in the 17th century until its results could be
reinterpreted in terms of the calculus of Newton and Leibniz.
Essentially, the method of indivisibles of Cavalieri consists of the following mathematical result
that became known as Cavalieri’s theorem:6
If between the same parallels any two plane figures are constructed, and if in
them, any straight lines being drawn equidistant from the parallels, the included
portions of any one of these lines are equal, the plane figures are also equal to one
another; and, if between the same parallel planes any solid figures are constructed,
and if in them, any planes being drawn equidistant from the parallel planes, the
6Cf. Edwards Jr. (1979), pp. 105 ff., Boyer (1949), pp. 117 ff. and Bell (2006), pp. 69-70.
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included plane figures out of any one of the planes so drawn are equal, the solid
figures are likewise equal to one another. (Geometria Indivisibilibus Continuorum
Nova quadam ratione promota, p. 484; Evans (1917), p. 448)
The idea behind this theorem is essentially a generalization of the method we used when we gave
the reconstruction of Galileo’s proof of the mean speed theorem for equating the areas of the two
small triangles. Now, however, we are not restricting our attention to two triangles, but are consid-
ering any two-dimensional figure (or three-dimensional solid) constructed in the space between two








Then, what one does is to think about these figures as being composed out of the numerous parallel
line segments — some representatives of which are denoted q, q′, r, r′, s, s′ in the figure — so that,
if one can establish a correspondence between the lengths of each pair q, q′, r, r′, s, s′ etc., then the
theorem guarantees, by an intricate but intelligent argument involving the superposition of the two
figures and a method for comparing the non-overlapping parts, that the areas of the figures must
also be equal.
The main point to keep in mind here is the notion of “any straight line being drawn equidistant
from the parallels”. These lines are examples of what Cavalieri called the “indivisibles of a figure”7.
He defines them in the following passage:
If through opposite tangents to a given plane figure two parallel and indefinitely
produced planes are drawn either perpendicular or inclined the given figure, and if
one of the parallel planes is moved toward the other, still remaining parallel to it,
7Geometria, p. 114: “indivisibilia. s. omnes lineas figurae”
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until it coincides with it; then the single lines which during the motion form the
intersections between the moving plane and the given figure, collected together,
are called all the lines of the figure taken with one of them as regula; this when
the planes are perpendicular to the given figure. When, however, the planes are
inclined to the figure the lines are called all the lines of the same given figure with
respect to an oblique passage (obliqui transitus),8 the regula being likewise one
of them. (Geometria, p. 99, translation from Andersen (1985), pp. 300-301)
This distinction between recti and obliqui transita is related to what he calls the distribution
of the respective line segments in a figure. In particular, it plays a role in an alleged counterexample
to Cavalieri’s theorem, which is given by Cavalieri himself in Ex. geom. sex, pp. 238-9. Consider
a triangle ABC with AB 6= BC. Then, draw a line BD perpendicular to the base AC. For each
point X on this line, one can consider the projection of this point on the AB and BC lines, which
we shall call, respectively, XAB and XBC . And for each such pair of projections, the respective line
segments starting at each projection point and meeting the base AC at a right angle are of equal
length, so that one would have to conclude from Cavalieri’s method of indivisibles that the triangles







8As opposed to the case in which the plane is perpendicular to the figure, which he called recti transitus.
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It is easy to see that this construction does not fall into the assumptions of Cavalieri’s theorem
since the triangles ABD and DBC are not drawn between two parallel lines so that the indivisibles
considered are parallel to these original lines. However, harder to see is why one requires such strong
assumptions in the theorem in the first place, i.e., why this construction is not analogous to the
construction in Cavalieri’s theorem in the sense that it establishes a correlation between pairs of
line segments of the same length that together exhaust the two triangles ABD and DBC.
Cavalieri’s answer was that in this kind of constructions the line segments obtained from the
points XAB did not have the same distribution as those arising from the points XBC . He never
gave a clear definition of what this notion of distribution was to mean, but it seams that this idea
would justify the stronger conditions of his theorem as necessary for the equality of the distribution
of the respective line segments involved in the analysis of area by the method of indivisibles. Thus,
Baron says that,
[a]lthough this idea of the distribution of indivisibles was never very clearly devel-
oped by Cavalieri he was careful only to compare figures in which the distribution
of indivisibles was, in fact, uniform. The summation of lines and planes in the
Cavalierian sense is therefore formally equivalent to the addition of rectangular








where b → 0. Many of Cavalieri’s contemporaries were quick to see this and to
make the required adjustments. Wallis and Roberval, in particular, considered
the use of lines and planes entirely justifiable since both derived from infinitely
narrow rectangles and sections of uniform thickness. (Baron (1969), pp. 134-135)
The formal equivalence noted at the end of this passage has a somehow double meaning here. On
the one hand, it shows that the assumption involved in this method regarding the composition
of higher dimensional continua from lower-dimensional indivisibles is not necessary, in the sense
that one can instead consider these continua as being composed of other continua of the same
dimensionality, whose thicknesses are a constant value b, and then consider the case in which b→ 0.
As a matter of fact, this is indeed the first notion of integration to achieve a canonical status
due to its rigorous formulation by Riemann. However, the aforementioned equivalence also shows
that the method of indivisibles, being equivalent to this “limit method”, which was made rigorous
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in the work of the nineteen century analysts, is a possible way of understanding the composition
of mathematical continua and, thus, it surely provides some strength to those who would like to
go against the classical Aristotelian view of continua and towards a recognition of the manifold-
theoretic constitution of these continua out of lower-dimensional indivisibles. And, indeed, given
the widespread acceptance of Cavalieri’s mathematical work, one can surely believe that its reliance
of this manifold-theoretic conception of continua might have found warm acceptance wherever the
mathematical method itself had been recognized as sound and useful.
Cavalieri, though, quite politically claimed that his method could be interpreted in both concep-
tions of the continua, viz. both if one thought it was composed of atomic indivisibles or if one held
the Aristotelian position of infinite divisibility. However, from his very attempt of presenting an
interpretation of the method in both conceptual schemes it seem clear how the method itself is much
more in line with the first way of understanding the composition of continua. Indeed, Andersen
(1985) says that
[h]e did not state exactly how the space occupied by “all the lines” should be
understood if continuous divisibility was assumed, but he argued for the existence
of the ratio between two collections of lines even in this case. (p. 306)
I believe it is doubtless how this method of indivisibles, if it is to be taken at face value, involves a
thorough acceptance of the thesis according to which, at least with respect to abstract geometrical
two and three-dimensional objects, continuous entities have their dimensions in virtue of their being
composed from a myriad of lower-dimensional entities — viz. plane figures from line segments and
solid bodies from plane sections. Further evidence is given by Andersen (1985) in the following
passage:
Although Cavalieri did not make it clear what he thought of the composition of the
continuum, one may wonder whether he did not incline more to the one possibility
than to the other. The following remark from Cavalieri’s letter to Galileo dated
June 28, 1639, “I have not dared to say that the continuum was composed of these
[the indivisibles] ... Had I dared ...” (Galilei Opere, vol. 18, p. 67) could give
the impression that most likely Cavalieri conceived of the continuum as composed
of indivisibles. Lur’e seems to have maintained that this was indeed Cavalieri’s
opinion not expressed too explicitly because he feared an opposition from the
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Catholic church holding the Aristotelian view (cf. Lombardo-Radice 1966, p.
206) (p. 307)
It is an undeniable historical fact that the period we are considering was a quite dangerous moment
for those who openly went against the Catholic doctrines of the Church, which were deep-rooted in
medieval Aristotelianism.9 However, she concludes more conservatively that
I find it likely that Cavalieri’s apparent ambivalence should be ascribed to the
circumstance that he was not genuinely interested in the philosophical aspects
of the composition of the continuum. The function of “all the lines” was first
of all, as Cavalieri himself stated in the introduction to Exercitationes (p. 3),
to be an instrument for quadratures; and his mathematical treatment of them
was independent of any conception of the continuum. (This point of view is also
expressed in Lombardo-Radice 1966, e.g. p. 206, and in Cellini 19661 p. 9.)
(Ibid.)
Indeed, although the method initially encountered stern criticism — mainly from Guldin10—,
it found relatively widespread acceptance in the mathematical community of the 17th century. As
an example of this acceptance of Cavalieri’s method of indivisibles, we can mention its use in the
mathematical work of Torricelli. According to Andersen (1985),
During the first years after the publication of Geometria (1635) Torricelli took
a rather sceptical [sic] attitude toward Cavalieri’s method (cf. Lombardo Radice
1966, pp. 21-22). But about 1641 he changed his mind and found that it opened a
“royal road” to quadratures (Torricelli Opere, vol. 1, part 1, p. 140), and he gave
examples of the use of the method in his Opera geometrica, published in 1644.
This book was well received by European mathematicians and became influential
in spreading knowledge of the method of indivisibles; for several mathematicians
it remained the only origin of this knowledge. (pp. 355-356)
Torricelli opens his Quadratura Parabolae per novam indivisibilium Geometriam pluribus modis
absoluta, with the following:
9One can mention here figures like Giordano Bruno, Copernicus and Galileo himself who either were killed by the
inquisition or whose lives were threatened by the it based solely on doctrinal reasons.
10Cf. Centrobaryca, pp. 340-342.
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Until now, the matter about the measurement of the parabola has been related
in the manner of the ancients. It remains that we should approach the same mea-
surement of the parabola with a certain new but marvelous system — namely, by
the aid of the Geometry of Indivisibles and with diverse methods in this manner.
(Opera geometrica, p. 55)
Then, before proceeding to the actual mathematical arguments, he concludes the introduction by
saying that
this [the method of indivisibles] is truly the Royal Road in the mathematical thorn
hedges, that Cavalieri, creator of these wonderful inventions, first among everyone
opened up and made public for the common good. (Ibid., p. 56)
From these quotes, it seems clear how much Torricelli valued the new method of Cavalieri; and
the proofs themselves have clear instances in which certain figures and solids are identified with
the collection of all lower-dimensional indivisibles of some kind.11 In order to see exactly in which
respect this is so, it is interesting to look at one of the actual proofs presented by him to show that
a certain figure which is bound by a parabola and a horizontal line has an area which is 43 of the
are of a triangle with same base and with the other vertex at the point where the diameter of the







11E.g., a line is “[...] una lunghezza, cioè una estensione di punti continuati”, Torricelli, Opere, II, p. 247.
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and it goes like this:
Let ABC be a parabola with tangent CD and let AD be parallel to the diame-
ter. Let the parallelogram AE be drawn, and let a circle with diameter AD be
conceived which is the base of a cone having vertex at point C and likewise is the
base of some cylinder ACED of the same height with the aforementioned cone.
Now let some line FG be drawn parallel to AD, and let a plane parallel to
the circle on AD be conceived to pass through the line itself. FG will then be to
IB as the line DA is to IB –– that is, as the square on DC is to the square on CI
(because of the parabola). Or as the square onDA is to the square on IG (because
of similar triangles) –– that is, as the circle on DA is to the circle on IG— namely,
as the circle on FG is to the same circle on IG. And it is this always. All the
first magnitudes are equal to the line DA and therefore equal among themselves.
Also, all the thirds are equal to the circle on DA, and on account of this equal
among themselves. Therefore, by Lemma 18, all the firsts together — namely
the parallelogram AE — will be to all the seconds together –– namely, to the
trilineum ABCD –– as all the thirds together –– namely, the cylinder AE –– are
to all the fourths together together — that is, to the cone ACD. Therefore, the
parallelogram AE is three times the trilineum ABCD. With the parallelogram
AE cut in half, the triangle ACD will be 32 of the trilineum ABCD. By conversion
of the ratio, the triangle ACD will be three times the parabola itself. On account
of this, from the explanation of Proposition 9, the parabola will be 43 of its own
inscribed triangle. (Opera geometrica, II, pp. 56-57)
The interesting thing to note in the quoted proof is how the parallelogram AE is identified with
the collection of all lines from which FG is an instance, how the trilineum ABCD is identified
with the collection of lines from which IB is an instance, how the cylinder ACED is identified
with the collection of circles from which the one with diameter AD is an instance and how the
ACD is identified with the collection of all the circles from which the one with diameter IG is an
instance.12 These identifications are clear instances of the general approach of considering continua
12Cf. Bascelli (2015) pp. 116-117.
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to be constituted by a collection of lower-dimensional heterogenea and the simplicity with which
these identifications are made seems to attest to how commonplace they became in the context of
geometrical discussions of integration type problems in the 17th century.
Now, whereas Cavalieri had a very technical and ontologically neutral or purely mathematical
approach to the method of indivisibles, what we see in Torricelli is a full blown acceptance of
these heterogeneous indivisibles, which were used in his work in a much more naive and widespread
manner.13 He even proudly claimed, perhaps unaware of Kepler’s work, that his method
proceeds with curved indivisibles, an example of which no one has yet given. Since
Cavalieri himself has not provided any element of this subject in his Geometry,
we have to assume that he should corroborate with certain examples this way of
reasoning. (Opera geometrica, p. 174. The translation here is our translation
from the French quote in De Gandt (1987))
Then, he used these curved indivisibles — in particular, cylinders — to prove a formula for the
volume inside a hyperboloid obtained by rotating a hyperbola about one of the axis, which shows
his intent of thinking about every geometric object in terms of these lower-dimensional indivisibles.
Another episode of the history of the calculus that has some interest to our overview of mathe-
matical developments which could have influenced the thorough acceptance in the late 19th century
of the idea that continua were composed out of indivisibles is an integration method presented by
Grégoire de Saint-Vincent in his Opus geometricum, which was published in 1647, although it seems
to have been written probably between 1622-1629.14 The method was called ductus plani ad planum.
Essentially, this method provides a way of comparing the volumes of solids that are constructed
according to a common construction method as ductii of certain plane figures on a ground line.
13Cf. De Gandt (1987), pp. 161-163.






Given two plane figures, e.g., the rectangle ABCD and the semi-circle AEB in the previous
picture, the ductus of these figures is the solid one builds by considering all the lines between DA
and CB parallel to HE and then constructing, for each of these lines, a rectangle with base HI
and height IE, where I is the point where HE meets the ground line AB. Thus, we have that a
parallelepiped is the ductus of two rectangles, a prism is the ductus of a rectangle and a triangle
and a square base pyramid is the ductus of two right angled triangles with equal sized bases, as
illustrated in the following pictures:
The ductus decomposition of a parallelepiped. The ductus decomposition of a prism.
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The ductus decomposition of a rectangular based pyramid.
This method is interesting to our present discussion because it seems to presuppose a close
relationship between the solids in question and the rectangles from which the solid is constructed.
Indeed, these rectangles can be thought of as that out of which the solid is composed, since one can
infer — this is the very lesson one draws from the method — a relationship between the volumes
of any two ductii whose composing rectangles stand in the relevant relation. This is indeed a very
general result, but let us consider, for the sake of clarification, a particular example15 of how this
method can be used.











Then, for any line perpendicular to AB which intercepts it at P , c1 at C and D, and c2 at E
15Cf. Baron (1969), pp. 140-141.
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and F , we have the following identities:
DP · PC = AP · PB = EP · PF.
From these identities, one can conclude, therefore, that the volumes of the ductus of AD1D2B in
ACB is the same as the volume of the ductus of AF1F2B in AEB, since the identities guarantee
the equality of the areas of any pair of corresponding rectangles, one from the construction of the
first ductus and the other from the construction of the second ductus.
Hence, one readily sees how this method also follows Kepler’s, Cavalieri’s and Torricelli’s inte-
gration methods in assuming that the continua whose area or, in this case, volume is to be evaluated
according to the integration method are composed of a myriad of lower-dimensional indivisibles,
such as lines or rectangles. It, thus, provides more evidence to the presence of this manifold-theoretic
conception of continua in the 17th century.
The last 17th century figure we shall consider in relation to this method of indivisibles is the
interesting case of Roberval, who, albeit claiming to having discovered the method around the time
Cavalieri developed his own version of it and, having used it to solve many open problems without
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making it public so that people would be impressed by his prowess,16 conceived of it in a way that is
much closer to the limit conception of integration which was eventually made clear with the Riemann
integral in the 19th century. This is because he seems to have at least half clearly understood the
composition of a certain geometrical continuum, not by means of “true indivisibles”, but by means
of homogenea, which were assumed to be very small in the dimension which the Cavalierian “true
indivisibles” were to be considered unextended. The exact extent to which Roberval himself thinks
of his method as being essentially different from Cavalieri’s is hard to assess precisely. Jullien (2015)
seems to think that Roberval had a clear conception of this difference and he says that
Cavalieri’s proposition, which involves continuum [sic] being composed via an
aggregate of indivisibles of a smaller dimension, is not part of Roberval’s approach.
Roberval was perfectly aware of his modification of the doctrine. (p. 180)
To justify such a position, one can — as Jullien does17 — mention the following passage from
Roberval’s letter to Torricelli:
16In this respect, it is worthwhile to cite a beautiful passage of one of Roberval’s letters to Torricelli, in which he
admits the silliness of this attitude and gives precedence to Cavalieri for being the first to make this method public.
This is the passage, as cited in Jullien (2015):
Let us now discuss indivisibles, since I believe them to be of some importance. Whether or not
the illustrious Cavalieri did indeed invent them before we did, I cannot be sure. However, I
do know this: five years before he unveiled his finding, the doctrine of indivisibles helped me
to solve some difficult problems. But do not worry: I will not claim that the invention of this
sublime doctrine is my own rather than his. I cannot, and I would not even if I could. It is
he who revealed it first, and thus, it is his. Let him therefore claim possession of it and make
full use of it; let him be known as its inventor. May God ensure that in future, I do not allow
myself to become a ridiculous intermediary in such an affair, as I have done in the past; all the
more since I have not even revealed the doctrine to my own friends, my youthful pride having
prevented me from deciding to make the discovery public. For I hoped that, in the meantime, I
would easily become renowned for my own doctrine by solving difficult problems which I publicly
submitted, every day, with the help of precisely the same technique. And I have certainly not
been disappointed. Indeed, once I had fully developed the theory, inspired as I was by an intense
enthusiasm, and once I had extended its field of application to points, lines, surfaces, angles,
solids and finally to numbers too, I had no difficulty in achieving such results as to delight my
friends and frustrate my rivals. My successes were thus rather too much like those of a child; I
concealed a doctrine which would itself have been worthy of the following line of poetry:
Nec ferre videt sua gaudia ventos.
Having discovered a gold mine, I put on display a few of the gold nuggets that I had collected
from it, in order to be taken for a rich and happy person; meanwhile, another man showed to
everyone the same gold mine which he had also discovered, and, to unanimous applause, brought
it into the public domain. Hence, I would almost certainly be ridiculed were I now to claim to
have also discovered it.
17Cf. Julien (2015), p. 180
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There is, however, a small difference between Cavalieri’s method and ours. Our
method considers the indivisibles of any surface in terms of an infinity of lines,
and the indivisibles of any volume in terms of an infinity of surfaces. [...]
We consider a line to be composed as if it were made up of infinite lines, or
of an infinite number of lines, a surface of surfaces, a solid of solids, an angle of
angles, an indefinite number of indefinite units, and even better, a plane by planes
(plano − planum in latin) made up of plane by plane, and so forth; each one of
these categories has its own properties.
Honestly, this passage certainly seems more confusing than illuminating, since in it Roberval seems
to recognize a small difference between his and Cavalieri’s methods, then to claim that his method
conceives of continua as being composed of lower-dimensional indivisibles and finally concludes that
continua must composed out of homogenea — together with other magnitudes such as angles and
“indefinite numbers”, which are not even part of our discussion regarding continua.
Jullien (2015) seems to explain away this and analogous inconsistencies in Roberval’s termi-
nology as merely a simplification, so that, in speaking of indivisibles as if they were true Cava-
lierian lower-dimensional heterogenea whose infinite multitude actually composed a certain higher-
dimensional continua, Roberval would always have in the back of his head their “true” interpretation
as very thin homogenea, a finite number of which would exhaust the dimensions of the continua in
question. Indeed, Jullien says that
if indivisibles are indeed homogeneous, the algorithms that are available require
discrete quantities to be added together. It is therefore necessary — for the sake
of calculation — to identify, fictitiously, the small lines with points. This method
is not entirely unique to Roberval. A short time before him, Simon Stevin made
use of some fairly similar notions. (Jullien (2015), p. 185)
We have already seen this when considering Cavalieri’s method in the quote from Baron (1969)
and we noted then that this equivalence between seeing a certain continuum as composed of lower-
dimensional indivisibles and seeing it as composed of many very thin homogenea has the two-fold
consequence of, on the one hand, retroactively giving some respectability to the anti-Aristotelian
conception of continua as composed of indivisibles, since this conception would yield a mathematical
method which is essentially equivalent to the undeniably rigorous limit method of the 19th century;
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and, on the other, of showing that this conception is not necessary, since the same results could
be obtained by thinking about the indivisibles in Roberval’s way as very thin homogenea whose
summed areas or volumes approximated the area or volume of the continuum in question to any
degree of accuracy required, so long as they were taken to be thin enough — and, eventually, with
the advent of the rigorous notion of a limit in the 19th century, one could just consider the case in
which these thicknesses were taken to the limit 0. In this respect, Anderson (1985) says that
it is obvious that Roberval’s procedure leading to a determination of a limit (which
in the 17th century was done by omitting certain terms) was an approach to quad-
rature quite different from Cavalieri’s calculations with collections of lines. How-
ever, Roberval himself did not seem to have considered his method very different
from Cavalieri’s. (p. 360)
Now, we must conclude by noting that, after these interpretations of indivisibles as very thin
homogenea, which eventually were made rigorous by the advent of the rigorous definition of the
notion of a limit, mathematicians were free to use the methods we have been discussing without
having to worry about adhering to non-Aristotelian metaphysical doctrines — an attitude which is
fairly ubiquitous in mathematics, not being restricted to these particular metaphysical doctrines,
but having more the form of a generalized desire of mathematicians to avoid metaphysical disputes
altogether. In this respect, we have statements such as Barrow’s in his Lectiones Mathematicae
of 1683:
I sey instant or indefinite particle, for it makes no difference whether we suppose
a line to be composed of points or indefinitely small linelets; and so in the same
manner, whether we suppose time to be made up of instants or indefinitely minute
timelets (Barrow (1916), p. 38)
and eventually that of his student Newton:
demonstrations are shorter by the method of indivisibles but because the hypothe-
sis of indivisibles seems somewhat harsh, an therefore that method is reckoned less
geometrical, I chose rather to reduce the demonstrations of the following Propo-
sitions to the first and last sums and ratios of nascent and evanescent quantities,
that is, to the limits of those sums and ratios, and so to premise, as short as I
could, the demonstrations of those limits. For hereby the same thing is performed
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as by the method of indivisibles; and now those principles being demonstrated,
we may use them with greater safety. Therefore if hereafter I should happen to
consider quantities as made up of particles, or should use little curved lines for
right ones, I would not be understood to mean indivisibles, but evanescent divisi-
ble quantities; not the sums and ratios of determinate parts, but always the limits
of sums and ratios ... (Newton (1962), p. 29)
As we have seen, even Cavalieri himself was very political in claiming that both metaphysical
conceptions regarding the constitution of continua could be regarded as a proper background to
his method, albeit it seems clear that, identifying as he did the indivisibles with lower-dimensional
continua, this is not strictly speaking true.
By the end of the 17th century, however, the method of indivisibles already started to lose its
prestige to this other method of infinitesimals and limits; and the idea of continua as constituted by
an actual infinity of lower-dimensional indivisibles was replaced by dynamical intuitions of continua
as the result of the motions of other thin continua in time, which were indeed around since the
Medieval, if not the Ancient period.
Thus, we get to 18th century, which is the century in which mathematicians worked towards
a clarification and a development of the calculus of Newton and Leibniz, thereby accepting with
it the idea that integration methods should be regarded in terms of the limit notion and not in
terms of lower-dimensional indivisibles. Thus, although the 18th century in a sense brought about
the decline of the integration methods that relied on the assumption of infinitesimals, on the other
hand, we have in the mathematics of the 18th century the beginning of the story which culminates
with the rigorous presentation of the calculus by the 19th century analysts.
2. The “barren” 18th century
The mathematicians of the 18th century surely did not fail to contribute to the growth of their
discipline. It is a mere case of listing the names of mathematicians living in this century — one
can, roughly chronologically, start with La Hire, then mention König, Lampert, the Bernoulli family,
Euler, D’Alambert, Bézout, du Châtelet, Fourier, Gergonne, Goldbach, Kästner, Lacroix, Lagrange,
Laplace, de l’Hôpital, Maupertius, and end with the mighty Gauss — to realize the sheer amount
65
of grandeur that these decades had in store for the development of mathematics in general, and of
the calculus in particular.
However, the development of mathematics carried out in the 18th century had much more to
do with the advancement of practical techniques that allowed these authors to develop the theory
of Newton and Leibniz to a whole new level. This development is arguably what brought about the
need for a revolution in the foundations of mathematics in the 19th century, which shall, in its turn,
bear many fruits with respect to the history we’re trying to trace in this chapter; notwithstanding
this, however, we must note that this development of mathematics in the 18th century was marked
by a strictly pragmatical approach that was almost exclusively based on problem-solving activities.
If one goes back to the list of mathematicians that worked during the 18th century, one readily
sees that they were all, with very few and localized exceptions, very skillful calculators and problem
solvers, who did not seem to assign much interest to foundational issues.
A consequence of this is that there was not much happening in the 18th century that deserves
mention in our historical overview of the mathematical ideas with respect to continua. In fact,
pretty much all of the mathematics that was done in this century was done against a background of
intuitions that sprung from the late 17th century — viz. either a conception of continua as composed
out of infinitesimal homogenea or, what became more and more fashionable as the years went by,
a dynamical conception of continua as being created by the motion of a single lower-dimensional
entity, i.e., a line as the motion of a point, a surface as the motion of a curve etc.
Perhaps even more telling is the fact that these background intuitions became more and more
distant as the algebraic methods grew in strength, so that much of the foundational issues being
discussed in the late 18th century have to do with the applicability and reasonableness of purely
algebraic expressions, such as the infamous ratio 00 , which was a nightmare for mathematicians, like
Euler, who wanted to explain away infinitesimally small quantities as being merely mechanisms to
deal with quantities that were actually equal to 0.18
This lack of any foundational concerns with respect to the nature of continua is the sense in
which we have termed the XVIII “barren”. In many other respects, this century was extremely
fruitful, yielding many strong mathematical ideas and results. However, they do not fall under the
topics with which we are concerned in this chapter, so that we might as well, for the sake of our
18Cf. Gray (2015).
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historical reconstruction, jump straight to the 19th century, in which we shall, on the contrary,
find many developments inside mathematics that are directly connected with our theme in this
monograph regarding the essence of continua.
3. From continua to the continuum of real numbers
It was part and parcel of the 19th century mathematical achievement of recasting the calculus
in strictly rigorous terms to present a formal characterization of the real numbers in terms of a
complete linearly ordered field. Indeed, this characterization was such a great achievement to the
eyes of 19th century mathematicians that one can even see a change in their language. Whereas
earlier mathematicians talked about continua as the geometrical entities that were their object of
study, after the first few constructions of the real numbers appeared and became widespread in
the literature we start to see more and more mentions to “the continuum” or “the continuum of
real numbers”. And this socio-linguistic drive was — I believe — further fomented by the way
mathematicians in the 19th century, following Grassmann and Riemann, began to thing about any
abstract n-dimensional space as what we would now call “the n-fold Cartesian product of copies of
R”, viz. Rn. Couturat, writing right at the turn of the century, is very clear on this respect.
But how do we define the continuous space of n dimensions? It is the set of
points (x1, x2, . . . , xn) obtained by ascribing to each coordinate x1, x2, . . . , xn all
real values. That definitely means that one grounds the continuity of space on the
continuity of the set of real numbers. But one knows how this latter continuity
is, in its turn, obtained: it is thanks to the creation of the irrational numbers in
virtue of the axiom or postulate of continuity, stated as it was by Mr. Dedekind.
(Couturat (1900), p. 167)
A field is a mathematical collection of entities together with two arithmetical operations cor-
responding to the usual addition and multiplication, which satisfy the usual requirements of asso-
ciativity, commutativity, the existence of inverses and neutral elements. An ordered field is a field
that is supplemented with an order relation, which in the case of the reals is further assumed to be
linear. Thus, we can think of these “new” purely mathematical real numbers as indeed composing
an infinite line which is “full” of points, each corresponding to one of the numbers. This notion of
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the “fullness” of the line of real numbers was, however, the notion that eluded rigorous mathematical
characterization for many centuries.
The first obvious property that could be related to this notion of the “fullness” of the real number
line is what became known as density. Given two real numbers x, y, there is always another real
number z, such that x < z < y. However, it is easy to realize that this property is also satisfied by
the rational numbers. This fact surely is a trivial matter, but although the existence of irrational
numbers was known at least since the time of the ancient Greeks,19 we had to wait until the 19th
century for mathematicians clearly to realize that one needed a stronger property to characterize the
real numbers in opposition to the rational numbers. Density just won’t do since, although the real
numbers are definitely dense, so are the rational numbers. And, in the 19th century, mathematicians
began to ask the important question: what is it about the former that distinguishes them from the
latter? In Dedekind’s words, one must ask the question:
In what then does this continuity consist? Everything must depend on the answer
to this question, and only through it shall we obtain a scientific basis for the
investigations of all continuous domains. By vague remarks upon the unbroken
connection in the smallest parts obviously nothing is gained; the problem is to
indicate a precise characteristic of continuity that can serve as the basis for valid
deductions. (Ewald (1999), p. 771)
In this respect, it is interesting to mention Hobson’s 1907 work, which was the first English account
of these new mathematical ideas that had been around for the last 30 years of the 19th century. In
it, he says that
[b]efore the development of analysis was made to rest upon a purely arithmetical
basis, it was usually considered that the field of operations was the continuum
given by our intuition of extensive magnitude especially of spatial or temporal
magnitude, and of the motion of bodies through space.
The intuitive idea of continuous motion implies that, in order that a body
may pass from one position A to another position B, it must pass through ev-
ery intermediate position in its path. An attempt to answer the question, what is
19Sometimes this discovery is credited to Hippassus of Metapontum along with a story of how this discovery led him
to drown at sea.
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meant by every intermediate position, reveals the essential difficulties of this ques-
tion, and gives rise to a demand for an exact theoretical treatment of continuous
magnitude.
The implication in the idea of continuous magnitude shews that, between A
and B, other positions A′, B′ exist, which the body must occupy at definite times;
that between A′, B′ other such positions exist, and so on. The intuitive notion of
the continuum and that of continuous motion, negate the idea that such a process
of subdivision can be conceived of as having a definite termination. The view is
prevalent that the intuitional notions of continuity and of continuous motion are
fundamental and sui generis; and that they are incapable of being exhaustively
described by a scheme of specification of positions. Nevertheless, the aspect of
the continuum as a field of possible positions is the one which is accessible to
Arithmetic Analysis, and with which alone Mathematical Analysis is concerned.
That property of the intuitional continuum, which may be described as unlimited
divisibility, is the only one that is immediately available for use in Mathematical
thought; and this property is not sufficient for the purposes in view, until it
has been supplemented by a system of axioms and definitions which shall suffice
to provide a complete and exact description of the possible positions of points
and other geometrical objects which can be determined in space. Such a scheme
constitutes an abstract theory of spatial magnitude. ((1907), p. 52)
This difference between the real and rational number systems eventually became known as the
completeness of the real numbers and there are many equivalent properties that do the trick of pin-
ning down this difference; but, perhaps, the most famous property to be considered is the existence
of a lowest upper bound to every set of real numbers that is bounded above.20 Other equivalent
properties are, for instance, the claim that every Cauchy sequence of real numbers converges to a
real number, which is the one that appears in the work of Cantor and that has a history dating
back to Bolzano in the early 19th century; or the perhaps more modern property that the inter-
section of every collection of nested intervals of real numbers is non-empty. First, though, in order
20A collection of real numbers said to be bounded above if there is a real number greater than or equal to any member
of the collection.
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to understand these properties, one must define what one is to mean by the mathematical notions
involved in the statement of these properties.
3.1. An abstract account of the main notions involved in the mathematical discus-
sions regarding continua in the 19th century. The purpose of this section — which is to
be thought of as a fairly technical intermission — is to present a fully abstract and contemporary
account of some mathematical notions that will be important for understanding the historical devel-
opments of the mathematical ideas in the 19th century. We shall begin with the notion of a sequence
of real numbers (xn)n∈N. The current definition is that such a sequence is to be any function from
the natural numbers to real numbers. Then, a fundamental or a Cauchy sequence21 is a sequence
(xn)n∈N such that, for any ε > 0, there is n0 ∈ N such that, if m,n > n0, then
|xn − xm| < ε,
where |xn − xm| denotes the absolute value of the difference of these real numbers. Now, certain
sequences might have another related property, viz. that they converge to a certain real number x.
This notion of convergence — which is intimately related to the notion of a limit — was rigorously
defined for the first time only well into the 19th century. In current mathematics, it is defined by
means of the ε-n0 style of definition that emerged from these efforts, to mean that, given and ε > 0,
there is an n0 ∈ N such that, if n > n0, then
|xn − x| < ε.








This sequence is famous because it captures the purely mathematical structure behind many of
Zeno’s paradoxes of motion. We can show that this sequence converges to the number 2, which
is essentially the modern resolution to these paradoxes. On the other hand, we can consider the
21A more historically precise name for this concept would be “Bolzano sequence” or at least “Bolzano-Cauchy se-
quence”, since its first appearance in the literature is in Bolzano’s 1817 Rein Beweis.
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where each ai is the i-th digit in π’s decimal expansion. This sequence is also Cauchy and, as in
the case of the former sequence, this latter sequence is indeed composed only out of rational terms.
However, whereas the first sequence converges to a rational number, viz. 2, the latter sequence
does not converge to a rational number, but to π, which is known to be irrational since the ancient
times. Now, it was a striking result of the developments in 19th century analysis to understand
that supplementing the limits of all Cauchy sequences of rational numbers that do not converge to
rational numbers is enough to obtain the kind of completeness that is required to distinguish the
real numbers from the merely rational numbers; and, thus, we can understand the “completeness”
of the real numbers, in opposition to the “incompleteness” of the merely rational numbers, as the
claim that every Cauchy sequence of real numbers converges to a real number. More precisely,
nowadays we define two Cauchy sequences (an)n∈N and (bn)n∈N to be equivalent if, given ε > 0,
there is n0 ∈ N such that, for every n > n0,
|an − bn| < ε.
Then, since this is an equivalence relation, we can define the real numbers to be the very equivalence
classes into which this relation partitions the set of Cauchy sequences.
Another important notion for the study of real numbers is that of a least upper bound of a given
bounded above collection X of real numbers. This is just the real number u such that x ≤ u, for
every x ∈ X and u ≤ v, for every real number v such that the first property holds. For instance,
consider the collections X and Y consisting of the terms of the first and the second sequence
introduced in the last paragraph, respectively. We know that 2 is an upper bound for X; that is,
2 satisfies the first property of the definition for a least upper bound. It so happens that, for any
other upper bound, it will necessarily be greater than 2, so that 2 is indeed the least upper bound
for X. Moreover, we know that 4 is an upper bound for Y and that 3 is not, so that the least upper
bound of this collection, if it is to exist, must lie between 3 and 4. Indeed, the least upper bound
of Y will not be a rational number, even though every element Y is, for it is, as one might easily
suspect, π.
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More generally, given a bounded above collection X of real numbers, one can consider a de-
creasing sequence (un)n∈N of upper bounds. This sequence is going to be Cauchy and, therefore, if
one assumes that every Cauchy sequence converges, one can consider u to be the limit of such a se-
quence. Well, this u is going to turn out to be the least upper bound for X. From this proof-sketch,
one can readily see that the claim that every Cauchy sequence of real numbers converges implies
the claim that every collection of real numbers that is bounded above has a least upper bound.
Conversely, consider a given Cauchy sequence (xn)n∈N. The collection of all the terms of such a
sequence is bounded — both above and below — so that, if we assume that such sets have always
a least upper bound, it will also have a greater lower bound — which is the dual notion to the least
upper bound concept. Indeed, one has only to consider the collection of numbers of the form −xn,
for xn in the original sequence, so that the least upper bound for this collection will be the greatest
lower bound for the original collection. Thus, we call, for each n ∈ N, ln the greatest lower bound
for the set of terms of the original sequence starting with the n-th term. Note that we will have
l0 ≤ l1 ≤ · · ·
and also all these lower bounds are bounded by any upper bound of the original sequence, so that
the set of these lower bounds has a least upper bound u. The claim is that this number will be the
limit of the original sequence, so that the existence of least upper bounds for bounded collections of
real numbers — and of greater lower bounds, which follows from it — also implies the convergence of
Cauchy sequences of real numbers, so that we can conclude that the properties are indeed equivalent.
A final property that is equivalent to both previously seen properties that characterize the
completeness of the real numbers is the assumption that the intersection of any collection of nested
closed intervals is non-empty. This property is perhaps the most intuitive of them all and maybe
for this reason is is the one that is most common in current mathematical presentations of this
topic. The idea behind it is that the completeness of the real numbers can be characterized by the
assumption that even in the case where we consider a collection of nested closed intervals whose
length goes to zero, still in this case their intersection will not be empty — actually, in this case it
will be a singleton. This property implies, say, the existence of a least upper bound for a non-empty
bounded above set X of real numbers because, assuming the upper bound u guaranteed by the
assumption is not the least upper bound we are looking for, we can consider again a decreasing
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sequence of upper bounds (un)n∈N for this set and an increasing sequence (vn)n∈N of lower bounds
to the set of upper bounds of this set. Then, we shall have a sequence of nested intervals [vn, un]
and the real number assumed to exist by the nested interval property — which will be unique, since
the size of these intervals goes to zero — is going to turn out to be the least upper bound for X.
Conversely, given a sequence of nested intervals of the form [an, bn], we can conclude from their
“nestedness” that
a0 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ b2 ≤ b1 ≤ b0.
Then, each bi is an upper bound for the set of the ai’s, so that this set has by assumption a least
upper bound u. We would like to see that this u is in every interval, so that it is indeed in their
intersection. For that, it is enough to note that, for any n ∈ N, since u is an upper bound for the
set of ai’s, an ≤ u and that, since u is the least such upper bound for the set of ai’s and that bn is
another upper bound for this set, we have u ≤ bn, so that indeed, u ∈ [an, bn] for any n ∈ N. Hence,
we see that this nested interval property is equivalent to both the aforementioned properties.
Now, this notion of a “complete linearly ordered field”, which is emblematically exemplified by
the real numbers, began to be called in the 19th century “the continuum” — a name that not only
stuck, but did so because, as was mentioned before, it seemed to provide both a mathematically
rigorous and intuitively satisfactory description of a continuous line of points that could be identified
with the formal structure behind not only the obvious 1-dimensional case, but also, through the
work of mathematicians like Grassmann and Riemann, as the foundation behind the general case of
an n-dimensional continuous manifold or, as it is more commonly know in current mathematics, an
n-dimensional vector space, which is the starting point whence one constructs geometrical spaces,
by introducing affine properties with the definition of a particular inner product on the elements
of the space and, eventually, by introducing a metric on this space, which will allow one to talk
about lengths, areas, volumes etc.22 Indeed, already in the introduction to his Ausdehnungslehre,
Grassmann is clear to state that
[a]s an example of an extensive magnitude, the best we can choose is the lim-
ited line (segment), whose elements are essentially separated from one another
and precisely thereby constitute the line as an extension. (Grassmann (1878), p.
XXVII)
22Cf. e.g. Grassmann (1878), p. 21, and Riemann (1868).
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And Bell (2006) is very clear to claim that
Cantor seems to have become convinced by this time that the essential nature
of a continuum is fully reflected in the properties of sets of points - a conviction
which was later to give birth to abstract set theory. In particular a continuum’s
key properties, Cantor believed, resided in the range of powers of its subsets of
points. Since the power of a continuum of any number of dimensions is the same
as that of a linear continuum, the essential properties of arbitrary continua were
thereby reduced to those of a line. (Bell (2006), p. 159)
However, besides this fundamental axiomatic characterization of the reals, one can introduce
other concepts with the help of which one can describe properties of this arithmetized continuum
that were out of reach for the plain axiomatic characterization, e.g. the notion of continuity of
functions or that of a closed or open interval, boundaries, accumulation points etc. What we have
in mind here are the standard topological concepts. Nowadays, mathematicians say that a topology
has been introduced over some given set X when one — perhaps arbitrarily — chooses a certain
collection T of subsets of X to be called “the open subsets” of X. In fact, this choice is not wholly
arbitrary, for the collection chosen must satisfy the following axioms:
1. ∅ ∈ T and X ∈ T;
2. for every sequence of sets Oi ∈ T,
⋃
i∈I Oi ∈ T;
3. for every pair O1, O2 ∈ T, O1 ∩O2 ∈ T.
But, as long as they are satisfied, the choice has no further constraints. Then, one defines the
notion of a closed set as a set whose complement is open. And one can really feel the degree of
abstraction of the current state of mathematics when one remembers that mathematicians even use
the word “clopen” to refer to sets which are both open and closed under some given topology.
With the help of this axiomatic definition of a topology, we can define other topological notions.
For now, we shall define three other notions that will appear further on when we look at the birth
of topology. First, we need to define the notion of an interior point of a set A ⊆ X. It will simply
be a point x ∈ A such that, there is O ∈ T such that x ∈ O ⊆ A. The second notion, we would like
to define is that of a neighboring point to A. A point x ∈ X will be a neighboring point of A if,
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for all O ∈ T, x ∈ O implies O ∩A 6= ∅. Note that it is enough for each O ∩A to have only a single
point, which might even be x itself. If it is the case that each O ∩ A has points which are distinct
from x, we say that x is an accumulation point, which is the third notion we shall consider.
Like much of the mathematics whose history we are concerned in this chapter, this notion of an
“open set” has gained in the course of the 20th century a high degree of abstraction; so much so that
modern accounts of topology are filled with weird, arbitrary and highly counterintuitive examples
and counterexamples, of which we might even mention a few. For instance, given an arbitrary set X,
the simplest — usually called “trivial” — topology one can define over X is the topology containing
only the empty set and X itself as open sets. This is not a very interesting topology and its role
in mathematical presentations is essentially that of providing a “coarsest” topology to every set
and thus to serve as a counterexample to some putative general properties. Besides this “coarsest
topology”, one can define over X what is called by mathematicians “the discrete topology”, which
is essentially the finest topology one can define over X, viz. the one that makes every subset of X
open. This notion of “discrete topology” has an intuitive foundation in the fact that it is the only
topology in which every singleton subset of X is open, so that X itself can be seen as a — perhaps
huge — union of all the open disconnected sets of the form {x}, for x ∈ X. This is for topologists
the highest degree of disconnectedness, whence its connection to the notion of a discrete set.
Thus, it will probably not come as a surprise that over the set R of real numbers one can define a
myriad of different topologies, each having its own different characteristic properties. For instance,
we can consider over R any of the following topologies:




(Discrete topology) TD = P(R)






A ⊆ R | R \A is finite
}
(Sorgenfrey topology) TS =
{
A ⊆ R | ∀x ∈ A ∃ ε > 0 such that [x, x+ ε[ ⊆ A
}
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(Usual topology) T =
{
A ⊆ R | ∀x ∈ A ∃ ε > 0 such that ]x− ε, x+ ε[ ⊆ A
}
.
For any one of these, we shall have a completely different ascription of topological properties to
the real numbers. For instance, given x ∈ R, {x} is neither open nor closed in TC ; but it is both
open and closed in TD; moreover, it is not open, but it is closed in Tcof , TS and in T. [0, 1[ is neither
open nor closed in T; but it is open and closed in TS . Therefore, whenever we are interested in the
topological properties of some mathematical set we must stipulate what is the topology with respect
to which we are considering these properties; and, in the case of “the continuum” of real numbers,
at least at the turn of 19th to the 20th century and when one is concerned with the intuitive picture
one has of it, the topology to consider is arguably the one we termed “the usual topology”. Thus,
in what follows it is the one we shall have in mind.
This topology over the real number line is essentially the rigorous mathematical characterization
of the “monstruous doctrine” first introduced by Bolzano23 to understand the contact of distinct
continuous entities. In an abstract setting, one can define the notion of the boundary of some given










i.e., as the set of points which are accumulation points for both A and A{. Then, by taking T
to be the usual topology of the real line, one gets out of this definition all the intuitive cases
of boundaries. Furthermore, from the one dimensional case, one can easily abstract to higher
dimensions by considering over Rn the product topology given by all the unions of sets of the form
O1 ×O2 × · · · ×On,
with all Oi ∈ T.
However, these definitions have some well known mathematical quirks that render it highly
unintuitive, despite all its clarity and rigor. The main discomfort our intuition has with respect to
this system of definitions is one that shows up when one tries to define contact in this setting. Let
us introduce the notation ∂A for the boundary of A. Then, we can say that two regions A,B ⊆ Rn
23Cf. Bolzano (1851), §66. This is, as we shall see in the next chapter, essentially the doctrine that Brentano
abhorred, and whose own account was meant to overturn. In fact, the pretty detracting terminology mentioned in
the text here to characterize this doctrine is Brentano’s.
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touch if there is a non-empty X ⊆ Rn such that
X ⊆ ∂A ∩ ∂B,
i.e., if their boundaries share a non-empty common part. However, the notion of contact is usually
related to circumstances in which the two regions that are supposed to be in contact are truly
“distinct”, or in set-theoretical terminology disjoint. But under these assumptions we cannot claim
that A and B “share a boundary” or something to the effect that X — the region of contact — is
a part of both A and B. It can be a part of one of them or of the other, but there is no principled
reason for choosing either; and if one wants to stick to one’s democratic ideals and claim that
X is part of neither region, then one ends up with a situation in which there is something that
is essentially “close” to both regions and that indeed causes these regions to be “in contact”, but
that cannot, as a matter of principle, be recognized as a part of either region — which is just as
mind-boggling as either one of the arbitrary exclusive ascriptions of the boundary to only one of
the regions.
Despite the last paragraph, though, we shall not be concerned with these quirks here. They are
fairly well known and our goal of this chapter lies elsewhere. But before we start looking at the
history of this conception of the continuum, there is one more aspect of this formal characterization
of the continuum that is worth going into. When we talked about the notion of the “completeness” of
the real numbers, we talked about it being possibly characterized by the statement that any Cauchy
sequence of real numbers converges to a real number; and this notion of convergence was defined
in the ε-n0 style that is characteristic of modern calculus or real analysis. However, there is also a
more abstract take on this notion of the convergence of sequences that hinges only on topological
notions and does not make use of the metrical notions required by the ε-n0 style definition.
Indeed, in modern mathematical presentations of general topology, it is common for one to
define the convergence of some arbitrary sequence (xn)n∈N in some arbitrary topological space X
with some given topology T as the claim that there is a certain x ∈ X such that, given O ∈ T with
x ∈ O, there is n0 ∈ N such that xn ∈ O, for every n ≥ n0. Moreover, one can define the concept of
a basis for the topology T as a set B of open sets such that every O ∈ T can be written as a union
of elements of B. Then, an equivalent definition of this convergence is the analogous claim for every
B ∈ B instead of every O ∈ T. The reason for going into these details here is to understand how
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the original ε-n0 definition is merely an instance of this more general definition when one considers
a basis for the usual topology on R to be the one composed of the “open balls” in R. More generally,
for any finite dimension n, we can consider the subsets of Rn given by
B(x; ε) =
{
y ∈ Rn |
√
(x1 − y1)2 + · · · (xn − yn)2 < ε
}
,
for x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn an arbitrary point. The value
(∗) d(x, y) =
√
(x1 − y1)2 + · · · (xn − yn)2
is known as the “usual metric” on Rn and B(x; ε) is just an instance of the very general concept of
“an open ball with radius ε in some metric space”. Now, going back to the simple example of the
real line R, the metric is simply given by
(∗′) d(x, y) = |x− y|,
so that one can easily see how substituting this in the general definition of convergence of a sequence
in a metric space will yield the original more intuitive definition in terms of ε-n0.
The goal of this formal discussion is to make clear how much structure is behind the “usual”
or “purely mathematical” conception of the continuum of real numbers and how this structure is
not something that is inherent to the real numbers themselves, but rather arise from more or less
arbitrary assumptions regarding the topology that is supposed to be introduced on top of the mere
set of real numbers; and, in particular, from the assumption that this topology is to be the one
generated by the open balls given by the metric (∗′) — or (∗) in the case of higher-dimensional
continua. There is nothing in the mere collection of all these numbers into a set R that will
automatically introduce into this set the topological properties with which we have been concerned
in the latter paragraphs; much on the contrary, they are arbitrary choices and there are many other
choices to be made, each yielding different topological properties to “the continuum”.
3.2. The history of the formalization of the continuum. Now, we shall have a look at
the process that took place in the 19th century and that had as a consequence the establishment
of this canonical notion of “the continuum of real numbers” as a complete linearly ordered field.
This process starts in the midst of the struggle to introduce rigor into the notions of limit, of a
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function, its continuity, its derivative, its integral, i.e., the notions that had been in place inside the
mathematical community for some 200 years, at least since the full introduction of the calculus by
Newton and Leibniz, but for some of them since even before.
The first appearance of the sort of properties that were used to characterize the real numbers
in opposition to the merely rational is in the work of Bolzano, more precisely in his 1817 paper in
which he gives the first rigorous formal definition of the notion of the continuity of a real-valued
function of a real argument and a proof of what became known as the “intermediate value theorem
for continuous functions”. In it, Bolzano proves a certain property which is not, as it is sometimes
claimed in the literature,24 exactly the same as the characterization of the completeness of the real
numbers in terms of the least upper bound property, but a very close property easily seen to be
equivalent to it: Let M ⊆ R be non-empty. If there exists u ∈ R such that, for all y < u, y ∈ M ,
then there is U ∈ R such that U is the greatest real number such that, for all y < U , y ∈M .
Indeed, it is very easy to show that the two properties — Bolzano’s and the existence of a lowest
upper bound — are equivalent. If the claims in the antecedent of the Bolzano’s property hold, then
U is just the least upper bound of the set M and, conversely, if we have P ⊆ R that is non-empty
and bounded above, we consider the set
M = {x ∈ R | ∃y ∈ P such that y ≥ x}.
This set satisfies the antecedent in Bolzano’s property and therefore we can conclude the existence
of U , which will be the least upper bound of P .
However, it must be noted that in his 1817 paper Bolzano did not conceive of his property as
a true characterization of the real numbers, but merely as a property they happened to satisfy;
and, indeed, it seems that, notwithstanding his incredible foresight regarding the role of analytical
or purely logical definitions in the context of the notions relating to the calculus, he seems not to
have even considered in 1817 the possibility or necessity of providing such a characterization.
In an unpublished manuscript entitled Functionslehre, probably written in the 1820’s, he does
indeed propose an interesting characterization of the reals in terms of what he calls “measuring
fractions”. However, this characterization is still fairly incipient and did not find its way into a large
enough audience to be considered as relevant in the history we are concerned with.
24Cf., for instance, Grabiner (1981), p. 74.
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3.2.1. Weierstraß. Weierstraß, on the other hand, is a central, albeit enigmatic, figure in the
history we’re trying to trace in this chapter. He is commonly credited with being the driving force
behind the process of presenting an analytic foundation to the calculus and his name is intimately
tied to the ε-δ style of definitions in analysis that are the roots behind the topological approach
to the real numbers — and, consequently, to the higher-dimensional spaces that eventually became
associated with the Cartesian products Rn — in terms of the “usual topology” that comes, as we
saw above, from the simple metric given by
d(x, y) = |x− y|.
Nonetheless, his ideas on these issues have not been published in his lifetime — and most of them
have not been published at all, while others have been printed as the notes taken by some of his
students25 during his famous courses at the university of Berlin.26 According to Dugac (1976),
Weirstrass exposed in a cycle, usually of two years, the totality of his mathematical
edifice, whose schema was the following: The theory of analytic functions; The
theory of elliptic functions; Applications of the theory of elliptic functions; The
theory of Abelian functions. (Dugac (1976), p. 8)
Therefore, if one is to do justice to Weierstraß’ real influence in the history we are trying to trace,
one must look at the few redactions we have of these lectures in order to identify in them his true
contributions to the transition towards the manifold-theoretic conception of the continuum.
The first thing we note in these lectures is, indeed, Weierstraß’ desire to present his mathematical
ideas on the concepts of the differential and integral calculus involving functions of one or more real
variables merely in terms of algebraic methods, foregoing all the usual geometrical intuitions that
have been behind these mathematical notions since their early introduction in the 17th century. In
this respect, we must note, however, that Weierstraß is not a true pioneer, in that he must be firmly
located in a tradition that goes back a few decades at least all the way to the works of Bolzano and
25Weierstraß had many notable students in his years as a professor in Berlin, including Schawrtz, Mittag-Leffer,
Cantor, Thomae and Husserl, the last of which was also a student of Brentano and might have introduced some of
Weierstraß’ mathematical ideas to the latter philosopher. The usual sources for the content of these courses are the
notes taken by Hurwitz, published as Weierstraß (1988) and some works published by students of Weierstraß that
claim to give an account of some of the mathematical ideas presented in these courses. The main ones to consider
are Kossak (1872) and Pinterele (1880). Dugac (1973) has published some excerpts of unpublished notes by other
students such as Schwartz, Hettner and Thieme.
26Cf. Ulrich (1989) and Dugac (1973).
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Cauchy. Indeed, for example, although Weierstraß’ name became very tightly associated with the
ε-δ style of definitions in analysis, these definitions are to be found in their complete form already
in the aforementioned works of Bolzano and Cauchy. In this sense, therefore, Weierstraß must be
considered less of a pioneer discoverer and more of a very apt teacher and publicizer.
Notwithstanding this, there are some true innovations to be found in Weierstraß’ lectures that
pertain to the topic we are trying to elucidate here. The first we should note is his algebraic account
of the real numbers, which was developed at least as early as the Summer semester of 1878, but
much more likely before that, since it figures in a very completed form in Adolf Hurwitz’ redaction
of the course given by Weierstraß in this semester.27 In this course we can see Weierstraß talking
about numbers as composed of parts, in a way that is akin to what today we would call an abstract
approach to expansions in an arbitrary base. The most common example of this is the usual base





in which each hn is numeral between 0 and 9. Indeed, any real number can be written like this; and
the rational numbers have the special property that their expansion in any base is finite, whereas
the irrational numbers have infinite expansions.
In a sense, this way of thinking about real numbers is very modern, in that it is exclusively
formal and symbolic. As Tweddle says is his recent reconstruction of Weierstraß’ method,
[i]n modern language, one could consider Weierstrass’s real numbers to be bounded
(possibly infinite) sums of positive rational numbers. (Tweddle (2011), p. 57)
However, although this can be recast in terms of a contruction of the real numbers, as Tweddle
proves by actually carrying this construction in a formal and rigorous way, from the original sources
it is hard to think of Wierstraß’ conception of the real numbers as properly a construction of these
numbers in terms of the rational numbers; it seems to be much more of an algebraic approach to
understanding the essential difference between the rational and irrational numbers — which seems
indeed to be in accord with the mathematician’s own ideas regarding the scope and methodology
behind the newly created discipline of mathematical analysis. Hence, his original approach, by the
very reason that it is essentially algebraic and formal, does not touch upon the notion of completeness
27Cf. Weierstraß (1988).
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that we have been discussing and its relation to the notion of continua and, in particular, to the
geometric linear continuum of real numbers upon which the higher-dimensional continuous spaces
Rn are built.
Besides having introduced a strictly algebraic conception of the real numbers, Weierstraß has
contributed to the processes we are trying to describe here by using in his courses some of the
topological notions we have discussed and, more importantly, by providing for these notions some
fairly rigorous definitions. However, we must note that the scope of these notions still was not the
full abstract one of their modern counterparts, since these notions were restricted in Weierstraß’
investigations to subsets of real numbers or of the higher-dimensional Euclidean spaces Rn. For
instance, in the course of 1886 we have the following definition of a “closed set”:
If all the positions28 for which each closeness [Nähe] has an infinite numbers of
positions belonging to the defined point-set, then one calls this point-set closed.
(Weierstraß (1988b), p. 66)
It is, indeed, a perfectly rigorous, albeit a little clumsy, definition that is in accord with the modern
content for this notion. However, we must note that, as we shall see below, by this time Cantor had
already published his own definitions of this particular notion, as well as the ones for many other
notions that play a foundational role in point-set topology.
There are other topological notions that have been used by Weierstraß in these lectures. For
instance, in the redaction by Hurwitz of the lectures given in 1878, we find a metric definition of a
neighborhood in Rn:
If x1, x2 . . . xn are the variables and a1, a2 . . . an a place in their region — which
is to mean that x1 = a1, x2 = a2 . . . xn = an is in its system of values — then
x′1, x
′
2 . . . x
′
n is a place in the neighborhood δ of a1, a2 . . . an, if |x′1− a1| < δ, |x′2−
a2| < δ . . . |x′n − an| < δ. (Weierstraß (1988a), p. 83)
It is interesting to note here that the metric used by Weierstraß in this definition is what we
nowadays call the 1-metric on Rn, in opposition to the 2-metric, which is the more common one,
and the one we discussed above. But we shall talk more about this below, when we talk about the
work of Jordan.
Then, Weierstraß goes on to define what he calls “a continuum”:
28An element of one of the spaces Rn is called by Weierstraß “a position” (ein Stelle).
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If a is a place in the defined region x′, and if all the places in a sufficiently small
neighborhood of a are contained in this region, then the x′ form a continuum.
(Ibid.)
This notion is precisely the notion of an open set one gets by considering the usual topology for R
and thinking about the open balls as the neighborhoods of this definition.
After these definitions are presented, he goes on to state and prove both that every bounded
subset of the real numbers has a greater lower bound and a least upper bound, and a proposition
that has come to be known as the Bolzano-Weiertraß theorem. In modern terminology, this theorem
states that every bounded infinite set of real numbers has an accumulation point. Weierstraß’
statement of this theorem is the following:
In each discrete region of a manifold that has an infinite number of places there
is at least one place which is distinguished by the fact that in every neighborhood
of it, no matter how small, there is an infinity of places from the region. (Ibid.,
p. 86)
In this statement, Weierstraß does not use the expression “accumulation point”, but the property
he claims the distinguished point has is a property that is only slightly stronger than the one we
used above to define our abstract notion of an accumulation point; and, indeed, it is not only
so uncommon to find in modern textbooks definitions of an accumulation point by means of this
stronger property instead of the property we used here, but also we shall see that this is the property
used by Cantor in his own definition, which is the one that became famous in the end of the 19th
century.
3.2.2. Heine. The first truly modern construction of the real numbers is to be ascribed — it is
true that only by a matter of months — to Heine’s paper “Die Elemente der Funktionenlehre” that
appeared in Crelle’s Journal in 1872. The meaning of it being “truly modern” is the fact that in
this characterization we already have, not only what is in essence everything that is to be required
of such a construction by today’s standards of rigor, but also the algebraic style that has been
omnipresent in later characterizations.
Heine’s construction is indeed essentially the same as Cantor’s, which we shall discuss later. And
just like the more famous mathematician’s construction, Heine assigns to each Cauchy sequence,
which he calls merely “a sequence”, of rational numbers a real number and, thus, he gets all the
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irrational numbers as correspondents of certain Cauchy sequences. We saw above how this style
of construction has to make use of equivalence classes, since there are many Cauchy sequences to
which the same real number is to be assigned. However, by 1872 this notion of equivalence class was
not at all discussed and one can hardly blame Heine, as one can hardly blame Cantor, for failing to
provide this final touch of rigor into his construction.
Nonetheless, everything else is there. There are perfectly good definitions of the operations, of
the order relation and there is even a hint towards the use of equivalence classes, since Heine defines
two (Cauchy) sequences (an)n∈N and (bn)n∈N to be “simply and always equal” (nur und immer
gleich)
when the sequence of numbers a1−b1, a2−b2, etc. is an elementary29 one. (Heine
(1872), p. 175)
This is precisely the relation which yields the equivalence classes that are identified with the real
numbers, so that in this respect we might even say that Heine’s construction is much closer to the
modern one than Cantor’s.
3.2.3. Dedekind’s construction of the reals. Perhaps the most famous construction of the real
numbers in History is arguably Dedekind’s construction in terms of cuts, which was first presented
in his Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen of 1872. He states his intentions right at the start of his
booklet in the following way:
In discussing the notion of the approach of a variable magnitude to a fixed limiting
value, and especially in proving the theorem that every magnitude which grows
continually, but not beyond all limits, must certainly approach a limiting value, I
had recourse to geometric evidences. Even now such resort to geometric intuition
in a first presentation of the differential calculus, I regard as exceedingly useful,
from the didactic standpoint, and indeed indispensable, if one does not wish to
lose too much time. But that this form of introduction into the differential calculus
can make no claim to being scientific, no one will deny. [...] The statement is so
frequently made that the differential calculus deals with continuous magnitude,
and yet an explanation of this continuity is nowhere given; even the most rigorous
29Heine defines an elementary sequence of numbers to be a sequence in which the terms an get smaller than any
given positive number as n grows.
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expositions of the differential calculus do not base their proofs upon continuity
but, with more or less consciousness of the fact, they either appeal to geometric
notions or those suggested by geometry, or depend upon theorems which are never
established in a purely arithmetic manner. Among these, for example, belongs the
above-mentioned theorem, and a more careful investigation convinced me that this
theorem, or any one equivalent to it, can be regarded in some way as a sufficient
basis for infinitesimal analysis. It then only remained to discover its true origin
in the elements of arithmetic and thus at the same time to secure a real definition
of the essence of continuity. (Dedekind (1901), p. 1)
However, to do so would require a much more complicated construction than the ones leading
to the other number systems. The idea behind it is to start with the rational numbers and then to
“fill the gaps”, so to speak, between them by introducing the irrational numbers. For that, we need
to define the notion of a Dedekind cut to be a partition of the rational number line into two sets A
and B, such that, for every rational numbers q ∈ A and r ∈ B, q < r. For instance, we can consider
A =
{










or, more generally, we can consider, for every q ∈ Q,
Aq =
{





p ∈ Q | p > q
}
.
However, we can also consider other kinds of cut, which are not determined by a rational number.
For instance, we can consider
A =
{









In this example, we note that there is no q ∈ Q such that p ≤ q for every p ∈ A and p > q for every
p ∈ B. These are the interesting kinds of cuts because they are the ones that will give rise to the
irrational numbers, such as the irrational number defined by our last example:
√
2.
Dedekind’s idea was to define the real number line R as being the collection of all these possible
cuts on the rational numbers, so that, for instance,
√
2 would be identified with the last cut we
referred to in the previous paragraph, and analogously for every other irrational number. In his
own words:
In the preceding section attention was called to the fact that every point p of the
straight line produces a separation of the same into two portions such that every
point of one portion lies to the left of every point of the other. I find the essence
of continuity in the converse, i. e., in the following principle:
“If all points of the straight line fall into two classes such that every point of
the first class lies to the left of every point of the second class, then there exists
one and only one point which produces this division of all points into two classes,
this severing of the straight line into two portions.” (Ibid., p. 5)
Thus, he can say that
[i]n this property that not all cuts are produced by rational numbers consists the
incompleteness or discontinuity of the domain R of all rational numbers.
Whenever, then, we have to do with a cut (A1, A2) produced by no rational
number, we create a new, an irrational number α, which we regard as completely
defined by this cut (A1, A2); we shall say that the number α corresponds to this
cut, or that it produces this cut. From now on, therefore, to every definite cut there
corresponds a definite rational or irrational number, and we regard two numbers
as different or unequal always and only when they correspond to essentially
different cuts. (Ibid., p. 7)
With this definition, Dedekind was then able to show how one can define the linear order relation
and the operations of addition and multiplication, which satisfy under these definitions the usual
axioms for a field.
Finally — and this is the important part of the whole construction —, Dedekind was able to
show that the ordered field he defined in terms of his cuts was indeed complete — or, in Dedekind’s
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words, that it “has continuity”. This completeness or continuity property is, as we saw, arguably
the characteristic property of the real numbers in their relation with the rationals and it can be
characterized by many equivalent formal statements. For Dedekind this was given by the principle
mentioned above, according to which every cut on the real numbers is produced by a single real
number.
This property is very closely related to Bolzano’s property and, since we saw that the latter is
equivalent to the least upper bound principle, by showing that Dedekind’s property implies Bolzano’s
property, we will show that it implies the least upper bound property. And, indeed, if M is such
that the antecedent of Bolzano’s property holds, then the pair (M,M{) is a cut in the real numbers,
so that, by Dedekind’s property, there is a real number α that produces this cut, i.e., such that
x ≤ α, for every x ∈M and y > α, for every y ∈M{. Thus, we can conclude that this α is in fact
the U we need to prove Bolzano’s property.
On the other hand, if we assume the least upper bound property, given a certain cut (A1, A2) in
the real numbers, A1 is bounded by any element of A2, so that we can conclude that there is a least
upper bound u for A1. This u is, then, going to be the required α of Dedekind’s property. Thus,
we see that Dedekind’s property is, indeed, equivalent to the least upper bound property and that
it can very well be seen as a proper characterization of the completeness of the real numbers.
This construction of the real numbers is very well-known, but there is a much less known
mathematical contribution of Dedekind that is nonetheless important for the picture we are trying
to paint in this chapter, viz. the topological investigations that compose the manuscript entitled
“General theorems about spaces”, which was first published by Emily Noether in Dedekind’sWerke,
i.e., Dedekind (1930-32). In this manuscript, which is dated by Ferreirós (1999) to the period
between 1863-1869, we find many of the foundational definitions that will constitute the basis of
the modern theory of point-set topology.
First, we have straight away a definition of an open set, which is called a “body” (Körper) by
Dedekind, and the related definition of an inner point:
A system of points p, p′ ... forms a body, if for every point p one can determine a
length δ such that all points, whose distance from p is less than δ, also belong to
the system P . The points p, p′ ... lie inside P . (Dedekind (1930-32), v.2, p. 23)
87
This is indeed, an incredibly early and precise definition of what is arguably, as our previous dis-
cussion hopefully made clear, the most basic foundational notion of point-set topology. What is
most interesting for us here, however, is how this abstract notion of an open set has been largely
forgotten — or, more precisely, has remained largely unknown for many of the next decades —,
only being reclaimed as a fundamental notion in point-set topology well into the 20th century.
After defining what one is to call an open set, Dedeking goes on to prove that, what we now
call the “open ball”, viz. the set
B(p; r) = {x ∈ P | d(x, p) < r},
is indeed open. And, then, he defines an outer point of some set P as a point p such that there is
an r > 0 such that the open ball B(p; r) does not contain inner points of P . With the two notions
of an inner point and an outer point, Dedekind can, then, define the notion of a boundary point of
some set P to be a point which is neither an inner point, nor an outer point of P . It is easy to
check that this definition is, indeed, equivalent to the one we provided in our abstract presentation
above.
3.2.4. Cantor. When one thinks about the creation of set theory by Cantor, one readily thinks
about the definition of the notion of the “power” or “cardinality” of a given set by means of the
equivalence relation that is supposed to hold between any two sets which can be put in a one-to-one
correspondence and the subsequent — now almost mathematical commonsense — results that the
rational and the algebraic numbers have the same cardinality as the natural numbers, which is
strictly smaller than the cardinality of all real numbers and, therefore, than the cardinality of the
irrational numbers. However, one tends to give less importance to the other notions involved in his
incipient set-theory — in particular to notions that will play a significant role in the development
of the mathematical theory of point-set topology. Nowadays, this theory is commonly described
as the theory which deals with the mathematical formalizations of notions such as “continuity”
and “closeness”; and we saw above how its basic notions are thought of by current mathematicians.
Now, however, we must note how this theory essentially began, despite Dedekind’s early efforts which
remained mostly unknown, with the definition of what is currently known as an “accumulation point”
and with the formalization of the abstract notion of a “neighborhood” by means of the axiomatic
definition of the notion of an “open set”.
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Even though the last two notions are still very intuitive in Cantor’s work and only relate to sets
of real numbers — or, in other words, to subsets of the real line —, the first precise definition of
a “derived set” as the set of the accumulation points of a given set is introduced by him already in
one of his early papers about trigonometric series, viz. Cantor (1872). In it, he says that
[w]hen a point-set is given inside a finite interval, so a second point-set is with
it in general given, and with the latter a third etc., which are essential to the
comprehension of the nature of the first point-set.
To define these derived point-sets, we must first talk about the notion of a
limit point [‘accumulation point ’] of some point-set.
By the ‘limit point of a point-set P ’ I call a point from the line in such a
position that in its neighborhood there is an infinite number of points from P ,
where it might happen that it is itself outside the set. Under ‘the neighborhood
of a point’ let us understand it here to be any interval that has the point in its
interior. Then, it is easy to prove that a [‘bounded’] point-set composed out of
an infinity of points has at least one limit point.
It is now a determined relation between any point in the line and a given
point-set P , whether this point is or is not a limit point of this set, and it is thus
conceptually given together with the point-set P the set of all its limit points,
which I would like to denote with the sign P ′ and call ‘the first derived set from
P ’.
If the point-set P ′ is not merely constituted of a finite number of points, then
it has analogously a derived point-set P ′′, I call it the second derived from P [sic].
One finds through ν such a transition to the concept of the ν-th derived point-set
P (ν) from P . ((1932), pp. 97-98)
These definitions are indeed identical in content, if not in form, to the contemporary textbook defini-
tions. They constitute the first rigorous public foray into this new mathematical theory of point-set
topology and they are very telling of Cantor’s conception of “the continuum of real numbers” as
simply a collection of a non-denumerable number of points, from which one could consider subsets
P having derived sets etc. But Cantor surely was not content with merely assuming the existence
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of this non-denumerable number of entities composing this manifold30 of real numbers; he went on
to provide a construction for these entities that is just as rigorous as Dedekind’s, equivalent to it,
but wholly different in style.
Already in 1872, Cantor knew that the real numbers were intimately related to the limits of
Cauchy sequences of real numbers. The current way of constructing the real numbers in terms of
Cauchy sequences is to define each x ∈ R to be an equivalence class of Cauchy sequences under the
equivalence relation given by
(an)n∈N ∼ (bn)n∈N ⇐⇒ for every ε > 0 there is n0 ∈ N such that |an − bn| ≤ ε, if n > n0
and, then, to define the operations by means of the term-by-term operations on rational numbers
and the linear order relation by making
(an)n∈N ≤ (bn)n∈N ⇐⇒ there is n0 ∈ N such that an ≤ bn, for every n > n0.
Now, although Cantor was not in possession of the concept of an equivalence class — albeit he would
certainly have understood it and perhaps realized its role in the definition of the real numbers, had
he been presented to it —,31 in §1 of his 1872, he presented an account of what he called the different
fields of “number-quantities”, which amounts, as we shall see to a quasi-rigorous definition of the
real numbers. Indeed, he says
When I talk about a number-quantity in general, then what happens is first that
there is a law-given sequence of rational numbers
(1) a1, a2, . . . , an, . . .
that has the property that the difference an+m− an becomes infinitely small with
the change of n, no matter which positive integer m is, or with other words,
30Mannigfaltichkeit was Cantor’s original term for what is today commonly known as a “set”.
31One must note that, even at such an early date, Cantor had perhaps, just like Heine, an inkling of the need for
equivalence classes, since he says, perhaps a little confusingly that
[a]lthough the domains B and C are here in a sense covered together, it is essential to the theory
laid out here that [...] one grasps the conceptual difference between the domains B and C, in
that the equality between two number-quantities b, b′ in B does not imply their identity, but
only expresses a certain relation that holds between the sequences to which they are related.
((1932), p. 95)
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that for a any given (positive, rational) number ε, there is an integer n1 so that
|an+m − an| < ε, when n ≥ n1 and m is a positive integer.
I express this property of the sequence (1) by the words: ‘The sequence (1)
has a determined limit b.’
[...] and from the fact that we connect with the sequence (1) a certain sign
b, follows that for different such sequences one can also build different signs
b′, b′′, b′′′, . . . . (Ibid., pp. 92-93)
Then, Cantor goes on to define very precisely the operations on these new “number-quantities” and
notes that, just as we build the domain B of the limit-points b, b′, b′′, . . . , we can for every Cauchy
sequence of elements of B consider its limit point c and, therefore, we can define a new domain C
of number-quantities. Cantor, however, is quick to note that
[w]hereas the domains A and B are related so that, to every a there is a b, but
one cannot conversely identify a certain a for every b, it turns out that, just as to
every b there is c, so conversely for every c there is a b. (Ibid., p. 95)
Thus, although surely Cantor goes on to consider indefinite repetition of this construction technique
to arbitrary domains L, we have here a clear indication of a statement of the completeness of the
domain B which will be identified with the real numbers — even if it is to remain unproved and
unrelated to the usual statements of completeness that we talked about before. Indeed, form an
intuitive standpoint, this passage seems to be recognizing the fact that, once we introduce the limits
of all possible Cauchy sequences of rational numbers, we have so-to-speak “filled all the gaps” left by
the rational numbers and, thereby, arrived at a domain that is indeed complete, for any repetition
of the construction method laid out will not yield any more number-quantities than the ones in B.
Now, with this fairly rigorous formal definition of the continuum of real numbers, Cantor could
then take the final step of identifying all higher-dimensional continuous spaces as collections of n-
tuples of real numbers, or as we would call it today, as the n-fold Cartesian product of copies of R.
This is very clearly stated in the following passage from 1883b.
Thus it is left for me nothing more than, with the help of the concept of a real
number defined in §9 to search a preferably general pure arithmetical notion of a
point-continuum. As a foundation, as it could not be otherwise, I will make use of
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the n-dimensional flat arithmetic space Gn, i.e., the collection of all value-systems
(x1 | x2 | . . . | xn),
in which each x can take independently of all the others any real number-value
from −∞ to +∞. Each particular value-system of this sort I call an arithmetical
point of Gn. The distance between any two points will be defined through the
expression ∣∣∣√(x′1 − x1)2 + (x′2 − x2)2 + . . . (x′n − xn)2 ∣∣∣
and under an arithmetical set P contained in Gn we can represent any collection
of points from the space Gn which is given by a rule. (Ibid., p. 192)
The above characterization of higher-dimensional spaces as n-tuples of real numbers is definitely
one of the earliest really modern characterizations of these objects. Indeed, a thorough such charac-
terization will be only available in Germany with Schläfli’s work Theorie der vielfachen Kontinuität
of 1901. However, the idea behind it predates Cantor and has its roots in Riemann’s idea of thinking
about these spaces as multiply extended magnitudes and in Grassmann algebraic characterization
of the vectors which would be later identified with Cantor’s n-tuples. In fact, even before the 1880’s
Cantor already thought about these higher-dimensional spaces in these terms, for he is then already
conducting investigations regarding the cardinality of these spaces in relation to his discovery of the
different infinite cardinalities; and the interesting thing to note in this respect is that, by 1878, it
was clear to him that, for any dimension n, the collection of all n-tuples of real numbers has the
same cardinality as the set of real numbers, i.e., that these two sets can be put in a one-to-one
correspondence. Indeed, he says that
in posing myself the question whether a continuous manifold of n dimensions can
be correlated injectively and completely with a continuous manifold of a single
dimension, so that each element from the first corresponds to one and only one
element of the second, I found that this question must be answered in the affir-
mative. (Ibid., pp. 121-122)
This is one of the original groundbreaking cardinality results by Cantor that composed the revolution
in mathematical thought that resulted in the establishment of set theory as the foundation of
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mathematics at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. However, this result is particularly
interesting to our topic here, not only because it is the least known of these results, but also
because of a very interesting exchange of ideas between Cantor and Dedekind that followed the
1877 letter in which the former stated this result to the latter.
Before Cantor’s work, it was assumed throughout the mathematical community as a fairly
trivial fact that there was an essential difference between spaces of different dimensions, in that
the full characterization of an element of two such spaces would at face value require a different
number of coordinates, that depended exclusively on the dimension of the space — whence, e.g.,
the discomfort of mathematicians in the 17th century to accept the idea of continua as composed
out of lower-dimensional indivisibles. However, by showing that, for any n ∈ N, there is a one-
to-one correspondence between the set of all n-tuples of real numbers and the set of real numbers
themselves, Cantor showed that one can characterize any such n-tuple simply by the real number
corresponding to it via the given one-to-one correspondence; thus, showing that, independently of
n, we need only one coordinate to characterize any n-fold Cartesian product of copies of R, i.e. any
continuous space regardless of its dimension. This story is very clearly told by Cantor himself in a
letter to Dedekind of 1877, in which he presents a full and irreproachable proof of this result, that
takes into account comments and suggestions made by Dedekind in earlier correspondences about
this topic. In this letter, he says that
[f]or several years I have followed with interest the efforts that have been made,
building on Gauss, Riemann, Helmholtz, and others, towards the clarification of
all questions concerning the ultimate foundations of geometry. It struck me that
all the important investigations in this field proceed from an unproven presuppo-
sition which does not appear to me self-evident, but rather to need a justification.
I mean the presupposition that a ρ-fold extended continuous manifold needs ρ
independent real coordinates for the determination of its elements, and that for a
given manifold this number of coordinates can neither be increased nor diminished.
This presupposition had become my view as well, and I was almost convinced of
its correctness. The only difference between my standpoint and all others was
that I regarded that presupposition as a theorem which stood in great need of
a proof; and I refined my standpoint into a question that I presented to several
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colleagues, in particular at the Gauss Jubilee in Göttingen. The question was the
following:
‘Can a continuous structure of ρ dimensions, where ρ > 1, be related one-to-
one to a continuous structure of one dimension so that to each point of the former
there corresponds one and only one point of the latter?’
Most of those to whom I presented this question were extremely puzzled that
I should ask it, for it is quite self-evident that the determination of a point in
an extension [Ausgedehntheit] of ρ dimensions always needs ρ independent coor-
dinates. But whoever penetrated the sense of the question had to acknowledge
that a proof was needed to show why the question should be answered with the
‘self-evident’ no. As I say, I myself was one of those who held it for the most
likely that the question should be answered with a no —– until quite recently I
arrived by rather intricate trains of thought at the conviction that the answer to
that question is an unqualified yes. Soon thereafter I found the proof which you
see before you today.
So one sees what wonderful power lies in the ordinary real and irrational
numbers, that one is able to use them to determine uniquely the elements of a ρ-
fold extended continuous manifold with a single coordinate. I will only add at once
that their power goes yet further, in that, as will not escape you, my proof can be
extended without any great increase in difficulty to manifolds with an infinitely
great dimension-number, provided that their infinitely-many dimensions have the
form of a simple infinite sequence.
Now it seems to me that all philosophical or mathematical deductions that
use that erroneous presupposition are inadmissible. Rather the difference that
obtains between structures of different dimension-number must be sought in quite
other terms than in the number of independent coordinates –— the number that
was hitherto held to be characteristic. (Ewald (1999), pp. 859-860)
This result seems to obliterate the background assumption that two spaces with different dimen-
sions are somehow incommensurable or deeply and essentially different — and indeed this was the
conclusion drawn by Cantor himself in the last paragraph of the aforementioned letter to Dedekind.
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However, in his reply to Cantor’s letter, Dedekind, albeit accepting the rigor of Cantor’s proof and
hence the correctness of his result, raises an interesting point that must be taken into consideration
when one is evaluating this radical conclusion of Cantor. He says
I declare (despite your theorem, or rather in consequence of reflections which it
stimulated) my conviction or my faith (I have not yet had time even to make an
attempt at a proof) that the dimension-number of a continuous manifold remains
its first and most important invariant, and I must defend all previous writers on
this subject. To be sure, I gladly concede that the constancy of the dimension-
number is thoroughly in need of proof, and so long as this proof has not been
furnished one may doubt. But I do not doubt this constancy, although it appears
to have been annihilated by your theorem. For all authors have clearly made the
tacit, completely natural presupposition that in a new determination of the points
of a continuous manifold by new coordinates, these coordinates should also (in
general) be continuous functions of the old coordinates, so that whatever appears
as continuously connected under the first set of coordinates remains continuously
connected under the second. Now, for the time being I believe the following
theorem: ‘If it is possible to establish a reciprocal, one-to-one, and complete
correspondence between the points of a continuous manifold A of a dimensions and
the points of a continuous manifold B of b dimensions, then this correspondence
itself, if a and b are unequal, is necessarily utterly discontinuous.’ This theorem
would also explain what happened with the first proof of your theorem, namely
the incompleteness of the proof; the relation which you then wished to establish
(by decimal fractions) between the points of a p-fold structure and the points
of a unit interval would have been (if I do not deceive myself) continuous, if
only it had also contained all points of the unit interval; similarly it seems to me
that in your present proof the initial correspondence between the points of the
ρ-interval (whose coordinates are all irrational) and the points of the unit interval
(also with irrational coordinates) is, in a certain sense (smallness of the alteration)
as continuous as possible; but to fill up the gaps, you are compelled to admit a
frightful, dizzying discontinuity in the correspondence, which dissolves everything
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to atoms, so that every continuously connected part of the one domain appears
in its image as thoroughly decomposed and discontinuous. (Ibid., pp. 863-864)
Dedekind’s main point here is that, although Cantor does indeed present a one-to-one correspon-
dence between a space of an arbitrary number of dimensions and the set of all real numbers, this
correspondence is discontinuous; and, Dedekind claims, any recasting of the elements of some
n-dimensional space into a new coordinate system must be a continuous transformation.
Continuity of functions. So far, following the terminology that dates back to Aristotle and
the Medievals, we have focused our attention on continuous spaces and their study by modern
mathematicians. However, with the advent of the calculus, a new use began to be made of the word
“continuous” in reference to functions. It is true that it took some time for mathematicians to come
up with a rigorous account of this notion of the continuity of functions32 and that the use of the
expression “continuous functions” had, until the work of Bolzano, Cauchy and Weierstrass in the
19th century, an intimate connection with the notion of a “continuous space” in that a real valued
function of a real argument — which was the paradigmatic example of a function — was thought
to be continuous if its graph was a continuous line in the sense of continuity that relates to spaces.
A good example of this is, e.g., Lacroix’s definition of the continuity of a function — or, in the
terminology of the time, of a function’s satisfying of the law of continuity —, which we take from
the fifth edition of his Traité élémentaire de calcul différentiel et de calcul intégral from 1837, i.e., 20
years after Bolzano’s paper in which he presents the first definition of continuity of functions with a
contemporary flavor, failing to get to the current definition by a little detail.33 Lacroix’s definition
goes like this:
32Indeed, they even had to come up with a definition of the general notion of a function itself, so that they could even
realize the need for an independent characterization of continuous functions in opposition to discontinuous ones, a
distinction which was overseen for more than a century, during which mathematicians implicitly assumed that every
function was continuous.
33Bolzano’s original definition goes as follows:
According to a correct definition, the expression that a function fx varies according to the law
of continuity for all values of x inside or outside certain limits means just that, if x is some
such value, the difference f(x + ω) − fx can be made smaller than any given quantity provided
ω can be taken as small as we please. (Bolzano (1817), p. 230)
Unfortunately, this definition is not completely precise. In fact, we can come up with an example of a function that
is discontinuous in our modern terminology, but satisfies Bolzano’s 1817 definition, viz. the function given by
f(x) =
{




Later on, in his unpublished manuscript Funktionslehre, probably written in the 1820’s, we see Bolzano realizing this
problem and correcting his definition so as to require that the difference f(x + ω) − fx not only be small, but also
remain small for all positive ω′ < ω. The corrected definition is as follows:
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One must understand by the law of continuity that which is observed in the
description of lines by motion, and according to which the consecutive points of
the same line succeed each other without any interval. (Lacroix (1837), p. 88)
In this quote, it is very clear how well into the 19th century, the notion of continuity for functions
was very much connected with the notion of the continuity of a space or geometrical figure.
With the work of the 19th century analysts, though, we arrived at the current definition of
a continuous real-valued function f of a real variable x. Now, we say that such a function f is
continuous at some point a in its domain if, given some ε > 0, there is a δ > 0 such that
|a− x| < δ
necessarily implies
|f(a)− f(x)| < ε.
However, just as in the case of the convergence of sequences, mathematicians later on recognized
that they could introduce a very general topological definition of the continuity of functions between
any two topological spaces, so that these classical definition would follow as the particular case in
which both the domain and the codomain of the function were the real numbers with its usual
topology given by the metric
d(x, y) = |x− y|.
Thus, more generally, we say that a certain function f : X → Y between two topological spaces X,
Y with topologies TX and TY , respectively, is continuous at some x ∈ X if, for every U ∈ TY , there
is O ∈ TX such that f(O) ⊆ U .
With this formal definition, the continuity of functions was thoroughly incorporated into the
newborn discipline of point-set topology as a notion that is independent of the continuity of spaces
or geometrical figures. Thus, in this context, we can understand the Cantor-Dedekind discussion
If a [...] function Fx of one or more variables is so constituted that the variation it undergoes
when one of its variables passes from a determinate value x to the different value x + ∆x
diminishes ad infinitum as ∆x diminishes ad infinitum – if, that is, Fx and F (x+∆x) (the latter
of these at least from a certain value of the increment ∆x and all smaller values) are measurable
[i.e. positive non-zero real numbers], and the absolute value of the difference F (x + ∆x) − Fx
becomes and remains less than any given fraction 1
N
if one takes ∆x small enough, and however
smaller one may let it become: then I say that the function Fx changes continuously with respect
to the value x [...]. (Bolzano (1930), p. 14)
And this is indeed equivalent to our current definition.
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regarding the invariance of the dimension number of a given space, and in particular Dedekind’s
unwillingness to accept Cantor’s conclusion that this dimension number is wholly unimportant
for the a full characterization of a given space, as a discussion regarding the importance of the
topological properties of a space in its characterization. And it seems that Dedekind’s position is
the one that prevailed, so that one now recognizes these topological properties as important for
such a characterization and, therefore, one sees the dimension number of a given space as a true
topological invariant. In fact, after reading Dedekind’s comments, even Cantor stepped back from
his radical conclusion, saying that
[i]n the conclusion of my letter of 25 June I unintentionally gave the appearance
of wishing by my proof to oppose altogether the concept of a p-fold extended
continuous manifold, whereas all my efforts have rather been intended to clarify
it and to put it on the correct footing. [...] I am also of your opinion that if
we require that the correspondence be continuous, then only structures with the
same number of dimensions can be related to each other one-to-one; and in this
way we can find an invariant in the number of independent coordinates, which
ought to lead to a definition of the dimension-number of a continuous structure.
(Ewald (1999), p. 864)
He even attempted to find a proof of the impossibility of having a continuous one-to-one correspon-
dence between spaces of different dimensions, but failed to do so rigorously.
Indeed, immediately after these issues were made public by the publication of Cantor (1878),
a number of mathematicians, including Cantor, began to work on proofs of such impossibility.
In particular, we can mention Lüroth’s, Jürgens’s, Thomae’s and Netto’s attempts, the first two
of which aimed at proving such impossibility for lower dimensional cases and the latter two of
which worked, as did Cantor, with general proofs that were later found to contain mistakes.34 An
34For a fuller historical account of this historical development, see Johnson (1979). His overall assessment of the
situation — with which I agree fully — seems to be encompassed in the following passage:
From our present vantage point the attempted proofs of dimensional invariance put forward
during 1878 and 1879 do not appear very satisfactory. Having the great benefit of hindsight, we
can see that the mathematicians of the period were struggling to subdue a difficult problem with
inadequate weapons. Fully developed topological methods and ideas were not available to them.
Their best means of attack lay in analysis. Indeed with only these means they handled their
problem very skillfully. It must be conceded that the standard of rigour and critical argument
among them was high, given the poverty of their methods. (p. 162)
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interesting point to be made here, though, is one that relates to the fact noted above regarding
the necessity of going beyond the purely set-theoretical notions and into full-blown topological
notions in order to attach this problem. Indeed, it is an interesting fact that these proofs relied
heavily on the intermediate value theorem, which states that if a continuous real valued function





there is c ∈ (a, b) such that f(c) = d — or a slight generalizations of this theorem.35 This fact is
interesting because it seems to show how much these investigations depend on full-blown topological
concepts that were in their infancy at the time the investigations were being undertaken. Indeed,
the intermediate value theorem for real-valued continuous functions of a real variable is a particular
instance of a much more general topological result related to the notion of connectedness. This
is arguably the hardest of all the “basic” topological notions, in that there are many different —
and, most importantly, non-equivalent!36 — ways of characterizing it. On the other hand, it is
clear that this notion is very intimately related to the notion of a continuum in that it seems to
capture the intuitive property of continua that they are such that there is “no empty room” between
two points of them, or that any two such points follow each other immediately in the context
of the continuum of which they are elements. However, any reasonable notion of connectedness
that aims to capture this intuition seems to satisfy the property that a continuous function always
takes connected spaces into connected spaces. This is the case, for instance, for the most common
current topological notion of connectedness, according to which a set X is connected if there are
no disjoint pair of open subsets O1, O2 of X such that X can be thought of as O1 ∪ O2. And
this permanence of connectedness under continuous transformations is precisely the general result
of which the intermediate value theorem for real-valued continuous functions of a real variable is
a particular instance, so that we can see how the result being used in the investigations taking
place just after Cantor’s publication of the result which initiated the whole discussion regarding the
notion of dimension foreshadows the essentially topological character of the discussion, while at the
same time failing to posses the topological generality required for furnishing the tools necessary for
35The history of this intermediate value theorem is itself very interesting as well. Although its truth is fairly obvious
and was indeed known for at least a full century, it was only with the work of Bolzano (1817), that mathematicians
began to realize that a rigorous presentation of this topic required a precise mathematical definition of the notion of
continuity for functions that allowed for a precise derivation of the theorem in question.
36Any decent general topology textbook will go over the different notions of connected, path-connected, locally-
connected, simply- or multiply-connected spaces etc.
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the task at hand. These, incidentally, will only be in place with the works of Brower, Urysohn and
Menger in the 1910’s and 1920’s.
Nonetheless, starting in 1879, Cantor began to publish a series of papers on his new theory of
manifolds, which contained, besides the protagonist notion of power and the counterintuitive results
that it yields, many other notions that are more related to point-set topology, than to set theory
per se. We have already mentioned his notion of a limit point and the related one of a derived set.
From these, one can define the notion of a perfect set as a set X which is equal to its first — and
therefore to every — derived set. Then, he goes on to define his own notion of connectedness —
which is now sometimes referred to as the property of being well-chained — as the statement that,
for every x, x′ ∈ X, given ε > 0, there is a finite sequence of elements x = x0, x1, . . . xn = x′ ∈ X,
such that each distance
d(xi, xi+1) < ε.
Now, in possession of these two notions, he can go on and define the very notion of a continuum
as any set which is perfect and connected in this sense. Indeed, this might be a much too narrow
definition, for it excludes, e.g., open intervals of real numbers. Cantor himself noticed this fact
and, in a footnote, made this clear by introducing the related notion of a “semi-continuum” as an
imperfect, non-denumerable37 connected set.38
Further on in this series of papers,39 Cantor goes on to define the notion of a closed set as one
which contains its first derived set and also40 the “converse” notion of a dense-in-itself set, which
is a set that is fully contained in its derived set — or equivalently, a set that is composed entirely
of boundary or accumulation points.41 We talked about the density of both the rational and real
numbers by considering their property according to which for every two distinct rational or real
numbers, there is always another rational or real number that lies in between these two. This is,
however, an essentially geometric notion in that it requires the previous understanding of this notion
of “lying between two points or numbers”, which is canonically obtained by means of a previously
37In Cantor’s terminology, “belonging to the second class”.
38Cf. Cantor (1932), p. 207.
39Cantor (1932), p. 226.
40Cantor (1932), p. 228.
41This notion is related to another density notion, defined in his 1879 paper, according to which a set P of real
numbers is dense in some interval (α . . . β) if
an interval (γ . . . δ) inside (α . . . β), no matter how small, always has points of P . (Cantor (1932),
p. 153)
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established order on these numbers. This notion of a set which is “dense-in-itself” is, however, a
purely topological notion. By a topological notion we mean a notion that does not depend on the
particular geometric — or metric — aspects of a certain domain, but merely on those aspects of
this domain that can be characterized in terms of notions such as its derived sets etc.
Therefore, with these new definitions, we can redefine the notion of a “perfect set” as a closed
dense set, whence a continuum would be a closed, dense, connected set.42 These definitions are
interesting, first, because they show how Cantor had already realized the necessity of handling the
notion of a continuum by means of topological concepts, having indeed carried out the project to
a very large extent, insofar as he already had clear and precise notions regarding many of these
concepts. Notwithstanding this, we have here an example of how the historical course of a certain
mathematical theory runs against its logical course. As we have seen, nowadays all the topological
concepts are derived from the fundamental concept of an open set; in prticular, closed sets are
defined to be the complements of the open sets. However, whereas Cantor was in possession by
1884 of a precise concept of a closed set which is as a matter of fact equivalent to the modern
concept, since every complement of an open set does indeed contain all its accumulation points,
he did not have a clear abstract concept of a open set, failing even to recognize the need for such
an abstract concept and using the word “open” merely for the characterization of intervals of real
numbers which lack their endpoints.
3.2.5. The French reception of the manifold-theoretic conception of continua. In the decades that
followed the establishment in the German speaking mathematical community of the, now canonical,
point-set topological conception of the continuum of real numbers and of the higher-dimensional
continuous spaces that one can build from the former, the ideas behind this notion found fertile
ground in the work of a new generation of French mathematicians, that eventually became known
as “the French analysts”. The arrival of these ideas in France can be traced back to Paul Tannery’s
Introduction a la théorie des fonctions d’une variable of 1886. In it, he presents a construction of
the real numbers in terms of cuts, which resembles Dedekind’s in form and in rigor. However, as
Tannery makes clear in the preface to this work, this construction was the development of
42We note, incidentally, that the rational numbers, although they form a dense and connected set (in Cantor’s
terminology), they are not closed in the real numbers, since all the irrational numbers are accumulation points of
rational numbers; thus, the rational points do not form a continuum in Cantor’s terminology.
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an indication given by Mr. Joseph Bertrand in his excellent Treatise of arithmetic
and that consists of constructing an irrational number by saying which are all
the rational numbers that are smaller and which are the all the rational numbers
which are grater than it; (Tannery (1886), p. IX)
and that he has
learned from a citation of Mr. Cantor (Grundlagen einer Allgemeiner Mannich-
faltigkeitslehre, p. 21) that Mr. Dedekind has developed the same idea in a writing
entitled Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen; I could not have at my disposal the work
of Mr. Dedekind. (Ibid.)
With respect to the definition of the real numbers by means of Cauchy sequences, which Tannery
ascribes first to Heine, and then to Lipschitz, du Boys-Reymond and Cantor, he says that
I find this definition more arbitrary than the one I have adopted, which permits,
if an irrational number is defined, to determine its place in the scale of numbers.
(Ibid. p. X)
This shows, I believe, an early recognition of the naturalness with which the notion of order follows
from the definition of the real numbers in terms of Dedekind cuts. However, Tannery seems not to
ascribe importance to the fact that, conversely, the definition of the operations on the real numbers
is much more straightforward in the definition by means of Cauchy sequences.
Even the famous Poincaré, whose work gave rise to a yet different approach to topology, viz.
the mathematical theory that is now known as algebraic topology, wrote about these point-set
constructions of the real numbers. And, in the context of this study, a discussion of Poincaré’s ideas
on this topic is especially interesting in that they seem to be essentially where Brentano learned
of these new mathematical ideas. In particular, this fact might even partially explain the lack of
sophistication in Brentano’s understanding. Indeed, right at the beginning of his paper on these
issues, Poincaré talks about the construction of the real number in terms of the basic “filling the
gaps” intuition that surely looms behind the actual rigorous mathematical constructions both in
terms of Dedekind cuts and of equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences. He says:
Let us start from the scale of integers; between two consecutive levels, let us
interpose one or more intermediate levels, and then between these new levels still
other levels, and so on indefinitely. We shall thus arrive at an unlimited number
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of terms, which will be the numbers we call fractional, rational or commensurable.
But this is not enough; between these terms that are nonetheless already infinite,
one must still interpose others, which one calls irrational or incommensurable.
[...] The continuum thus conceived is nothing other than a collection of in-
dividuals arranged in a certain order, infinite in number, it is true, but exterior
from each other. It is not the ordinary conception, in which one assumes between
the elements of the continuum a sort of intimate connection that makes it into
a whole, where the point does not have priority over the line, but the line over
the point. [...] The analysts do not have less reason to define their continuum
in the way the do it, since it is with respect to it that they reason after they
have injected themselves with rigor. But it is enough to forewarn us that the true
mathematical continuum is not the continuum of the physicists and the one of the
metaphysicians. (Poincaré (1893), pp. 26-27)
Then, Poincaré goes on to talk about the introduction of the irrational numbers by means
of the notion of a Dedekind cut. However, he seems to claim that this introduction is due to
Kronecker, which is absolutely false. The latter mathematician is surely to be credited with the
advancement of the view that the only numbers that are truly real are the natural numbers, all the
other numbers being merely symbolic mechanisms for carrying out calculations — a view that does
indeed harmonize well with a somewhat arbitrary construction of the more complicated number
systems in terms of the natural numbers. And, indeed, in his discussion of the cuts Poincaré seems
to be hinting at this state of affairs, so that his mention of Kronecker is not wholly of the mark;
however, even if there is some salvaging to Poincaré’s claim, crediting Kronecker with the Dedekind
cuts is just plainly historically inaccurate.
The same year as Poincaré’s paper saw also the publication of the second edition of Jordan’s
Cours d’analyse de l’école polytechnique. In this new edition, that appeared eleven years after the
first edition, we see major changes in the book. Whereas the first edition was a simple textbook
presenting the various results in the theory of the differential and integral calculus, the second edition
contained a fairly lengthy addition of chapters dedicated to more fundamental issues required for the
theory to be presented in the latter chapters. First, there is a fairly simple but thorough discussion
about real, and in particular irrational, numbers in terms of (Dedekind) cuts as well as the further
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notions to be defined on top of this set of real numbers; then, after some talk about the notion
of limits and a quite anachronistic discussion of infinitesimals, Jordan goes on to discuss the new
notion of sets. Essentially, Jordan is thinking about sets as subsets of some Euclidean space Rn,
but under this restriction, he provides a fairly general presentation of the notions of “derived sets”
and “perfect sets”, which are defined in terms of the notion of a “limit point”, which in its turn is
defined by Jordan not in Cantor’s way, but as a point which is the limit of a sequence of points in
the given set.43
What is interesting to note in this work, however, is that, although the general notion of a
topological space is still not fully in play, we do have a definition of what is called “the gap between
two points p, q”. Assuming, as Jordan does, that these points are taken from Rn, he defines the gap
between them to be
pq = |p1 − q1|+ · · ·+ |pn − qn|.
Now, this definition amounts essentially to the definition of a metric on Rn, a metric that is however
dintinct from the “usual metric” we have been considering.44 Furthermore, just as in the current
studies of metrizable topologies, we have a clear and precise definition of an interior point as a
point p for which there is a radius ρ, such that every point whose gap to p is smaller than ρ is in
the set to which p belongs.
Finally, we have in this work by Jordan essentially the proper current mathematical definition
of the boundary of a set E as the set of points which belong both to E or to its complement and
also to the derived set of either the complement of E or of E itself.
On the other hand, a much more philosophically oriented account of the mathematical ideas and
constructions related to this new conception of the continuum can be found in the work of Couturat,
who undoubtedly helped to forge the context in which the so-called French analysts could flourish
and develop their mathematical ideas.
43Even today these two not quite equivalent definitions still confuse students, since both are still in use. In general, if
we call a point that satisfies Cantor’s definition an “accumulation point” and a point satisfying Jordan’s definition a
“limit point”, we can say that, in general, every accumulation point is a limit point, but not conversely. E.g., consider
the set {1} ⊆ R. 1 is a limit point of this set, since it is the limit of the constant sequence (1)n∈N, but it is not an
accumulation point.
44Jordan’s definition is what today is called the 1-metric on Rn, whereas the “usual metric” is called the 2-metric on




|x1 − y1|p + · · ·+ |xn − yn|p.
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Indeed, in the first book of his 1896 L’infini mathématique, Couturat presents a thorough and
rigorous construction of the positive rational numbers, together with the usual mathematical prop-
erties and operations on them, starting from just the natural numbers and, then, in the second
chapter, he extends this definition to negative rational numbers as well.
In the third chapter, he presents the usual definition of complex numbers in terms of pairs of
reals and, after that, he makes an important remark. Indeed, he notes that in order to “complete”
the system of numbers with irrational numbers, the method for doing so is more complicated in the
sense that it requires for the definition of each irrational number, not merely — as was the case
with the other construction methods before — two numbers of the system we started from, but an
infinity of them. However, he says that
[the] introduction of these numbers completes therefore the linear sequence of
arithmetical numbers and makes it continuous [...]. (Couturat (1896), p. 52)
He notes that this completion can be obtained by two distinct methods: one which he ascribes to
Cantor and Weirstrass and another that he ascribes to Dedekind and Tannery. The method he goes
on to follow is then Tannery’s.
Chapters II and III talk about how one can understand a certain line by means of the rational
and real numbers. In the following quote from this part of his work, we can clearly see how the
everlasting mathematical pendulum between intuition and logical rigor is leaning towards the latter
side in both the work of Couturat and, by consequence of those in the mathematical context he is
helping establish through his work.
Even though we shall not admit that the idea of a continuum has an arithmetic
origin, we must nonetheless keep this remarkable fact, to wit that one can con-
struct analytically a numerical continuum that is independent of all intuition. An
important consequence stands out: that continuity does not belong properly and
exclusively to the geometrical magnitudes, and it can be logically conceived in
the category of pure number. [...] continuity seems to be an essential characteris-
tic of any magnitude in general, and not merely of spatial magnitudes or even of
magnitudes that can be reduced to the linear type, such as time. (Ibid., p. 172)
In particular, the claim that continuity is a strictly logical property relating essentially to the pure
idea of a magnitude in general stands out as a clear representative of the time and context in
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which these ideas are being put forth. And the basis for this shift is undoubtedly provided by
the rigorous mathematical constructions of the real numbers, together with Cantor’s discovery of
the uncountability of these numbers, which provides a clear cut reason why one should have the
completeness of the real numbers whereas the rational numbers are merely dense.
Then, we have Couturat pressing on with these ideas into a proper definition of the n-dimensional
Euclidean spaces, in the manner of Cantor and Riemann, a manner which is commonsensical now
and which was by the time of Couturat already fairly canonical as well; moreover, we have him
laying down some fairly advanced conceptions of what it is for a set to be a neighborhood of a
point.
We call n-dimensional (arithmetical) space the set of points (x1, x2, . . . , xn) whose
coordinates take any real value. [...] An n-dimensional set [which is just a subset
of an n-dimensional space] is called continuous when each coordinate of the gen-
erating point takes, when considered independent of the others, every value of a
finite interval [...]. (Ibid., p. 626)
We call a neighborhood of a point any sphere of arbitrary radius having this point
as center, that is the set of points in n-dimensional space whose distance to the
considered point is less than a given quantity. (Ibid., p. 630)
We have seen how these truly topological notions have been already somehow — i.e., with dif-
ferent degrees of preciseness and rigor — present in Cantor’s work and Weierstrass’ work. However,
it is mainly with the work of the French analysts that they have achieved the logical watertight
state they now posses.
The first work to mention in this context is Borel’s Leçons sur la théorie des fonctions of 1898.
It has as its goal to present some results on the theory of analytic functions and on the theory of
series, which is indeed indispensable to the study of the former theory, since the very definition
of analytic functions has a deep connection to their Taylor series expansion. However, in order to
present these results, Borel has to begin by introducing some set-theoretic notions that were at the
time still fairly intuitive in their presentations.
He starts by assuming the existence of the mathematical continuum of real numbers:
Hence, we know a non-denumerable set; one can note that the existence of this set
results from the following theorem: The growing numbers, which are all inferior
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to some fixed number, have a limit. Indeed, such theorem is a consequence of the
definition of the incommensurable numbers and, in any point of view one places
oneself, it postulates the notion of a continuum. [...] [W]e will admit that the set
C of numbers between 0 and 1 is given [...]. We shall say that the sets with the
same power as C have the power of the continuum. (Borel (1898), pp. 15-16)
Then, Borel goes on to consider some examples of sets of this kind, viz. which have the power of the
continuum. The first example he gives is that of a set obtained from the interval [0, 1] by deleting a
denumerable number of points, e.g., the rational numbers. A second example is that of the union of
a denumerable collection of sets all of which have the power of the continuum and, finally, he gives
the example, as we have seen above already known to Cantor, that the set of points in a square
has the same power as the interval [0, 1]. Moreover, he goes on to summarize the Cantor-Dedekind
discussion by stressing the fact that these size characterizations fail to assume the continuity of the
one-to-one correspondence between the sets.
The preceding remarks are very important since they show us that if one abstracts
from the continuity of the correspondence between two continuous sets, there is no
essential difference between a continuous set of one dimension and continuous sets
of two (or three...) dimensions [...]. (Ibid., p. 20)
The next definition presented by Borel is that of a “derived set”, which again is not a new notion,
but one that has already been defined by Cantor.
We call the derived set of some given set the set of all those points such that in
the neighborhood of any of them we find an infinite number of points from the
given set. (Ibid., 3p. 34)
We note here how Borel disregards Couturat’s definition of a “neighborhood” and uses this notion
as Cantor did, without properly defining it. Analogously, throughout his book, Borel also uses the
word “interior” without definition, taking for granted that his uses relating to intervals or geometric
figures is clear enough. However, after this definition of a derived set, he goes on to define the
notion of a “limit point”:
We say that a point a′ is a limit point of the given set if, no matter how small
ε is, there is a point a [which is assumed to be in A] distinct from a′ and whose
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distance from a′ is less than ε. [...] We call a perfect set any set that is equal to
its derived set. (Ibid., pp. 34-35)
This last definition is essentially Cantor’s definition. Borel himself notes that Jordan gives a slightly
different definition, according to which a perfect set is a set that contains its derived set, not being
necessarily equal to it. These two definitions disagree only when it comes to sets with isolated
points, so that this distinction is indifferent when one restricts one’s attention to continuous sets —
in other words, to sets with no isolated points. However, in the sequel, Borel proves that the set of
these isolated points cannot be larger than a denumerably infinite set.
Finally, Borel defines what it is for a set to be dense in an interval :
We shall say that a set A is dense in an interval a, b if any interval inside a, b, no
matter how small, has points of A. (Ibid., p. 38)
This is a simple generalization of Cantor’s definition of a set that is dense-in-itself if one notes
that Cantor’s requirement that every neighborhood has an infinite amount of points is equivalent
to Borel’s requirement of the existence of only one point if one thinks about the neighborhoods in
Couturat’s manner of intervals of points as “spheres of arbitrary radii”. The fact, however, that
Borel did indeed require in his definition of a limit point the presence of an infinite amount of points
in a given neighborhood shows how these ideas were still not fully ripe in this early period.
Seven years after Borel’s book, Baire published his own work on discontinuous functions, in which
he proceeded with the same mathematical methods. All the definitions used, that of a “derived set”
and of a “closed set” are essentially related with his definition of a “limit point”, which is clearer
than the previous definitions presented here in that Baire does not make use of the intuitive notion
of a neighborhood in this definition, substituting it for something like Coutourat’s definition, viz.
the more rigorous notion of a segment or interval containing a certain point:
Let us consider a set of points P on a line segment AB. We say that M is a limit
point of the set P if every segment containing M has in its interior a point from
P distinct from M . (Baire (1905), p. 13)
Other notions defined later on in this work are the notions of a “perfect set”, as a set that equals its
first derived set and that of a “dense-in-itself set”, whose definition is exactly like Cantor’s original
definition. They are essentially introduced to prove the result that there are perfect sets in the
real line that are nowhere dense in the interval (0, 1). His example is simply the famous Cantor
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set, which was first described by the latter in a footnote to his (1883b)45; but the layout of the
definitions makes the whole presentation slightly more rigorous and closer to the current state of
the theory in Baire’s work.
Especially interesting is his extension of his discussions to functions of multiple variables, for
this extension is achieved firmly in the context of thinking about these variables as having their
values in continua that constitute the multi-dimensional space Euclidean space that we currently
denote by Rn, and that was denoted then by Cantor’s conventional name Gn.
3.2.6. Hausdorff’s pièce de résistance. I believe the best way to end our historical account of
the birth of point-set topology is to consider the first textbook covering the early results of both
set theory and point-set topology, viz. Hausdorff’s Grundzüge der Mengenlehre from 1914. This
choice is especially significant because the publication date for this book coincides with the year that
Brentano is dictating his most comprehensive discussion regarding the nature of continua. Thus,
although one can be quite sure that Brentano did not have access to Hausdorff’s textbook,46 it
nonetheless can be seen as a good comprehensive collection of all the ideas that were being put
forth in the prior 40 or so years with respect to the questions pertaining to these new mathematical
subjects. In this sense, Hausdorff’s work can be seen as a strong landmark and as an accurate
portrait of the state of affairs in which these new mathematical disciplines were at the time of
Brentano’s attempts to engage with the same problems that were being tackled by these disciplines.
A quick look at the table of contents is enough to see that everything is there. From a introduc-
tory account containing the set-theoretical operations, the concept of a sequence and of a function
and that of a ring and a field, going through Cantor’s theory of transfinite cardinals and ordinals and
the notion of well-ordered sets, finally ending with an account of the point-set topological notions
that are of interest to us, but also of the new ideas regarding measure and integration that sprung
from the work of the French analysts, in particular the work of Borel and Lebesgue.
Hausdorff’s book is a masterpiece not only in that it covers the full span of the new mathematical
ideas relating to the notion of sets, but also because it does so with immense precision and rigor
in such a way that, if one were to abstract from the fact that it could not contain many important
results in the theory that were only discovered and proved many years later, it would rival any
45Cf. Cantor (1931), p. 207, n. 11.
46Brentano certainly did not read it, since he was sadly already blind at this time. However, it is also to be surmised
that he had no other type of access to it and there seems to be no textual evidence against this assumption.
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contemporary textbook in the subject. In particular, we can mention in this regard how the very
idea of a topological space is presented and compare it to our general abstract presentation above.
Indeed, Hausdorff distinguishes three ways in which one can regard sets. The first is Cantor’s more
abstract way in which the elements of the set are considered either independently of their relation
to each other or simply with an extra order structure. The second is the metric way of Jordan, in
which the elements of the set are related through a certain distance relation. However, Hausdorff
says, there is a third — one might say intermediate — way of looking at sets, in which one can
assign as the foundation of the distance of a point subsets of the space, which
we call neighborhoods of this point; and then we can take this system of neigh-
borhoods as the foundation of the whole theory, thus eliminating the concept of
distance. (Hausdorff (1914), p. 210)
This is as clear a statement of the goal of point-set topology as any other in the mathematical
literature. And to relate it to our abstract account above, we can mention that the difference is
merely accidental, in that Hausdorff uses the notion of a “neighborhood” as primitive, which is not
how we chose to introduce the notion of a topological space above, but it is an equivalent way, which
is still used in textbooks today as a different approach that has some technical advantages. In this
approach, we define what we have called an “open set” as any set that is a union of neighborhoods;
and, indeed, after presenting the very same set of axioms that characterize a metric space in con-
temporary textbooks, Hausdorff goes on to define a topological space as a a space satisfying the
following axioms:
(A) To each point x, there corresponds at least one neighborhood Ux; each neigh-
borhood Ux contains the point x.
(B) If Ux, Vx are two neighborhoods of the same point x, then there is a
neighborhood Wx which is a subset of both neighborhoods (Wx ⊆ Ux ∩ Vx).
(C) If the point y is in Ux, then there is a neighborhood Uy that is a subset
of Ux (Uy ⊆ Ux).
(D) For two distinct points x, y, there are two neighborhoods Ux, Uy with no
points in common (Ux ∩ Uy = ∅). (Hausdorff (1914), p. 213, with modernized
notation)
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These axioms are not the simplest way of defining a basic topological structure on a given set
— our definition of open sets is arguably simpler — and also axiom (D) is now not seen as a general
requirement for topological spaces, but as the defining property for a subset of “nice” topological
spaces, very sensibly called Hausdorff spaces. However, they must nonetheless be regarded as the
first truly abstract and fairly complete characterization of topological spaces. And Hausdorff himself
is aware of this, as he goes on to prove that, while the usual metrical topology on a certain multiply
extended space Rn is indeed a model for these axioms, one can come up with other models that are
not obtained from a certain background metric.
After that, given a set A, he goes on to define an inner point to A as a point of A such that
there is a neighborhood of that point that is contained in A and also a boundary point of A as
a point in A which is not an inner point. Thus, we have in this work the first fully worked out
rigorous definition of these notions in terms of an abstract, viz. axiomatically defined, notion of
a neighborhood. Also, he goes on to define the usual notions of a limit point, of a closed set, of
a set that is dense in itself and of a perfect set, and uses these definitions to prove several results
pertaining to these notions. For instance, in page 228 he shows the usual relationship between closed
and open sets, i.e., that a closed set is the complement of an open set and vice-versa. Currently,
since point-set topology is usually presented as we have in terms of a choice of which sets are to be
open, this relation is actually used to define the notion of a closed set, but Hausdorff defines both
of these notions independently in terms of his neighborhoods and, thus, he has to prove that this
relationship actually holds. Nonetheless, it does hold, so that we are firmly inside the territory of
Bolzano’s “monstrous doctrine”.
Another example is the proof of a generalization of the property of nested intervals, that we
saw can be used to characterize the completeness of the real numbers. This generalization, which
Hausdorff calls Cantor’s intersection proposition, is given in page 230 and says that given a sequence
A1 ⊇ A2 ⊇ · · · of closed compact non-empty sets,47 its intersection is not empty. A final interesting
example is the collection of two propositions stated in page 231, which taken together are word
for word identical with the current definition of compactness. Indeed, together they state that a
47Hausdorff had already at this point defined a compact set as set such that every infinite subset of it has an accumu-
lation point. Closed intervals of real numbers are also compact in this sense, so that this is indeed a generalization.
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compact set A is precisely a set such that, if it is contained in the union of a sequence of open sets,
then it is contained in the union of a finite number of open sets in this sequence.48
A final example to be mentioned is Hausdorff’s statement and proof of the Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem which states that every bounded infinite set of real numbers has at least one accumulation
point. This is done in chapter VII, §9, and it might very well be the first clear ascription of this
theorem to both Bolzano and Weierstrass.
Now, the purpose of this overview is not to present a detailed account of these historical land-
marks, so that we must pick and choose the best examples to paint a fairly didactic picture of this
very complicated and multifaceted history. However, I must not fail to note that in Hausdorff’s
textbook, i.e., at the same year which Brentano is dictating his views on continua, we have even the
very first discussion regarding the so-called enumerability axioms, which are properties regarding
the existence of a denumerable number of things of some kind of another relating to some set, e.g.,
the existence of a denumerable dense subset. We have not talked about these axioms,49 but they
play a very important role in modern general topology, and their presence in Hausdorff’s textbook
is surely a clear indication of how far the subject had already been developed by 1914.
4. Conclusion
In this chapter we have gone through the centuries that spanned the period immediately after the
end of full-blown Scholasticism, during which the doctrines of Aristotle in general, and his doctrine
regarding the essence of continuity in particular, have been dominant unquestioned dogmas. We
have done so looking for the driving forces inside the development of mathematics that led to a
complete reformulation in the 19th century of the mathematical notion of continuity and that of the
continuum of real numbers. We have termed this reformulation in the 19th century “the manifold-
theoretic conception of the continuum” and saw how this conception was already extremely dominant
and well developed in the mathematical community by the time Brentano was thinking about his
own doctrines about continua.
The reason for the historical reconstruction of these notions is to paint a general background
picture of the standard view against which Brentano was arguing in his papers about continuity
48These propositions are called by Hausdorff the “Borel proposition” and its converse. Hausdorff uses the word Gebiet,
which can be translated as region, to refer to our open sets.
49Any decent textbook on topology will discuss these axioms.
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in the early 20th century, for I believe that this background picture shall bring much clarity as to
Brentano’s own views by allowing us to regard them as opposed to these background assumptions.
It is very unlikely that Brentano himself had a thorough understanding of the whole mathemat-
ical literature that was devoted to these notions in the latter part of the 19th century and early
20th century and, as we noted, it is almost surely the case that he did not have access, for instance,
to Hausdorff’s textbook that came out in the very year he was dictating his essay on continua.
There are even passages in this essay in which it seems clear that Brentano misunderstands the
relevant mathematical ideas — in particular the distinction between different sizes of infinity. How-
ever, through the work of the mathematicians whose work he was acquainted with — in particular,
Riemann and Poincaré are the ones he mentions in this respect —, Brentano was definitely exposed
to the core of mathematical ideas that constituted the manifold-theoretic view of continua and he
is surely engaged with this new tradition when he expounds his own ideas on the subject, as shall
become clearer in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Brentanian continua and their boundaries
People say that ideas die hard. I’m not sure sayings are to be considered true or false, but what
we will see in this chapter is definitely a case study that seems to confirm this saying, specially
when it relates to interesting and fruitful ideas. Although, in the decades that preceded the turn of
the 20th century, the Aristotelian position — according to which continua cannot be composed out
of indivisibles — seemed to be completely dead and buried by the newly established mathematical
orthodoxy that, as we saw, was founded upon the account of continua in terms of the newly developed
set-theoretic topological concept of a continuuous manifold, we shall see that Brentano had the
courage to go against the establishment and to propose a new account that has deep roots in
the original Aristotelian tradition, but that builds on it in order to create a cohesive and credible
picture of the ontology of continua and their — as Brentano will think about them — inseparable
boundaries.
His views on this subject are mainly to be found his Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum,
Zeit und Kontinuum (Brentano (1976), English translation Brentano (1988)), more specifically
in the first paper called “On what is continuous” and dictated in 1914. There is also a fairly
lengthy presentation of the subject in his Kategorienlehre (Brentano (1968), English translation
Brentano (1981)) and also shorter presentations of his account are found in his 1917 essay “Vom ens
rationis” (Brentano (1959), pp. 238-281; English translation Brentano (1995)), in his Deskriptive
Psychologie (Brentano (1982), English translation Brentano (1995b)), in his Untersuchungen zur
Sinnespsychologie (Brentano (1979)), in Von Sinnlichen und Noetischen Bewusstsein (Brentano
(1928), English translation Brentano (1981a)) and in his manuscript “Vom Unendlichen” (Brentano
(1963)). One also finds a fairl early detailed presentation of Brentano’s reflections on continua in
his Lectures on Elementary Logics given in 1884/1885.
However, before we dive into the details of Bretano’s account, we should consider a few of
the background assumptions that guided his thought. First of all, we should stress the point that
Brentano’s main philosophical goal was to provide the philosophical foundations for a truly scientific
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psychology, i.e., for a rigorous study of the subjective dimension of reality, which was delimited by
him as that portion of reality that is characterized by the property he called intentionality. Certainly,
this is not the place for a thorough account of this notion or of the whole philosophical project that
arose from its recognition as the main property of the subjective domain; nonetheless, a few remarks
are definitely in order.
First, we would like to stress a fact that is commonly overlooked in the epistemological liter-
ature, viz. that the term “intentionality” is a technical term in Brentano’s work and is not to be
connected with the common meaning that the word “intentionality” or its corresponding terms in
other languages usually have, which is related to an individual’s drive to perform some action or
another, usually referred to as “the intent” of the agent.
Brentano’s term comes from wholly different etymological sources. It has its origins, as he points
out himself in his PES1, in the scholastic doctrine of relations and, in particular, in the specific class
of relations that obtain between a thinking subject and the thought object, which is characterized
by Brentano by the now very weird, but historically accurate, notion of “intentional inexistence”.
This is again a technical term that is very distanced from the usual meaning of these words. Indeed,
it has nothing to do with some kind of lack of existence as the “in” prefix might imply, but to an
“existence in”, which is the mode of existence of the term of an intentional relation.
Well, under these assumptions one can readily understand that, for Brentano, a philosophical
account of certain objects is to be carried out as an account of how these objects are intentionally
presented or, in a more Brentanian terminology, present to the cognizant subject.
Thus, it is no wonder that, when it comes to the special kind of objects that we’re calling
continua here, we have Brentano claiming that
it is much rather the case that every single one of our intuitions — both those of
outer perception as also their accompaniments in inner perception, and therefore
also those of memory — bring to appearance what is continuous. Thus in seeing
we have as object something that is extended in length and breadth which at the
same time shows itself clearly as allowing us to distinguish a front and rear side and
thus as characterised as the two-dimensional boundary of something extended in
three dimensions. And since this continuous something presents itself to us who
1Cf. 1973, p. 68
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see as being our primary object, we see also at the same time and as it were
incidentally, our seeing itself, that is, we are conscious of ourselves as ones who
see, and we find that to every part of the seen corporeal surface there corresponds
a part of our seeing, so that we also, as seeing subjects, appear to ourselves as
something continuously manifold. And still more, what appears to us first and
foremost is rest and motion; so also persistence and gradual change appear to
us as primary qualitative objects. This happens in that, whilst certainly in our
perceptual presentation of the primary object we are never able to present the
same place filled with two qualities simultaneously, still we are able to present
it as filled with one quality as present, with another as most recently past, and
with yet another as further past, whereby the transition from present to further
past takes place in an entirely continuous manner. Thus once more we appear
to ourselves, in seeing phenomenal qualities following each other in a temporally
continuous way or in seeing them persisting continuously in time, as something
that is continuously manifold. (1988, pp. 4-5)
Here, we have a passage in which Brentano talks about how this notion of continuity is present both
in pretty much all our intentional objects of experience and indeed in our very temporal nature.
So, his project is to present an account of this property of continuity as it is ubiquitously present
in our common experience of both the objects in the external world and of ourselves as subjective
observers of this world.
This statement, however, altough essentially correct, is not fully devoid of ambiguities, lending
itself to possible conciliatory interpretations such as the one put forward by Kölner and Chisholm
in their introduction to Brentano (1988). Indeed, in it they claim that
[o]nce we recognise the distinction between the mathematical and the phenomeno-
logical conceptions of continua, it should be clear that there is no conflict at all
between the theories of descriptive psychology (in the sense of Brentano) and
the theories of pure mathematics (in the sense of Dedekind) or the theories of
mathematical physics (in the sense of Einstein). (Brentano (1988), p. xii)
Now, although this interpretation can surely be entertained as a possible way of understanding
Brentano’s (proto-)phenomenological approach to psychology, we must disagree with Kölner and
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Chisholm. The true situation seems to be better captured by Olivier Massin in his (2018) paper
entitled “Brentanian Continua”. In it, he states:
Appealing as this irenic picture may be, it is, I believe, erroneous. Brentano
and Dedekind, are not talking past each other, but actually disagreeing. First,
Brentano not only thinks that he is in disagreement with the classical mathemati-
cal approach to the continuum, he in fact argues that there is genuine disagreement
here. Thus, he stresses from the very beginning of his investigations into the con-
tinuum that there must be a single concept of continuity that we all share, which
constitutes the subject-matter of such disagreements: The question concerning
the concept of continuity cannot be framed in such a way that one would call into
doubt whether we do in fact possess such a concept. For otherwise we would not
be able to understand ourselves when arguing about other aspects of this concept.
(Brentano 1988, 1; see also Brentano 1981b, 55) Second, as the rest of his discus-
sion makes clear, some of Brentano’s objections target not only the application
of the mathematical approach to continuity to the simple contents of perception,
but also to the “number-continuum” itself (a point further documented by Ierna
2012).
What Brentano sets out to uncover is what all continua —sensory and math-
ematical— have in common. Note also that Dedekind would also not welcome
a restriction of his enterprise to pure mathematical continua, since he explicitly
states that he intends to lay the “scientific basis for the investigation of all con-
tinuous domains” (Dedekind 1901, 5). (Massin (2018), p. 236)
His argument is that both Brentano and the mathematicians of his time were dealing with
essentially the same notion of continuity as characterized by the idea of “gaplessness”, so that instead
of “talking past each other” they were in actual disagreement as to how to understand systematically
this intuitive, and as we saw in previous chapters, old idea of thinking about continuity in terms of
this notion of “gaplessness”.2
2However, this notion of “gaplessness” is ambiguous and can be formally understood either as a statement of math-
ematical density or as a statement of true mathematical continuity, the latter of which, as we saw in chapter 2, can
be cashed out in many equivalent mathematical statements, but is indeed stronger than the former.
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Thus, in Massin’s view there is indeed disagreement between Brentano and the mathematical
community, viz. disagreement about how one is to cash out this traditional idea of “gaplessness”,
either in terms of a convoluted step by step construction of ever new intermediary objects interposed
between the ones obtained from previous steps, which was the rationale behind the various formal
mathematical constructions of the continuum, or in terms of something that is immediately present
in all, or at least pretty much the vast majority, of our intuitions and that is, thus, to be simply
extracted from it by some abstraction process.
From this point of view, we can better understand why Brentano wants to oppose his notion
of continuity from the one that was being crystallized in the set-theoretical mathematical topology
of his time, since this mathematical notion appeared to him as distanced from our intuitive ideas
regarding continua. Thus, before we dive deeply into Brentano’s account, it will be profitable to un-
derstand these Brentanian criticisms in the context of the aforementioned (proto-)phenomenological
background assumptions, which will be the task of the next section.
1. Brentano’s criticisms
Brentano’s criticism of the mathematical constructions of the continuum that were being car-
ried out in the late 19th century by figures like Cantor and Dedekind are intimately related to a
distinction regarding the two ways through which one can acquire concepts in general, and in par-
ticular the concept of a continuum. According to Brentano’s anti-rationalist account, there cannot
be any a priori concepts3. Thus, any concept, according to him, is either given straight through
some intuition or is constructed by means of some logical components which were usually called
marks (Merkmale) in the German epistemological tradition dating back at least to Kant. It is
Brentano’s view that the mathematical constructions of continua — essentially of the continuum
of real numbers — are examples of such second way of obtaining concepts, so that his criticism
of such constructions is fundamentally connected to a criticism of the view according to which the
notion of a continuum can and must be obtained by such a logical construction and, therefore, is
equivalent to a justification of his starting point according to which continua are abundantly given
to us in experience, so that an account the notion of a continuum must necessarily be obtained in
these particular intuitions we have of individual continua, or in Brentano’s own words,
3Cf. Versuch über die Erkenntnis, ed. by A.Kastil (1st ed. Leipzig, 1925; repr. Hamburg, 1970), Part I, pp. 26ff.,
40f., 153f
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the concept of the continuous is acquired not through combinations of marks taken
from different intuitions and experiences, but through abstraction from unitary
intuitions. (1988, p. 4)
These ideas, of course, will have a great impact in Brentano’s students, in particular Husserl, so
much so that they will play a leading role in the, at that time, incipient idea of a phenomenology.
However, to stay closer to the present discussion, we must note that this essentially translates
Brentano’s reluctancy in accepting that an intrinsically never-ending4 interposition of intermediate
terms would account for our notion of a continuum as some kind of “completely filled” extension.
Indeed, he says that,
[p]roceeding in this way [i.e., by means of the usual mathematical constructions],
we should have to ascribe to the concept of continuity an origin in operations of
thought both artificial and involved. This seems unacceptable from the very start,
for how could this concept then be found in the possession of the simple man or
even of the immature child? And further, how dubious it appears to suppose
that the halvings and other divisions have been executed to an actual infinity,
that they have been brought to completion, just because one can assume without
absurdity that they have been executed beyond any arbitrarily determined limit.
(1988, p. 3)
Turning our attention back to Brentano’s criticism, then, we see that he first presents a quick
account of certain attempts of constructing the mathematical continuum of real numbers — with an
emphasis on Poincaré’s — and, while doing so, he criticizes some “silly” attempts of performing such
a construction by means, for instance, of successive halvings of the interval between 0 and 1. These
are termed “silly attempts” because they are of course much less sophisticated than either of the
canonical constructions – i.e., Cantor’s construction by means of Cauchy sequences or Dedekind’s
construction by means of his cuts – in that, as Brentano rightly observes, they obviously fail even
to account for the presence of the ratio 13 in between 0 and 1.
5
4Nowadays we could even say “uncountably large”, although, as we shall see, Brentano did fail to grasp this essential
feature of true continuity, as opposed to the mere density of the rational numbers, which are, of course, only countably
infinite.
5The more general statement would be that, any attempt to construct a continuum by means of successive partitions
of the interval [0, 1] into n equal sized portions would fail to encompass fractions of the form 1
m
, with m not a power
of n.
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However, Brentano’s main criticism of taking the outcome of the mathematical constructions
as that which is given to our intuition as a continuum is presented in the following passage, which
is applicable even to the more sophisticated mathematical constructions mentioned above and has
clearly Dedekind’s construction in mind.
That one has indeed here posited something completely absurd is seen immediately
if one splits the supposedly continuous series of all fractions between 0 and 1 into
two parts at some arbitrary position. One of the two parts will then end with some
fraction f, the second however could now start only if there were some fraction
in the series which was the immediate neighbour of f, which is however not the
case. With what, then, does the second series begin? With a multiplicity of
fractions rather than just one? But this, too, is impossible since every fraction is
distinguished from every other by a before or after in the series. But if not with a
single fraction and not with a multiplicity of fractions then with what, since there
is nothing to be found in the series other than fractions taken either singly or in
groups? We should apparently have something that began but without having
any beginning.
One sees that in this entire putative construction of the concept of what is
continuous the goal has been entirely missed; for that which is above all else
characteristic of a continuum, namely the idea of a boundary in the strict sense
(to which belongs the possibility of a coincidence of boundaries), will be sought
after entirely in vain. Thus also the attempt to have the concept of what is
continuous spring forth out of the combination of individual marks distilled from
intuition is to be rejected as entirely mistaken, and this implies further that what
is continuous must be given to us in individual intuition and must therefore have
been abstracted therefrom. (1988, p. 3)
This passage is somewhat dense, but very interesting. First, it considers the open/closed background
framework on top of which the construction is formulated. We shall talk more about this problem
later for it is, I believe, precisely the point in which Brentano’s ideas show their true strength,
especially in relation to the notion of connectivity. Furthermore, this passage is interesting because
the criticism it contains is intrinsically connected with Brentano’s assumption that with a given
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continuum, there must necessarily correspond a boundary or limit, viz. something that marks the
precise location where such continuum “starts” and “ends”; and this, we shall claim, is Brentano’s
main contribution to the subject.
Indeed, one might even claim that Brentano’s criticism would not really amount to a thorough
refutation. It’s form is much better understood as a two-pronged attack: first, he hints towards some
essential kind of “intuitive unnaturalness” of all the mathematical constructions of continua that
were founded on what we’re calling the “manifold conception” of continua; and, then, he shows how
there is an alternative way of thinking about the various kinds of continua which are presented in
intuition that is much more in accord with some natural assumptions about them. This alternative
way, however, is essentially not new, but springs from Aristotle’s conception of continua, which is
itself based on the Greek philosopher’s thorough denial of actual infinities and his intuition that the
notion of a continuum should be intimately connected with the notion of its boundary or its limit,
which is in its turn something whose being is derivative or dependent on the being of the continuum
it bounds.
Under these assumptions, it would be an absurdity to attempt at a construction of some contin-
uum by starting from its lowest-dimensional boundaries, viz. its points. Such a construction would
amount to nothing other than a blunt metaphysical putting of the cart in front of the horses, in
that it would amount to a construction of a certain entity out of other entities whose being would
be highly dependent on the first entity’s being to start with. In this respect, we have the following
illuminating passage:
If something continuous is a mere boundary then it can never exist except in
connection with other boundaries and except as belonging to a continuum which
possesses a larger number of dimensions. Indeed this must be said of all bound-
aries, including those which possess no dimensions at all such as spatial points and
moments of time and movement: a cutting free from everything that is continuous
is for them absolutely impossible. And this allows us to grasp very clearly the
topsy-turvy character of the above-mentioned attempt at construction of the con-
cept of the continuous through interpolation of fractional numbers, where every




In the criticisms of Brentano we can distinguish two key points that serve as foundations for the
whole argument, viz. the question regarding the ontological status of boundaries that we mentioned
above and the question regarding the possibility of actual infinities. We will study the second point
in this section and the first point will be discussed in the following one.
As we saw, the question whether actual infinities are metaphysically possible is one that dates
back at least to Aristotle — who answered strongly in the negative — and Brentano seems to be
following the Ancient Greek philosopher closely in this regard when he denies that the mathematical
constructions could ground our notion of continuity, for these constructions would require an actual
infinity of interposed elements in any given continuous extension. Indeed, in a text dictated in 1917
and present in the Appendix to the English translation to the PES, we have the following passage:
Just as the concept of the actu infinite number of entities is absurd, so is the that
of a thing which is infinitely small. [...] One can say of a continuum, then, only
that it can be described as being a as large a finite number of actual entities as
you please, but not as an infinitely large number of actual entities. (p. 354)6
The acceptance of actual infinities seems to go, after the mid 19th century, hand in hand with
the new set-theoretic foundation of modern mathematics. Indeed, since the groundbreaking work
of Cantor, that arguably established set theory as an acceptable mathematical theory, we have
the establishment of different transfinite cardinalities as a mathematical fact and the study of their
arithmetical and geometrical properties as part of the set-theoretical work to be done. In particular,
we have, in the context of the discovery of different sizes of infinity, the revolutionary distinction be-
tween density and continuity, which is the distinction that somehow grounds the numeric distinction
between the merely rational numbers and the truly continuous set of real numbers.
Before the work of those mathematicians that aimed to establish a precise formulation of this
property of continuity, which distinguished the real numbers from the merely rational numbers, the
notion of “continuity” seemed to be related with the property of the real numbers — or, indeed,
of any continuous extension — according to which, between any two real numbers, no matter how
6Brentano goes on to add: “And in order to call attention to its distinctive character, we may also use the expression
‘a continuous number of things’, but this must be distinguished from the actu infinite number.” This complement
is not directly relevant to the point being made here, but it perhaps shows an incipient attempt by Brentano to
understand the aforementioned distinction between mere density and full-blown continuity, which is arguably what
he calls “its distinctive character.”
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close together, we can always find another real number between them. This property is, as we
saw, nowadays unambiguously called “density” and it is sharply distinguished from what we call
“continuity”, which is characterized by all the equivalent assertions we mentioned in chapter 2, viz.
the existence of cuts or of lowest upper bounds for bounded subsets etc.
Unfortunately, even though Brentano was by no means a complete stranger to the latest math-
ematical developments of his time, he nonetheless surely failed to capture their full meaning. In
particular, he never clearly understood this distinction between density and continuity, and con-
tinued to think about the latter in terms of its older characterization in terms of properties that
resembled more the modern notion of density then the proper modern notion of continuity per se.
One can clearly see this fact when one pays attention to an alleged proof in his manuscript
entitled Descriptive Psychology of the false statement that
[i]t is also possible to give a unique and mutually exhaustive pairwise coordination
between the point set of a continuum and the full set of integers. (DP , p. 113)
In his “proof”, what he actually does is to show how the set of positive integers can be put in
a one-to-one correspondence with a set in which, for every point, there would be another point
closer to the former than any preassigned distance. Following many older mathematicians, then, he
identifies this property with the notion of continuity. However, as we discussed previously, with the
development of 19th century analysis, this property became associated with the notion of density,
which is a weaker notion than continuity, not every dense set being continuous in the proper sense.
I believe that this lack of proper understanding on Brentano’s part unfortunately prevented him
from engaging more thoroughly in the discussion regarding actual infinities, in the sense that any
of the continuity properties requires a more robust acceptance of actual infinities than any merely
dense set does, since one easy way of understanding what it is to be continuous certainly would
require the property of being composed by a continuously or non-denumerably infinite number
of points, although this requirement would by no means be sufficient since, e.g., the Cantor set
is non-denumerable, but one would hardly say that it is continuous, for, as a subset of the real
numbers, considered with their usual topology, the Cantor set is not connected and, from a measure
theoretical point of view it has measure zero.
However, what seems to be the case is that Brentano believed that his account of boundaries as
dependent entities would be more in synchrony with Aristotle’s tradition of denying actual infinities.
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This is because his account of boundaries as dependent entities would equate them with universals,
which according to him have not a proper kind of existence and could correspond to many different
individuals. Indeed, he says that
[b]ecause a boundary, even when itself continuous, can never exist except as be-
longing to something continuous of more dimensions (indeed receives its fully
determinate and exactly specific character only through the manner of this be-
longingness), it is, considered for itself, nothing other than a universal, to which
— as to other universals — more than one thing can correspond. (1988, p. 8)
This move to consider boundaries as universals has the upshot of allowing him to consider
the inner boundaries of some extended continuum as merely potential, i.e., as not being actually
instantiated by a certain individual, whereas the outer boundaries would be actually instantiated.
Thus, one might be able to hold the view that only the outer boundaries have actual existence and,
therefore, that number of things with actual existence remains finite.
On the other hand, this subsumption of the boundaries of continua to the class of universals
also allows Brentano to think about the coincidence of boundaries, a subject which is very new and
interesting and that shall be further discussed below.
3. Boundaries
Before we get to the topic of coincidence of boundaries, however, we still need to discuss the
second background assumption in Brentano’s criticism, which is that there is an intrinsic relation
between a continuum and its boundaries, according to which the reality of the latter is strictly
speaking dependent on the reality of the continuum itself. In other words, for Brentano, boundaries
— as, indeed, any other universal7 — can have no independent existence and, therefore, can only
exist as boundaries of a certain particular higher-dimensional continuum.
Beside the passages in the compendium about space, time and the continuum that we mentioned
above, we find clear expressions of this thesis in Brentano’s Theory of categories:
no continuum can be built up by adding one individual point to another. And
a point exists only in so far as it belongs to what is continuous; points may be
joined together just to the extent that they do belong to the same continuum.
7This point will be made clearer later, but have already discussed a version of it in relation to Aristotle’s account in
chapter 1.
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But no point can be anything detached from the continuum; indeed, no point can
be thought of apart from a continuum. (1981, p. 20)
In the special context of Brentano’s aforementioned intentional — or one might say “proto-
phenomenological” — approach to the ontology of the objects which are presented to us, what we
have is that the only self-standing continua, besides the one-dimensional temporal continuum, are
essentially the three-dimensional bodies of outer experience; all other lower-dimensional continua
are to be though of as boundaries of some three-dimensional body.8 The first, viz. the temporal
continuum and the three-dimensional bodies of outer experience, are what Brentano calls “primary
continua” in the sense that more dependent continua have their existence founded upon the —
logically, as opposed to chronologically — previous existence of these primary continua. For example,
besides the boundaries themselves, one might mention as secondary or dependent continua any kind
of property, such as color or hardness, that is present in some primary continuum. Thus, a red
parallelepiped must be understood as being composed of the primary continuum that constitutes
the parallelepiped’s volume and which is both bounded by the six rectangular faces which constitute
its outer boundary and filled by all the rectangular inner boundaries that can be transformed into
outer boundaries of its parts, were the parallelepiped to be divided; but also, it has a secondary
continuum in its composition as well, which is to be identified with the red color that permeates its
outer boundary and is to be regarded, according to Brentano, as something continuous, since it is
just as extended as the outer boundary itself. Indeed, he says that
the colour, too, appears to be extended with the spatial surface, whether it man-
ifests no specific colour-differences of its own — as in the case of a red colour
8Or, of course, boundaries of boundaries of such bodies, for the case of one-dimensional boundaries, and boundaries
of boundaries of boundaries of such bodies, for the case of points. In this sense, it is useful to mention the following
clear passage from Brentano (1988):
If something continuous is a mere boundary then it can never exist except in connection with
other boundaries and except as belonging to a continuum which possesses a larger number of
dimensions. (p. 7)
However, this account is not something he developed late in his life, but was indeed a point that stayed fairly
unchanged, as we can attest from this earlier passage from the Descriptive Psychology manuscript:
It is to be noted in this context that the one- and two-dimensional ones, like points, are only
possible as boundaries, by themselves they are nothing. Everything they are, they are only in
connection with the third dimension, i.e. with the physically spatial. We said earlier that a
spatial point never exists without a continuum. This must still be more precisely determined to
the effect that it can never exist without connection to three-dimensional spaces. (DP , p. 120)
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which fills out a surface uniformly — or whether it varies in its colouring — per-
haps in the manner of a rectangle which begins on one side with red and ends
on the other side with blue, progressing uniformly through all colour-differences
from violet to pure blue in between. In both cases we have to do with a multiple
continuum, and it is the spatial continuum which appears thereby as primary, the
colour-continuum as secondary. (1988, p. 15)
We would like to stress here that, although our example considered a uniform color as a secondary
continuum, it is clear from Brentano’s passage, that he also thinks of a continuously varying colour
as a possible example of a secondary continuum.
Now, this talk about dependent boundaries and secondary continua is, indeed, the main point of
Brentano’s account. They are the most distinctive characteristics of this account and they are the
ones that most strongly relate it to the Aristotelian tradition. Moreover, their recognition brings
about the possibility of describing two new and interesting properties of continua, which shall be the
topic of our presentation in the next two sections. These are the notions of plerosis and teleosis,
which are intuitively to be understood, respectively, as a measure of the “fullness” of a certain
boundary and a measure of the “degree of change” of a certain secondary continuum.
4. Plerosis and coincidence of boundaries
As we saw, for Brentano, it is a conceptual requirement for boundaries to have their existence
be dependent on the existence of some other higher-dimensional continua they somehow limit or
bound. An important part of Brentano’s account, though, is that this notion of “limiting some
higher-dimensional continuum” does not have to be — and moreover usually is not —, according
to him, total. Much more commonly, boundaries only bound other higher-dimensional continua
in a restricted portion of the possible total number of directions that are present in the higher-
dimensional space in which the bounded continuum is embedded. For instance, according to the
Brentanian account, the disc that bounds the northern hemisphere of a solid sphere only does so
in the north-pointing direction, but not in the south-pointing direction. Now, to make this point
clearer, Brentano introduces a concept that is supposed to be a function of the number of directions
in which a given boundary bounds a higher-dimensional continuum in relation to something like “the
total number of directions in which the boundary could bound some higher-dimensional continuum”,
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i.e., some kind of “measure” of the degree to which the boundary in question actually fulfills the
possibility of being a boundary in every possible direction of the space that embeds the higher-
dimensional continuum the boundary is a boundary of.
What we have here is a intuitive proposal of a concept that can have a much deeper mathematical
significance. The background idea here is certainly something like the Jordan curve theorem, which
states that any closed Jordan curve or, in other words, any closed non-self-intersecting curve on the
plane divides the plane into two connected regions. Thus, one can think about this Jordan curve
as a boundary of either of these two regions, or of both. In the former case, we shall say that the
curve has “half plerosis” and in the latter that the curve has “full plerosis”. Indeed, this theorem —
which, by the way, was the center of much discussion during the turn of the 20th century — deals
with the plane as the background space, which is certainly one dimension less than what Brentano
considers to be the embedding space for the “usual continua of outer experience”. However, by the
time Brentanto is dictating his notes, Brouwer and Lebesgue have already used homology theory to
prove a generalization of the Jordan curve theorem to higher dimensions.9
Thus, because of these theorems, the notion of the plerosis of boundaries that have one dimension
less than the embedding space is very simple and amounts essentially — in the case of boundaries
which are images of an injective continuous mapping from a sphere — to the statement that this
boundary has full plerosis if the portions of the embedding space into which it is divided by the
boundary are not actually split up by the boundary, so that the boundary is not an actual outer
boundary, but simply an inner boundary10, or half plerosis otherwise.
However, the situation is more complicated when one tries to generalize this idea to boundaries
with smaller dimension when compared to the embedding space. This is because, for instance, given
a line embedded into R3, this line can be a boundary of an infinite number of different half planes,
9In fact, they have proved that any topological sphere in the (n+ 1)-dimensional Euclidean space Rn+1 (n > 0), i.e.,
the image of an injective continuous mapping of the n-sphere Sn into Rn+1 divides the space Rn+1 into exactly two
connected components, one of which is bounded (the interior) and another which is unbounded (the exterior), and
which have the topological sphere as their common boundary.
10In the sense of a possible place in which the total object can be divided into two parts. In this context, Brentano
says that
[w]here we have to do with the interior of a continuum, every point has full plerosis, i.e. is
connected in every conceivable direction with the relevant continuum. (1988, p.20)
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so that ascribing to it a plerosis with the formula
(∗) P = 1
n
,
where n is the number of portions of the embedding space of which the boundary in question can
be a boundary of, does not make any mathematical sense.
If the situation is such that, some higher dimensional continuum is, as a matter of fact, par-
titioned into a finite number of symmetric regions that meet at a single boundary, then one can
surely ascribe a plerosis to this boundary with (∗). A simple example to portray this situation is a
disc without one of its quadrants, as shown in the following picture:
The center point of the amputated disc is a boundary of each of the remaining three quadrants, but
certainly not of the missing quadrant, so that we could ascribe to this point a plerosis of 34 .
11
The more general case in which the higher dimensional continuum is not partitioned into a
finite number of symmetric regions that meet at some given boundary, could be studied with the
help of measure theory.12 However, for now, we should limit our attention to the simpler and more
pedagogically inclined cases in which we do indeed have such a finite partition of the embedding
higher-dimensional continuum.
11In this discussion, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, we are assuming the disc to be the embedding space.
Otherwise, i.e., if we were considering the more realistic case of a disc embedded into the real 3-dimensional space,
then we would need to consider directions that are not co-planar with the disc as well, so that we would not end up
with a finite partition of the possible regions the center of the disc could be a boundary of and, therefore, could not
ascribe to this point a plerosis according to (∗).
12The idea would be to ascribe to a certain boundary of dimension n −m a copy of Sm and, then, to define as the
plerosis of the boundary the (Lebesgue-)measure of the subset of Sm that is intersected by the directions which are
actually bounded by this particular boundary, divided by the area of the n-sphere, i.e., by












π, Γ(1) = 1 and Γ(x+ 1) = xΓ(x).
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4.1. What does it mean to touch? Now, with this in mind, we can shift our attention to
the most interesting consequence of this notion of plerosis, which is that it enables one to give a new
and surprisingly down to earth account of what it is for two continua to touch each other. Under
the background assumptions of the set-theoretic conception of continua, the notion of two bodies
touching is a little abstract and arbitrary. To understand why, let us consider a solid 3-dimensional
sphere that is cut through its equator line. According to usual set-theoretic topology, what we end
up in this case are two hemispheres, one of which is closed since it contains the boundary disc, and
the other open since it does not contain the boundary disc.13 This type of situation, i.e., two regions
A and B such that ∂A ∩ ∂B ⊆ A, ∂A ∩ ∂B ∩B = ∅ and ∂A ∩ ∂B 6= ∅ is the only one in which we
can talk of touching under the set-theoretical topological assumptions.
However, this situation is simply a more general statement of the position which was famously
termed a “monstrous doctrine” by Brentano. The reason for doing so was that he could not accept
the symmetry of this situation and the analogous situation in which we have ∂A ∩ ∂B ⊆ B,
∂A∩ ∂B ∩A = ∅ and ∂A∩ ∂B 6= ∅, which would entail a fundamental arbitrariness to the choice of
which region should contain the common boundary. 14 This problem is very accurately described
in Smith (1998/99) with his example of two tangent spheres:
Imagine two perfect spheres at rest and in contact with each other. What happens
at the point where they touch? Is there a last point p1 that belongs to the first
sphere and a first point p2 that belongs to the second? Clearly not; for then
13Of course, here we use the further ontological assumption that two truly distinct and separated bodies cannot
contain a common part and, in particular, both halves cannot contain their common boundary at the same point in
time.
14The talk in Bolzano and Brentano is a little bit less general than our exposition here, for they conceived only of
the possibility that either A is closed and B is open or vice-versa, whereas our statement here, although it certainly
encompasses this particular case, also takes into consideration cases in which neither A nor B are fully open or closed,
albeit their common boundary certainly does not belong to both regions. Here is Brentano’s famous passage against
Bolzano’s “monstrous doctrine”:
According to the doctrine here considered, in contrast, the divisions of the line would not occur
in points, but in some absurd way behind a point and before all others of which however none
would stand closest to the cut. One of the two lines into which the line would be split upon
division would therefore have an end point, but the other no beginning point. This inference
has been quite correctly drawn by Bolzano, who was led thereby to his monstrous doctrine that
there would exist bodies with and without surfaces, the one class containing just so many as
the other, because contact would be possible only between a body with a surface and another
without. He ought, rather, to have had his attention drawn by such consequences to the fact
that the whole conception of the line and of other continua as sets of points runs counter to the
concept of contact and thereby abolishes precisely what makes up the essence of the continuum.
(1988, p. 105)
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we should have to admit an indefinite number of further points between p1 and
p2 and this would imply that the two spheres were not in contact after all. To
acknowledge one of p1 and p2 but not the other, however, would be to countenance
what is here an asymmetry of a quite peculiarly unmotivated sort. And our third
alternative seems to be ruled out also. For to admit that the point where the two
spheres touch belongs to neither of the two spheres seems to amount to the thesis
that the two spheres do not touch after all. (Smith (1998/99), p. 108)
On Brentano’s account, though, there is a very simple and intuitive definition of contact that
hinges on his definition of plerosis. Since not all boundaries have full plerosis, we can think about
the possibility of coincidence of boundaries that have only partial pleroses up to a point in which
the sum of their pleroses adds up to 1 or full plerosis. On a purely extensional account, like the
set-theoretical one, two boundaries which occupy the same region of space are to be identified as a
single entity. This is the reason why one has to make the arbitrary decision as to whether, given
a 3-dimensional region A, ∂A is to be thought of as a part of A or as a part of the complement of
A, i.e., whether A is to be though of as closed or open. On the other hand, with this possibility
of a coincidence of boundaries, then, one can define the notion of touching as being the relation
holding between two regions of space that have at least one pair of boundaries with partial pleroses
which coincide at least partially. So, on this account, both A and its complement would have their
boundaries as parts. But each boundary would have half plerosis in opposite directions and, thus,
could coincide — which would enable one to say that A and its complement actually touch.
This new definition bypasses much of the intrinsic unintuitiveness of the set-theoretic account.
As we mentioned, in this picture, we do not have to make an arbitrary decision as to whether “the
common boundary” is part of the first or the second touching regions; much on the contrary, in it
we don’t have open regions at all (even partially), for every proper region15 has a boundary, which
in general will have half plerosis (in the case of 2-dimensional boundaries of a 3-dimensional region
in 3-dimensional space) and, therefore, will be able to coincide with other boundaries having partial
pleroses, thus creating the alleged contact between these two regions.
Smith (1998/99), just after introducing the problem as we saw, also presents a good account of
Brentano’s solution:
15I.e., any region that is a proper subregion of the whole embedding space.
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The picture of the world of continua and boundaries that is dictated by the above
is as follows. Boundaries are full-fledged denizens of reality. They serve as objects
of perception (and are perhaps the only objects of perception). But boundaries
cannot exist in isolation: there are, in reality, no isolated points, lines or surfaces.
Boundaries might be compared in this respect to forms or structures (for example
the structure of a molecule as this is realized in a given concrete case) in that
they are located in space but do not take up space. Further, both boundaries
and forms or structures (and holes, and shadows; perhaps also minds or souls)
are comparable to universals in that, while they require of necessity hosts which
instantiate them, they can in principle be instantiated by a variety of different
hosts. (See Casati and Varzi (1994)) Consider, for example, that boundary which
is the surface of an apple. The whole apple can here serve as host, but so also can
the apple minus core, which might have been eaten away to varying degrees from
within. (Ibid., p. 109)
However, it is unfornutate that he should describe the boundaries in Brentano’s account as “full-
fledged denizens of reality”. These boundaries are for Brentano, as Smith himself recognizes,
comparable to universals in that, while they require of necessity hosts which in-
stantiate them, they can in principle be instantiated by a variety of different hosts.
This, however, renders boundaries as abstract entities, which in the ever more radically reistic
ontological position developed by Brentano throughout his career, are not “full-fledged denizens
of reality”. The latter are only the actual psysical objects that fill actual regions of space, their
boundary being analogous to properties of these objects, that have some sort of reality in that they
are actual propereties of real physical objects, but are not what one might call a “full-fledged denizen
of reality”, since they can never exist independently from the body of which it is a boundary or a
property — more generally, an instantiated universal.
4.2. The problem of internal boundaries. So far, our exposition has mainly focused on the
usual notion of a boundary, which can be more precisely characterized by the expression “external
boundary”. These boundaries are the more abstract version of the usual common-sense “shells” of
three-dimensional objects. However, as we saw, there is also concern in the Aristotelian tradition
regarding these notions also with respect to what are called “internal boundaries” of continua. These
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are essentially, from an intuitive perspective, the various “collections of lower-dimensional entities”
which have the property that, if one moves slightly in any direction from this entity, then one
necessarily passes through portions of the original continuum.
Given this intuitive characterization, it might seem fairly trivial to conclude that these inner
boundaries all have full plerosis, since, as we said, they seem to be boundaries of the original
continuum in all possible directions. In Brentano’s own words,
[w]here we have to do with the interior of a continuum, every point has full plerosis,
i.e. is connected in every conceivable direction with the relevant continuum. (1988,
p. 20)
However, it is interesting to see that the literature on the topic is not so straightforward as one
might expect, given this introduction. Indeed, we have Massin say that
in the case of internal boundaries, Brentano’s theory appears to face the following
dilemma:
1. Either internal boundaries (in contrast with external boundaries) have full
plerosis, but then internal contact does not consist in boundary-coincidence but
in boundary-sharing.
2. Or internal contact (like external contact) consists in several coinciding
boundaries, but then it is not the case that all internal boundaries have full
plerosis. Does Brentano endorse the first horn of the dilemma? I do not think so
[...]. (2018, p. 17)
For him, a reasonable account of what he calls “inner contact” would simply have to be analogous
to the “external contact” situation we have discussed in the last section, i.e.,
Brentano must embrace the second horn of the dilemma: inner contact, like ex-
ternal contact, consists in boundary-coincidence. (Ibid., p. 18)
Now, as Massin himself readily recognizes, this solution seems to be in direct contradiction
to Brentano’s quoted statement asserting the full plerosis of any inner point of a continuum. His
answer is
that this sentence is slightly hyperbolic. Brentano should have said, more cau-
tiously, that at every point in the interior of a continuum, there is a boundary with
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full plerosis. This more modest claim is interesting in that it does not rule out
that, at every point in the interior of a continuum, there may also be boundaries
with partial plerosis. (Ibid.)
This, indeed, seems to solve the problem and we should agree that it does go in the direction
towards the right solution. However, there are further complications to entertain. In particular, if
we take Massin’s solution ipsis literi, then we must have to conclude that boundaries with partial
pleroses can add up to more than 1 or full plerosis, which is not only against our explicit statement
regarding the matter, but also against the likely intuition behind this whole talk: how can one
speak of “full plerosis” if one must entertain the possibility of boundaries adding up their respective
pleroses to something that is more than “full plerosis”. And the alleged coincidence of internal
boundaries assumed by Massin to solve the problem does exactly that; for if we assume his “more
cautious” statement that
at every point in the interior of a continuum, there is a boundary with full plerosis,
and the relevant claim only made possible by this logical weakening that, together with this full —
i.e., 1 — plerosis boundary that is assumed to exist at every point in the interior of a continuum,16
there might also be other coincident boundaries with partial pleroses — say, plerosis a, with 0 <
a < 1 —, then we must have to conclude that the overall plerosis in that point is 1 + a > 1.
It should be noted, though, that Massin does indeed consider this problem, albeit very quickly
and in passing when he says that
[o]ne may worry that, if we admit internal boundaries of partial and full plerosis,
we end up with too many coinciding boundaries (2018, p. 18)
and he eventually feels it is satisfyingly settled by
Brentano’s suggestion that coinciding boundaries may enter into part-whole rela-
tionships. Two inner coinciding boundaries of half-plerosis form together a bound-
ary of full-plerosis. It is therefore not as if the inner boundary of full plerosis is
a third, additional boundary coinciding with the two half-plerosis boundaries:
rather, the third boundary is mereologically constituted by these two half-plerosis
boundaries. Despite being spatially indivisible, some boundaries nevertheless have
plerotic parts[,]
16Note here the not quite Brentanian construction “there is a boundary at every point”. More on this later.
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although he does indeed aknowledge the fact that this whole talk of “plerotic parts” is Zimmermann’s
and not Brentano’s.
Now, one can evaluate this solution from two distinct standpoints: From a merely logico-
systematic standpoint, this is surely a viable solution. It is indeed consistent and it is somehow built
upon the very Brentanian notion of “coincidence of boundaries”. Notwithstanding this, though, I
believe that we can salvage Brentano’s original claim — which is “too strong” in Massin’s view —
when we understand Brentano’s ideas regarding multiple continua, which shall be done in the next
few sections. Then, we shall come back to this question.
4.3. Multiple continua. This account of boundaries and their coincidence is especially suited
for the talk of what Brentano calls double, or triple etc. continua. What we have in these situations
is that, built upon some primary continuum, we find secondary, tertiary etc. continua that are
usually to be identified with continuously varying properties that each portion of the primary con-
tinuum instantiates. For instance, we can think of a disc such that each of its quadrants is painted
with a different color, as shown in the following picture:
In this case, what we have is the disc as the primary continuum, on top of which we have four
secondary continua, one for each color, which are coextensive with each of the four quadrants.
If we consider only the primary continuum, then, of course, it will be clear that the center of the
disc bounds each quadrant and thus has full plerosis. However, if this point is considered, not as a
part of the primary continuum, but as a part of any of the secondary color continua, we would have
to ascribe to it 14 plerosis, for the total number of directions this point can bound is partitioned into
4 classes, one for each collection of directions that stay in a single quadrant.
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Similarly, if one were to detach, say, the green part of the disc, then we would end up with the
following figure:
in which the center point, considered as a part of the primary continuum, now only bounds three
of the four quadrants and, therefore, has plerosis 34 , whereas, considered as a part of any of the
remaining three color continua, it will remain with plerosis 14 . These are just simple examples that
help illustrate the various types of distinctions that this notion of “plerosis” allows one to draw
with respect to the various multiply continuous objects that present themselves to one’s spacial
intuitions.
This notion of plerosis, moreover, can play a role in elucidating the phenomena of motion and
rest, and in particular the puzzles regarding the transition from motion to rest or vice-versa. For
suppose one throws an object upwards. Then, this object is moving upwards with an uniformly
diminishing speed up to a point where it stops and starts falling with uniformly increasing speed.
As we saw in previous chapters, ever since Antiquity, there has been a debate as to the exact
moment when such transitions — from movement in one direction, to rest, to movement in the other
direction — actually take place. It is not our goal here to go very deeply into the current state of
this discussion, but we would like to point out that a commonly accepted answer was a set-theoretic
style of answer that would ascribe perhaps a last moment for the upward motion, but no first instant
of rest, or that would need to rely on an infinitesimally small, but nonetheless extended time span
for the rest portion of the motion. On the other hand, with this notion of plerosis at hand, one
is able to provide a much more down to earth account. Indeed, we can say that the moment of
rest is literally a point in time, i.e., a true unextended boundary; and, furthermore, that it is not a
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single moment, but two moments with half plerosis each — viz., the moment in which the upwards
movement ceases and the moment in which the downwards movement begins — that coincide with
each other.17
4.4. More on multiple continua. It is interesting to note that both Kölner and Chisholm in
their introduction to Brentano (1988) and Massin in his aforementioned paper ascribe to Brentano
the view that time is the only true primary continuum. Indeed, we have the former clamming that
[t]here are, therefore, secondary and primary continua. A secondary continuum,
unlike a primary continuum, is one that is founded upon another continuum.
Every continuum is founded upon a temporal continuum; thus whatever is spatial
is also temporal. And every qualitative continuum is founded upon a spatial
continuum (Ibid., pp. xii-xiii)
and the latter that
[Brentano] thinks that time, rather than space, is the only fundamental —pri-
mary— continuum (Massin (2018), p. 8)
Brentano does in fact claim something like that; e.g. we have him say that
[y]et still one would have to admit that if our determinations are to be of com-
plete exactness then the temporal continuum is in the eminent sense the primary
continuum if compared to the spatial. This is not only because of the limita-
tion of the primary character of what is spatial to three of its four dimensions,
which, in so far as it is primarily continuous, allow it to appear in fact only as a
three-dimensional boundary of something four-dimensional. It is also because of a
certain multifariously different degree of variation which, precisely because what
is spatial exists in these four dimensions only as boundary, can apply to it even in
an individual moment of time. Moreover, it exists in an individual moment in not
quite the same way according to whether it exists as boundary of something that
17Brentano discusses this particular point with an example of something that ceases to be. In his words,
[i]t was affirmed that when something that is ceases to be, then there was a last moment in
which it was, but no first moment in which it was not. With a better understanding of the
peculiarity of partial plerosis one should have said that in the same moment it exists in partial
plerosis and that it does not exist in full plerosis, since until that moment it had existed and
from that moment on however it existed no longer. (Brentano (1988), p. 21)
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is continuing to exist or of something that is gradually passing away, and, con-
sidered from the side of the past, whether it exists as something that has existed
just as it is until now or has come to be what it is through gradual change. These
are differences of temporal teleosis, which have significance also for the individual
boundaries of time. (Brentano (1988), pp. 17-18)
As we can see, then, the situation seems to be a little more complicated in this respect. Especially
when one considers that just two paragraphs before we can read Brentano say that
[i]n addition to the temporal as such we have also put forward the spatial as such
as an example of a primary continuum. (Ibid., p. 17)
The way to understand this seeming discrepancy in his presentation is, however, to simply read
carefully what Brentano himself has to say about this theme:
One might see a contradiction here. Note however that we had in the first place
spoken of space as conceived by the geometer who abstracts from its perseverance
in time and therefore also ascribes to bodies three dimensions. If, however, he
took into account the time in which it exists, then he should have to call it four-
dimensional, as was noticed already by Lagrange and has been emphasised also by
later thinkers. If we do not carry out this abstraction however, then we shall still
have to go on affirming that the body does not appear in the fourth dimension
thus accruing to it as primarily continuous, as it does in the remaining three
dimensions. Rather, it appears as secondarily continuous, in that time running
its course provides the primary continuum of a body which extends from the
beginning to the end of time as at rest or as more or less in motion. (Ibid.)
Thus, the answer to the whole conundrum seems to be this: as long as we think about space as
the “real space” that we live in, then we must surely consider it as a secondary continuum that is built
upon the temporal continuum or, more precisely, as a three-dimensional boundary of a quadruply
extended continuum, which is the true primary continuum. However, the interesting point here
is that one can — and indeed usually does —18 think about our usual three-dimensional space of
experience as a continuum in its own right and, when doing so, we see that it presents several
properties that are characteristic of primary continua, such as a homogeneity that in Brentano’s
18Most usually geometers, according to Brentano.
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words “is encountered throughout and as a matter of necessity, where it is present in the secondary
continua only as a matter of exception.” (Ibid.)
Thus, if we are to be extra picky we would have to grant that, strictly speaking, space is a
secondary continuum and, moreover, a mere boundary of the “true” four-dimensionaly extended
continuum of reality, which would be thus the only truly primary continuum. In this sense, Massin,
Kölner and Chisholm are indeed correct in saying that space is not a primary continuum. How-
ever, as Brentano recognizes, the abstract three-dimensional space of experience does have many
properties that are to be ascribed to primary continua and they, as a matter of fact, figure in many
actual cases as a basic continuum on top of which other more dependent continua — such as colour
or temperature —, can be built. It is this fact, thus, that leads Brentano to incur in this (meta-
physically) loose, but (practically) pregnant talk of abstract three-dimensional space as a primary
continuum.
4.5. Back to the problem of coincidence of internal boundaries. Now, in possession of
this notion of a secondary continuum whose existence depends on some primary “basic” continuum,
we can present a solution to the problem posed by Massin regarding the coincidence of internal
boundaries.
So far, we have studied Massin’s solution to this problem, which is to relax Brentano’s claim
that “every [interior] point has full plerosis”, so that it is captured by the less Brentanian formula-
tion: “at every point in the interior of a continuum, there is a boundary with full plerosis.” This
version is less Brentanian simply because it seems to distinguish between a point in space and the
boundaries that might occupy that point. For Brentano, however,19 it is clear that points are in-
ternal boundaries and not simply formal locuses for such boundaries, which seems to be implied by
Massin’s weaker formulation. This incongruity seems enough to reject Massin’s interpretation as a
possible reconstruction of Brentano’s position, although it is, as we mentioned previously, certainly
a logically possible position to support.
A more Brentanian solution seems to be the one that relies precisely on the distinction made in
the latter sections between primary and secondary continua. Thus, in the rest of this section the
goal is to hopefully explain precisely how this can be done.
19As indeed it was for Aristotle, as we saw in chapter 1.
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The main idea is that the Brentanian claim mentioned a couple of paragraphs ago is not to be
weakened in Massin’s way, but simply restricted to primary continua — in the more lax interpreta-
tion of this notion that allows for three-dimensional space to be a primary continuum. In this sense,
it is certainly true, since a merely spacial continuum, being, as Brentano says, fully homogeneous
just as any other primary continuum, has all internal boundaries with full plerosis, since they do
not truly separate distinct parts of this continuum — only what one might call “abstract parts”, i.e.,
parts that one might conceive as being distinct but that, in the context of this specific homogeneous
continuum, are not really so — in opposition to actual, somehow more ontologically robust parts,
that are delimited by boundaries with partial pleroses.
This is, in fact, fairly consistent with the original Aristotelian distinction studied in chapter 1
between mere coincidence of boundaries, which would imply that two distinct continua are indeed
contiguous with each other — i.e., in a more modern terminology, they touch —, and true identity
of boundaries, which would imply that the continua of which they are boundaries actually merge
together into a new fully-fledged truly existing continuum. This is, as we saw, what one can
understand by the Aristotelian expression “are continuous with each other”, in opposition to mere
contiguity, and thus, from a historical point of view, we can understand how a philosopher with
such Aristotelian background assumptions as Brentano might have actually adhered to a position
like the one we are delineating here.
So, the introduction of these secondary continua, understood as properties that somehow im-
pregnate the more fundamental plain homogeneous regions of space, is what allows one to discern
proper distinct parts in this region and it is only with respect to these that one can talk about
internal boundaries with partial pleroses.
An example might make the point clearer. Let us consider, for simplicity’s sake, a two-
dimensional square embedded in usual R2 and let us consider it in a two-fold way: firstly, merely
as a portion of R2, which might be thought to be divided in the middle by the dotted line in the
picture and, secondly, as a coloured object which is painted red in the portion that is left of the
dotted line and blue on its right.
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Then, the dotted line, in the context of the first continuum, does not really divide it into two
actual portions, but only marks a position in which such a division might occur. In this sense it has
full plerosis. On the other hand, the second rectangle has two actually distinct parts that can be
characterized by two different functions on two different sets of (abstractly constructed) points:20
one for the red part and one for the blue part. Now, in this second case, in the precise place we drew
the dotted line in the first rectangle, we find two different lines: one that is part of the external
boundary of the blue region and one that is part of the external boundary of the red part. Each of
these lines only bounds the region whose external boundary it is a part of in one of the possible two
directions which it could do so and, therefore, to each of these lines one has to ascribe half plerosis.
However, in this example it does not even make sense to ask whether the two boundary parts
we mentioned in the last paragraph somehow merge their half pleroses in order to thus “form” the
dotted line. On the contrary: these three lines, albeit collocated, are completely distinct, as they
are parts of different continua to start with. Only the two that are boundary parts for the secondary
continua have partial pleroses and only they coincide to form a shared boundary and, thus guarantee
that the two halves of the rectangle actually touch. This is what we should understand as the proper
Brentanian analysis of this topic.
4.6. The aledged problem with primary continua. Now, in the already mentioned paper
by Massin, he attempts to show through an analysis of the Brentanian notion of coincidence of
boundaries that it cannot be logically harmonized with Brentano’s account of primary continua.
The section in which he talks about this is not so long, so we can quote it almost in full:
20We shall attempt such a construction in the next chapter.
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Brentano’s theory of contact as coincidence of boundaries is quite plausible in the
case of things that are in space, such as a blue and a red book touching each
other on a surface, or a blue and a red square touching each other on a line.
But can the boundaries that make up space itself coincide? More generally, can
the boundaries constitutive of primary continua coincide? That the boundaries
of two things in space may coincide is one thing, but that the boundary of two
regions of space may coincide is quite another. For boundaries to coincide, several
boundaries must be at the same place. But what would it mean for a boundary
that constitutes space to be at a place? How can the very boundaries making up
space be located at places, since they are themselves constituent of places? We
are basically saying that places are located at places.
One may retort that location is a reflexive relation (Casati and Varzi 1999,
21). Places can therefore be seen as located at themselves. But whatever its
intrinsic merits (or problems), this proposal does not demonstrate the possibility
of coincidence between the boundaries of primary continua. For even if places are
located at themselves, this does not show that two places can be located at the
same place. On the contrary: if places are (exactly) located at themselves, and
if two places are exactly located at the same place, then they must be one and
the same. To show this, we just need to make the additional assumption that
places, if located, have only one exact location. One quick argument in favour of
this assumption is that places are particulars, and particulars have only one exact
location (contrary, perhaps, to universals). The argument to the effect that, if
two places are located at the same place, then they are not distinct then proceeds
as follows:
(1) Coincidence: p1 and p2 are exactly located at a p3.
(2) Reflexivity: p1 is exactly located at p1. p2 is exactly located at p2.
(3) Unicity: Every place has exactly one exact location.
(4) p1 is identical to p3. (from 1, 2, 3)
(5) p2 is identical to p3. (from 1, 2, 3)
(6) p1 is identical to p2. (from 4, 5)
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Thanks to reflexive location we may ‚find (sic) a way of holding that the
boundaries constituting space are located, but we still do not get coincidence of
boundaries. Summing up: either we hold that location is irreflexive, in which
case two places can never be exactly located at the same place for the reason that
places simply cannot be located. Or we accept the reflexivity of location, in which
case two places cannot be exactly located at the same place for the reason that
they fuse into one place. Either way, two places can never be located at the same
place. The relation of coincidence, therefore, must hold between things which
exist in space: it cannot hold between constituents of space. If this is right, any
coincidence-based account of primary continua is doomed to fail. (Massin (2018),
pp. 22-23)
As we can see, this is a very detailed presentation of what seems to be a reasonably airtight
logical argument. The problem, however, is that every logical argument must start from a set of
premises and Massin, for the sake of his argument here, inadvertently assumes several premises that
are quite foreign to Brentano’s account, most noticeably the background structural assumption that
“boundaries are located at some place”.
For Brentano, boundaries of primary spatial continua — and more specifically, 0-dimensional
boundaries of such continua, called points — are the possible places in this primary continuum.
What we have is the possibility of defining a relation of “colocation” between these boundaries,
which, being an equivalence relation, logically yields an equivalence class construction of some
abstract “location entity” that is just the equivalence class of all boundaries collocated with some
fixed original boundary. However, this abstract entity, which is called p3 in Massin’s argument, in a
notation that ensures the reader that it is actually of the same nature as the collocated boundaries
p1 and p2, is not at a par with the boundaries themselves — it is an even more abstract entity. All
of this confusion is, according to Massin, supposed to be justified by the fact that
places are particulars, and particulars have only one exact location (contrary,
perhaps, to universals). (Ibid.)
This assumption that places are particular is, however, simply in contradiction to an explicit
claim by Brentano, viz. that
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[b]ecause a boundary, even when itself continuous, can never exist except as be-
longing to something continuous of more dimensions (indeed receives its fully
determinate and exactly specific character only through the manner of this belong-
ingness), it is, considered for itself, nothing other than a universal, to which—as
to other universals—more than one thing can correspond. And the geometer’s
proposition that only one straight line is conceivable between two points, is strictly
speaking false if one conceives the matter in terms of lines of incomplete plerosis
whose pleroses, even though they coincide with one another, relate to different
sides. (1988, p. 8)
This passage, indeed, seems to suggest that “places” — or, in Brentano’s technical terminology that
is based on Aristotelian assumptions, “boundaries” — are universals, which might in their turn
be instantiated by a particular (outer or inner) boundary that is fully determined by the actual
concrete continuum — whether primary or secondary — it bounds.
Thus, we have to disagree with Massin and say that there is no problem with Brentano’s account
regarding the possibility of boundaries of primary continua to coincide. This is not to say, though,
that there is absolutely no difference between this coincidence in the usual case of higher-order
continua and in the particular case of primary continua. In fact, there is a deep difference between
them, that was already touched upon in the last section, viz. the fact that, whereas coincidence of
boundaries in the case of higher order continua grounds the contiguity of these two continua, i.e.,
the fact that they touch, in the case of primary continua it grounds true fusion of the two continua
into some larger new primary continuum.
This difference, however, is, according to Brentano, simply a consequence of the homogeneity of
primary continua; and, in our view, instead of offering a challenge to Brentano’s account, it simply
makes it more clearly in sync with Aristotle’s original position.
5. Are continua gunky?
In the past few decades, some of the questions that Brentano was wrestling with have been
restated in terms of a notion of “gunk”. In general, gunky substances can be defined as substances
that have what Brentano — coming from the Aristotelian tradition — would call infinite divisibility.
In other words, a gunky substance is something that can always be split, no matter how many
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times we have split it in the past, never reaching a final indivisible entity, like the ones assumed to
ultimately constitute a continua in the set-theoretical mathematical account that, as we saw, was
the one being criticized by Brentano. In David Lewis’ words, a “gunky” individual is
[a]n individual whose parts all have further proper parts. (1991, p. 20)
However, it seems that the ascription to Brentano of an account of continua that accepts some
kind of “gunky substance”, although surely a natural move in light of what Brentano has to say
on the subject, is not, according to the current literature, so simple. Massin, for instance, in his
aforementioned paper, presents an alleged dilemma that Brentano must face with his account. He
says that
Brentano’s account of continua faces an unattractive dilemma:
• Either continua consist entirely of boundaries, but then (1) it is impossible
to destroy any part of a continuum without modifying all the rest of it (due to the
essential dependence of boundaries); and (2) extension becomes impossible (due
to transitivity of coincidence and the view that continuity can only stem from
coincidence).
• Or continua consist of atomless gunk surrounded by a bounding skin, but
then (1) continuous transitions are hard to accommodate; (2) some entities —open
gunk, that is, gunk in abstraction from its boundary— begin without having any
beginning point. Further, the contact between the skin of the bodies and their
gunky interior remains unaccounted for. (Massin (2018), p. 28)
Notwithstanding this clear analysis of the logical space covered by this question, he nonetheless fails
to provide an interpretation of Brentano’s view regarding it. The most he does is to refer the reader
to a possible answer that is provided by Zimmerman (1996b), without claiming it to be the correct
one. Indeed, he even seems to suggest that this interpretation runs into some problems, which are
characterized in the second horn of the dilemma.
Now, we shall see that these problems are indeed solvable and that, as Zimmerman himself
recognizes, Brentano’s account, as understood by him in terms of his “bounded gunk” approach, is
consistent. This approach is, for Zimmerman, to understand that
Brentano believes that extended objects are wholes composed of two radically
different kinds of parts: (1) extended parts, which, though infinitely divisible into
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extended parts within extended parts, ad infinitum, cannot be “infinitely divided”
(even “in thought”) into a set of simple parts; and (2) non-extended (zero-, one-,
and two-dimensional) parts which are necessarily present at or along the inner
and outer boundaries of every extended part. (1996b, p. 28)
This enumeration of possible classes of parts fails, however, to account for Brentano’s whole
position. Were this all there was to say on the matter, then this account would indeed run into the
problems raised by Massin, viz. the difficulty of explaining continuous transitions and, especially,
the difficulty involved in dealing with open regions and their supposed “contact” with their indivisible
boundaries. But it so happens that, for Brentano, these two constituents of reality are not merely
independent parts that normally seem to accompany each other in reality, but actually complexly
related complementary parts. For instance, let us consider the second problem raised by Massin,
viz. the “weird” open entities problem. In Brentano’s picture, these entities simply would not have
to be accounted for, so that their weird properties would not amount to a problem for his account.
On the contrary, from Brentano’s perspective, their presence in the usual point-set topological
account is precisely what makes this theory “monstruous”; they are the entities that cause all
the problems. Conversely, on Brentano’s account, these entities do not even exist; they might be
abstractly considered as objects of thought, but they cannot exist in reality in abstraction from
their boundaries. In this sense, nothing can “begin without having any beginning point”, as Massin
correctly claims the open entities do. For any possible denizen of reality, its beginning points are
always there as some of its (external) boundaries, which might be abstracted from the whole by some
cognizant subject — just as one does when one considers the notion of a dog in abstraction from
the particular characteristics of this particular dog one is looking at —, but never truly separated in
reality from its underlying “open” gunky counterpart. Everything in the world is closed; everything
has boundaries and, although one might consider a part of something in abstraction from these
boundaries, that is all there is to it: a fictitious abstraction from something real and not something
that can serve as a counterexample to Brentano’s account of continuous reality.
Moreover, it is interesting to realize how widespread this misconception is with authors trying
to interpret Brentano’s account. For example, we have Smith (1996) say that
[s]ome entities are what we might call tangential to, i.e. such as to touch or cross
the exterior boundaries of, other entities. Some entities are themselves boundaries
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of other entities, though we note that the boundary of an entity may be outside
the entity it bounds (as for example in the case of an open interval in the real
line) (p. 290)
Although Smith surely recognizes that, according to Brentano,
boundaries exist only as boundaries, i.e. that boundaries are dependent partic-
ulars: entities which are such that, as a matter of necessity, they do not exist
independently of the entities they bound[,] (Ibid., p. 295)
this seems to be simply an empty rhetorical recognition, whose consequences are not really taken into
account. Note, indeed, how in the first quote, boundaries are taken to be precisely “an entity just like
any other”, an approach that is radically different from Brentano’s very strict distinction between
homogeneous portions of space and their boundaries — which are, for him, wholly dependent on
the continua they bound and just as abstract as universals.
Indeed, Baumgartner and Simons (1994) say, regarding Brentano’s increasingly strict ontological
position, that
In his mature work Brentano held strongly to a view which was already prefigured
in the dissertation, according to which ontologists should only deal with concrete
things (“the thinglike, as it really is”), so that expressions which purport to refer
to something which is not a concrete thing are not “authentic” but “fictionalizing”
(fingierend). (pp. 63-64)
In this context, we can understand that, for Brentano, the boundaries of continua are not one of
these “thinglike” entities that “really are”; they are merely abstract parts of truly existing bodies
and have an analogous being to any other universal that is instantiated by some particular truly
existing body.21
Something analogous holds for the alleged “contact problem” between boundaries and their
gunky interiors. The problem would be that, when one recognizes that reality is composed of both
gunky substances and their boundaries, one would still need to define a “contact relation” between
these parts which would somehow justify there not being anything else between them, or something
21As the authors of the last quote also note in this regard, Brentano in his 1869 essay “Auguste Comte und die
positive Philosophie", in (Brentano 1968), pp. 99-133, warns against the danger of an “entity-fictionalizing mode of
explanation" (p.127), which would be precisely what is involved in these accounts of gunky continua that put their
boundaries on a par with the whole material bodies which are bounded by these boundaries.
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of this sort. However, just as in the solution to the last problem, when we are assuming the existence
of these two radically different constituents of reality, we are not conceiving of them as independent
entities that enter into relations like contact with one another and thus somehow “form” reality —
like two objects that are indeed in contact and thus form a composite reality; we are, on the contrary,
assuming that these classes of entities have very specific dependence relations on top of which one
might, e.g., logically construct a contact relation, that explains the usual intuitive contact intuitions
we have. But note, that this contact relation holds exclusively between actual fully independent
denizens of reality, viz. whole bodies, which are themselves closed and composed, in Brentano’s
account, of an inseparable communion of some gunky interior with its respective boundaries. And
this communion is not to be explained in the same way that contact between bodies is supposed to
be; much on the contrary, whatever relation that holds between a gunky interior and its boundaries
is not “external” in the sense of a contingent relation that must be explained by means of deeper
concepts — like contact between bodies is in the Brentanian account — but as something that
is “internal” in the sense of something that pertains to the very nature of reality and must hold
as a matter of necessity. It is not something we need to justify, but it is the very justification of
real topological relations such as contact between bodies. In fact, Rush Rhees, who studied the
philosophy of Brentano under Kastil, states this last thesis very clearly as follows:
I think we must agree that it is necessary to know what is meant by the side of
the one body and the side of the other before we can understand what is meant
by their contact. (Erbacher, C. and Schirmer, T. (2017), p. 15)
Furthermore, this point is, not justified, but explained by Brentano with his distinction be-
tween something being a plurality — like a deck of cards or a space in the set-theoretical pointy
conception of it — and something being a multiplicity. This last notion is used by Brentano exactly
to characterize the way in which a great number of boundaries are to be identified as somehow
pertaining to a given continuum in opposition to how the cards in a deck are a plurality of parts of
the deck. Indeed, Brentano says that
[w]e cannot conceive a continuum as a discrete infinite plurality, for it may be
demonstrated that the latter concept involves a contradiction. But we certainly
can conceive a continuum as a continuous multiplicity [V ielheit]. Indeed we can
conceive it as a continuous multiplicity of boundaries. The boundaries do not exist
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in and for themselves and therefore no boundary can itself be an actual thing [ein
Reales]. But boundaries stand in continuous relation with other boundaries and
are real to the extent that they truly contribute to the reality of the continuum.
(Brentano (1981), p. 55)
More precisely, he carachterizes the relationship between a certain continuum and its boundaries in
the following way:
every boundary is likewise a conditio sine qua non of the whole continuum. The
boundary contributes to the existence of the continuum. This case of the boundary
differs from that of the part: the boundary is nothing by itself and therefore it
cannot exist prior to the continuum; and any finite part of the continuum could
exist prior to the continuum. [...] No boundary can exist without being connected
with a continuum. Therefore the continuum is also a conditio sine qua non of the
boundary. But there is no specifiable part, however small, of the continuum, and
no point, however near it may be to the boundary, which is such that we may say
that it is the existence of that part or of that point which conditions the boundary.
(Ibid., p. 56)
And Rhees, who one might recognize as the first philosopher to understand and further develop
Brentano’s account of continua, has the following to say about this topic:
What I want to suggest is that a surface is not something which has a relation
to a body; or at any rate that it is misleading to put it in this way. It cannot
properly be described as the bearer of a relation “in” which it “stands” to the
body. It is better to say that it is itself something relative and essentially belongs
to the body. [...] It seems to me better to say that a surface is itself something
relative rather than to say that a surface is “essentially connected with” something
else, chiefly because the type of “connection” to which we should wish to refer by
such an expression would be just what we call “being a surface” (Erbacher, C. and
Schirmer, T. (2017), pp. 25-26)
It seems, however, that precisely this confusion has creeped into the discussion with the passing
of the years. Indeed, Chisholm (1983), perhaps the first contemporary paper on the issue, had
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already a clear conception of this distinction, recognizing it as one of the possible ways of going
about defining the notion of a boundary:
There are two ways of defining boundary. We could appeal to the fact that a
boundary is a dependent particular — a thing which is necessarily such that it is
a constituent of something. Or we could appeal to the fact that a boundary is a
thing that is capable of coinciding with something that is discrete from it. One
of these should be a definition and the other an axiom. (Chisholm (1983), p. 90)
Note that Chisholm does indeed start with a general notion of a “thing” and then splits this domain
into two by one of the two possible definition of boundary. However, he never claims that the
question as to how these two essentially distinct kinds of things interact makes any sense; on the
contrary, he recognizes that the two subsets of possible things, which he calls “constituents that are
not proper parts” and “proper parts”, have the intrinsic relation to which we referred above, so that
not even
God could remove just the surface of a three dimensional object. (Ibid., p. 91)
This surface is just not something that can exist in isolation.
It is also interesting to note that this distinction is perhaps the main distinction in Husserl’s
theory of parts and wholes, which surely sprang from Husserl’s study under Brentano and eventually
led to the creation of the mereological aproach to ontology that, in its turn, let to the interest in
point-free constructions of space such as the one we are considering here. Indeed, in the very begining
of his third Logcal Investigation, which is devoted to the topic of parts and wholes, Husserl says:
The difference between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ contents, which is plainly the
same as Stumpf’s distinction between dependent (non-independent) and independent
contents, is most important for all phenomenological investigations; we must, it
seems, therefore, first of all submit it to a thorough analysis. As said in my
previous Investigation, this distinction, which first showed up in the field of the
descriptive psychology of sense-data, could be looked on as a special case of a uni-
versal distinction. It extends beyond the sphere of conscious contents and plays
an extremely important role in the field of objects as such. The systematic place
for its discussion should therefore be in the pure (a priori) theory of objects as
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such, in which we deal with ideas pertinent to the category of object. (Husserl
(1970), v.2, p. 3)
Sadly, though, Chisholm in his (1994) paper, in which he tries to present a thorough account
of this distinction between dependent and independent entities, distanced himself greatly from the
Brentanian account by simply abiding to the, as we said, now pretty much standard view in the
literature according to which boundaries are particulars. Surely, one has to take into consideration
that Chisholm’s goal in this second paper was not to recapture Brentano’s position, but to use the
latter’s ideas to come up with a new account that was indeed properly his own. However, I believe
that, in mentioning Brentano as he was presenting his views, together with the fact that many
crucial concepts in his new account do indeed resonate strongly with Brentano’s position, this led
to a misrepresentation in the contemporary philosophical community of Brentano’s own position
regarding continua and their dependent universal-like boundaries.
6. Tension between gunky spaces and measure theory
Besides the possible objections discussed above, there is one more that is to be found in the
literature against the type of point-free topology we have recognized in Brentano’s account. Indeed,
in his (2012) paper, Arntzenius suggests the general result that any attempt to construct a countably
additive measure on a point-free space would yield inconsistencies. Indeed, according to him,
[t]he main problem is that on the topological approach to gunk one is ignoring
differences that are much too large to be ignored, and the main idea of this
topological approach is that differences between pointy regions that differ only
on their boundaries are not real differences. This seems a fairly intuitive and
reasonable idea when one considers only pointy regions which are islands, or finite
collections of such islands, since their boundaries are ‘small’; that is, they have
measure 0. But as soon as one realizes that certain countable collections of islands,
such as the Cantor Archipelago, have boundaries that have non-zero—indeed,
arbitrarily large—measure, the whole idea no longer seems plausible. (Arntzenius
(2012), p. 145)
The idea here is that countable additivity is not usually retained by point-free topological con-
structions. His counterexample is this region he calls “the Cantor Archipelago” which, although
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poorly defined in his aforementioned paper, is indeed a valid counterexample. A better, albeit more
abstract, construction of the infringing region can be found in Russell (2008). Essentially, to carry
out the construction, we start with S0 = [0, 1]. Then, we define S1 to be the 14 long interval that
has the point 12 as its middle point. S1 then splits its complement into two equal length segments.
Take the midpoint of each of these segments and define S2 to be the union of both 116 long intervals
whose midpoints are the midpoints of these two segments composing the complement of S1. After
doing this, the complement of the union of S1 and S2 will have four disjoint equal sized parts. Take
the midpoints of each of these parts and define S3 as the union of all 164 long intervals that have as
their midpoints one of the mentioned four midpoints. Because the size of the ever larger collection
of intervals keeps getting smaller by a factor of 2, this construction does not end in a finite number




Now, the problem is that, it seems plausible that any reasonable mereological structure would
have some sort of fusion or union operator that satisfies the intuition that the fusion or union of all
the Cantor sets Sn, n > 0, is precisely the interval S0 we started with. However, while our intuition
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We shall not go further into the technical details of this here, but we should note that, whereas
the earlier arguments against a Brentanian approach simply failed to appreciate some important
details about it, this one seems to point at a truly deeper incompatibility between point-free accounts
of topology and countably-additive measures.
On the other hand, if one remembers that Brentano’s goal was not to understand the abstract
concept of a continuous space in general but to present an account of a particular class of continuous
spaces that are presented to us throughout our daily intuitions, then it might not seem too strange
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to restrict the respective notion of mereological union simply to a finite class of regions and to reject
infinite such fusions.
7. Teleosis
Another seemingly novel notion introduced by Brentano in the context of this account of continua
and boundaries is the notion of teleosis, which is introduced originally in relation to the temporal
dimension that would have to be recognized in corporeal 3-dimensional objects if one were to be
able to talk about change regarding these objects. Indeed, the very word “teleosis” is paraphrased
by Brentano as “velocity of change”. Moreover, Brentano believes that this notion of teleosis is much
more important and widespread. In his view, this is
a concept which is of the utmost importance for the understanding of the con-
tinuum and in particular for the phenomena which occur in the case of multiple
continua. (1988, p. 18)
However, it seems that his own paraphrase of the concept of teleosis as “velocity of change” is,
on the one hand, not quite that accurate and, on the other, indicative of the fact that this notion is
not that revolutionary. Indeed, the notion of telosis does have something to do with how fast some
property relating to the continuum is changing, but the way that Brentano speaks seems to imply
that the teleosis of a certain continuum is not its velocity of change per se, but something like the
inverse of this velocity. In fact, he says the following:
Imagine a sphere which is at one moment fully at rest in a given place, at a later
moment rotating within the boundaries of this place. In the first case it is clear
that in regard to its temporal dimension the sphere exists in full local teleosis. [...]
The local teleosis in the temporal dimension appears therefore to be incomplete in
the case of a rotating sphere, and this incompleteness increases with the velocity
of rotation. (Ibid., p. 21)
From this passage, we can conclude that he ascribes full teleosis to a the stationary sphere, i.e.,
to the one whose “velocity of change” is zero, and incomplete teleosis to the one that rotates, thus
having non-zero “velocity of change”. Moreover, in relation to the example we considered at section
3.4.3, he says that
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[t]he moment of rest will be a moment of rest in the same sense in which a red
line in a coloured surface which varies in regular fashion from pure blue to pure
red and then back to pure blue is truly to be called pure red. It remains however
no less correct that it is still to be distinguished from a pure red which belongs
as internal boundary to a purely red surface. Indeed, certain differences will still
exist in the manner in which the momentarily resting body is at rest, according
to whether the motion which leads thereto and departs therefrom is subject to
a more or less strong acceleration. [...] When it rests momentarily it is truly at
rest, but at rest in a more incomplete teleosis than when it remains at rest for a
period of time. And the completeness of teleosis in what is momentarily at rest
decreases also if the motion to which it leads in infinitesimal fashion accelerates
more powerfully from the very start. (Ibid., p. 22)
The idea here is the following: let us consider a given primary continuum, which for simplicity
will be be a line ab. Then, we can build on top of this primary continuum a plethora of different
secondary continua, which can all however be formally described by a certain real-valued continuous
function f on the points — i.e., on all the possible inner or outer boundaries — of the original
primary continuum. More concretely, this function might stipulate the color of that particular
point, or its temperature etc. Now, this function is — apart from the assumption of, at least,
(usual, mathematical) piece-wise continuity — completely arbitrary, so that we can consider two
radically different possibilities. First, let us assume that this function f is constant. This is, for
instance, akin to the higher-dimensional case of the “purely red surface”. In this case, we shall
have full teleosis for every point on the line with respect to this preassigned function. Moreover,
every point with full teleosis with respect to some function f must be part of a finitely extended
region in which the function in question is constant, so that we can draw a parallel — indeed, a
sort of equivalence — between the notion of “having full teleosis with respect to some property” and
the notion of “having zero derivative with respect to some function”. The latter is a mathematical
characterization of the former, and the former is an intuitive appreciation of the latter.
On the other hand, we can think about the function f as varying. If this variation is smooth,
then we characterize it by means of a differentiable function, i.e., by means of a function that
possesses a derivative for each of the points of the primary continuum. This is the example of “a
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coloured surface which varies in regular fashion from pure blue to pure red and then back to pure
blue”. To spell it out, this case can be modeled in our simplified case of a 1-dimensional primary
contiunuum by a function taking values on the interval [0, 1] — 0 standing for blue, 1 for red and
all the numbers in between for the infinite hues in between — such that f(a) = 0, f(c) = 1 and
f(b) = 0, where c is the midpoint between a and b— ab being a curve that cuts through the surface
in the direction in which the color change is taking place.
Let us note, again, how the notions of teleosis, on the one hand, and of derivative, on the other,
are inversely correlated. Having full teleosis is equivalent to having zero derivative. However,
otherwise these two notions seem to serve the same role in the characterization of secondary continua,
which are modeled by (piece-wise) continuous functions on the primary continuum. Indeed, a further
clue that this is indeed so is the fact that, in the canonical application of the differential calculus
to classical mechanics, the derivative of a function is precisely called something like its “velocity
of change”.22 Therefore, since Brentano himself paraphrases his notion of teleosis as “velocity of
change”, it seems clear that this relation with the derivative of mathematical analysis is, if not
something that Brentano had explicitly in his mind when providing his account, certainly a logical
fact that allows us to say at least that, although not fully realized by Brentano himself, his account
seems to rediscover the usefulness of the notion of the derivative for the study of continua, which
is, for instance, the background assumption for the discipline of differential geometry.
Of course, the notion of a derivative is much more formally accurate and technically oriented
than Brentano’s notion of teleosis, but the latter certainly seems to have as goal to capture, in the
restricted domain of continua that can be given in intuition, the same kind of property that is also
captured by the much more abstract notion of a derivative.23 This again, confirms the overall view
of the project as a very interesting account given by a very capable thinker who had some, but
nonetheless did not have much intimacy with the new mathematical developments of the century
that preceded his life.
22In fact, in the case in which a certain function portrays the position of some particle, its derivative is literaly
identified with its velocity.
23Perhaps a further constraint to consider here is that we are only considering real valued functions for the secondary
continua. An interesting line of inquiry to pursue, might be to understand if and how this generalizes for, e.g., functions
having values in Rn or some even more general space.
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8. Conclusion
Brentano’s account of continua is, as we mentioned in the beginning, essentially an account
of something like “the continua that are presented to us in spatio-temporal intuition” and not an
abstract and fully general account of what it is to be a continuum. Thus, with the help of the
later developments in mathematical topology, we can characterize his account, not as a brand
new conception of topology as a general discipline, but certainly as a very interesting and self-
consistent account of something like the “real” or “phenomenological” topology of the “real” or
“phenomenologically present” continua in spatial-temporal intuition. Going back to our discussion
in the second chapter, we can further clarify this claim as the statement that Brentano’s account
is not at the level of the definition of a topology as the collection of all open sets satisfying some
axiomatic properties, but at the level of the choice one has to make as to what is going to be the
“usual topology” that we have to use in order to characterize the actual continua that are given to
us in spatio-temporal intuition. And one must certainly say that, in this restricted scope, it surely
succeeds as a very interesting and consistent account, having many interesting connection points
with issues in ontology, such as e.g. issues regarding the notion of contact.
In this respect, we can locate Brentano’s theory on the same logical region as the one proposed
by, e.g., N. M. Gotts, J. M. Gooday, and A. G. Cohn (1996). In this paper, they describe their
account as follows:
The main rationale for this project is that qualitative descriptions of spatial prop-
erties and relationships, and qualitative spatial reasoning, are of fundamental im-
portance in human thinking about the world: even where quantitative spatial data
are most important (as for example in architecture, engineering and medicine),
they must be attached to the components of a perceived spatial structure (of walls
and floors, girders, bodily organs or cells) if we are to make use of them. RCC
theory covers other qualitative aspects of spatial description and reasoning (in
particular, it deals with the notion of convexity), but the topological properties
and relations of spatially extended entities are fundamental to our work. The
topological formalisms used by mathematicians are, in general, not well suited
to the task of formalising the kinds of ‘common-sense’ or ‘everyday’ qualitative
spatial description and reasoning which are our primary interest. Nevertheless, we
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must come to grips with the concepts of topology as practised by mathematicians
if we are not to risk constantly ‘reinventing wheels’. (1996, p. 51)
Also, a few pages later, they come back to this point, saying that
topology as developed by mathematicians over the last century is relatively remote
from the kinds of spatial reasoning employed in everyday life. Its central aims are
to investigate, and prove results concerning the properties of entire classes of
spaces, while ours are to find perspicuous ways to represent and reason about the
topological properties and relations of spatially extended entities embedded in the
space of everyday experience. (Ibid., p. 53)
I believe we should take this point seriously, not to tear down the edifice of mathematical
topology, but to understand that its scopes are different from a thorough characterization of how
continua are presented in our spatio-temporal intuition, which, as this 22 year old paper seems to
suggest, is still very open to further development.
A similar opinion is voiced by Russell (2008). In it, he says that
[a] third reason to investigate gunky space is to formalize the psychology of space.
Regardless of whether phenomena like perfect contact are physically or even meta-
physically possible, they surely play into “common sense” spatial reasoning. Rigor-
ously capturing this kind of reasoning is important for formal semantics, cognitive
science, and artificial intelligence. (p. 250)
Moreover, I believe Brentano’s account of continua can surely serve itself as a very solid starting
point from whence such a development can take place. Thus, a possible interesting development of
the work presented in this monograph would be an attempt at a formal reconstruction of this account
as to further understand its logical relationship with the formal mereotopological theories that have
been proposed in the literature. This will perhaps serve as the topic of a future paper on the
issue, presenting how the Brentanian intuitions regarding these notions can serve as a background
framework for interesting formal point-free versions of a topology for space.
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